THE 1944 FOOD PROGRAM

Report to

WAR MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE

Submitted by

U. S. WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATION

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December 16, 1943

C O N T E N T S

A P P E N D I C E S

I THE PROBLEMS AND THE OBJECTIVES

The Problems

The Axis during the early days of the war deprived the United Nations of vast areas of agricultural land. Japan's conquests meant the loss of large quantities of rice, vegetable oils, sugar and many other foods. Russia lost the area which before the war produced about 40 percent of her food. The occupation of Europe deprived Britain of an important source of meat, eggs, butter, cheese and other foods. The drastic shipping shortage made difficult the international distribution of the food supplies that remained.

Strategically located between the European and Pacific theaters of war, the United States has been called upon to contribute heavily toward making up the deficits in the food supplies of her allies in addition to meeting her own expanded wartime needs.

But for decades the United States has produced food primarily for domestic consumption. Only a small fraction of the total production has been exported, and these exports have constituted a very small part of the food moving in world trade. In fact, food imports exceeded the exports of food or commodities used for food from this country in each year from 1922 through 1941. This country cannot possibly be expected suddenly, or even ultimately, to become the food basket of the United Nations.

Furthermore, expanding food production would be relatively easier if an ample supply of labor, machinery, tools, fertilizer and other supplies could be had as needed. With a reduced labor supply and with the demands for guns, planes, ammunition and ships curtailing the supply of new equipment, increased food production is not easy of accomplishment.

In addition, as military operations are expanded and as Axis-occupied areas are liberated, total food needs are likely to become still larger.

However, American farmers are accepting the challenge to play a major role in producing the food that the United Nations must have.

The Objectives

In this situation, what are the objectives of the food program? They may be stated as follows:

(1) to use in the production and distribution of food, such quantities of the nation's total resources as can contribute more to the war effort in this employment than they could in any alternative employments,

(2) to use these resources with the maximum efficiency in supplying the kinds and quantities of commodities that yield the highest returns in terms of essential needs, and

(3) to secure a distribution of food, internationally among all countries depending upon it in their war effort and internally among all domestic groups,

which will insure the greatest practical equity in sharing and the best use toward winning the war.

To realize these objectives, production must be adjusted in such a way as to concentrate on those enterprises which yield largest quantities of needed nutrients in relation to the amount of labor and other critical resources used in production and distribution, while recognizing that shifts between farm enterprises have very important physical limitations, especially if they are to be made in a year or two, and that eating habits are strongly established and are not changed radically without serious difficulties.

In the distribution of our food supplies all needs, domestic, military and foreign, must be carefully evaluated so that insofar as possible every pound of food will go where it is most urgently needed. United States supplies must be considered in relation to supplies available elsewhere, and production resources in all areas accessible to the United Nations should be drawn upon to the fullest possible extent. The importance of domestic food needs must not be overlooked. United States production of war materials is a factor of steadily increasing importance, and adequate food is essential to morale and production efficiency.

Until quite recently, the importance of allocating a sufficient portion of the Nation's productive resources, including labor and materials, to food production has been greatly underestimated by many not familiar with food needs or food production. Perhaps they have been lulled to sleep by the erroneous assumption that the agricultural surpluses of the thirties signified that we had inexhaustible reserves of food and capacity to produce it. To these, the events of the last six months have been a rude awakening. Until the war is won we can no longer afford to neglect any of the action needed to achieve an all-out food program. The specific programs designed to accomplish this objective are described in succeeding sections of this report.

II REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET FROM 1944 PRODUCTION

Wartime demands upon the agricultural production capacity of the Nation are so great that it is vitally important for all resources to be distributed between the various farm enterprises in accordance with the relative urgency of the needs for the different products.

Farmers are already well along in planning their 1944 crop production as well as their livestock breeding and feeding operations. Some crops are already planted for harvest next year. Crops produced in 1944 will provide the supplies of many foods through most of 1945. Hence, in developing the production program for 1944, it is necessary to project requirements for at least two years into the future. Actually the work of estimating requirements to be met from 1944 production began last spring. It must be remembered, too, that planned food production cannot be executed with the same exactness and degree of finality as that of most industrial products, for at least two reasons: the six million individual production plants (farms) and the weather, over which we have no control.

As total wartime demands have outrun supplies of first one food and then another, it has become necessary to examine all requests and needs and to allocate currently available supplies as equitably as possible among the many claimants. Many adjustments have been made by the military services and by the recipients of lend-lease aid as well as by United States civilians in both quantities and kinds of food used. In this way it has been possible for most essential nutritional and dietary needs to be met even though each claimant has not received all kinds of foods in the quantities desired. This experience in allocating supplies has provided a most useful background for estimating future needs.

Estimates have been prepared covering all essential needs of our own civilians and military services as well as those needs of our Allies which can be met most economically from United States supplies. These estimates are not intended to include any more than the basic needs that can be anticipated with a reasonable degree of certainty. While it would be desirable to have more food than is indicated by these figures, they still call for even greater production than the record high level of 1943. These requirement estimates are discussed in more detail below and the figures presented in Appendix A. These tables include civilian and non-civilian requirements for both food and non-food uses of farm products. They show prospective imports, changes in stocks, and finally total requirements to be met from production. Supplementary tables, Appendix B, show the breakdown of non-civilian requirements by major claimants.

Civilian Requirements

Since the major part of our agricultural production is consumed by the civilian population, estimating civilian needs is of primary importance. One approach might be to estimate how much of each food would be purchased by consumers at the prices and with the income level expected to prevail in 1944 and 1945. The result would be larger quantities of most foods than have ever been consumed before in this country. The increases would be greatest

for the more highly prized and expensive foods such as milk, meat, eggs, and fresh fruits and vegetables. This fact is clearly evident from the upward trend in consumption of these foods during 1941 and 1942 until supplies began to run short of demand for some of them.

While it is important for the civilian food supply to be adequate to maintain the health, vigor and morale of the population, it is not necessary that enough food be available to satisfy the current high level of demand for all kinds of food. After our essential military and civilian food needs have been met, any additional food that can be produced will contribute more toward winning the war if it is made available to our fighting allies who need it urgently.

Meat is a relatively expensive food to produce from the standpoint of its nutritional value, and yet it is a very important element in the American diet. Requirements are estimated at the level of consumption under the present ration program (about 2 lbs. per person per week, retail weight). This level is known to be adequate nutritionally, and has been tested by the experience of the current year. Requirements for fats and oils are likewise estimated at the current ration level. This again is above specific nutritional needs for fats and oils and has been found by experience to meet the distribution test of being generally available to all consumers at the ration level.

A different basis was used in estimating requirements for eggs and poultry meat. It is generally recognized that it would be extremely difficult to ration these foods successfully; and without rationing a short supply would create serious distribution problems. Therefore, the requirements have been estimated on the basis of the quantities expected to be taken without limitations on use. The 1943 level of consumption was used for this purpose. Thus chicken and eggs would be generally available as protein foods to supplement meat.

Dairy products are extremely important in the civilian food supply because they are excellent sources of several of the essential nutrients. They are especially important to children and nursing and expectant mothers. Furthermore, dairy production represents a relatively efficient use of feed if all of the nutrients in the milk are used as food. It is recognized that milk production during the next year is determined within rather narrow limits by the present number of cows. Therefore, requirements are estimated at about the level of consumption this year even though it would be desirable to have a larger quantity.

As usual the current level of production of cereals is well above the domestic needs for human foods. Since cereals represent one of the most economical sources of nutrients, food requirements are estimated on the basis of the quantities likely to be consumed with no restrictions (about 10 percent increase over this year for wheat).

Potatoes, sweetpotatoes, dry beans and dry peas are crops which yield a high return in nutrients in relation to the land, labor and other resources used in their production. Hence it is the policy that these foods should be available in ample supply to meet all demands for them. Thus they would be available to fill in any gaps resulting from shortages of other foods. Requirements are estimated on the basis of unrationed consumption.

Requirements for processed fruits and vegetables are estimated at approximately the level of current consumption under the rationing program. One exception is made in the case of canned tomatoes for which the need for a larger quantity is indicated because of the importance of tomatoes as a source of Vitamin C. Since it is believed to be impractical to ration fresh vegetables and fruit, requirements are estimated as the quantity necessary to permit reasonably satisfactory national distribution without ration controls.

The requirement for sugar was determined to provide a level of consumption slightly above the quantity that would be used in 1943. Some increase in imports is expected as the shipping situation improves, but it is doubtful if sugar should be provided in greater quantities in view of the need for sugar for non-food purposes.

These civilian requirements as a whole have been tested as to their nutritional adequacy as well as to their suitability from a dietary standpoint. They would provide reasonably well for all groups with special needs. Problems of distribution have been taken into account. While supplies of some foods would be less than unrestricted demand, other foods would be available in ample supply so that everyone would have enough good and nutritious food to satisfy his needs.

Military Services Requirements

The various military services have estimated their needs from this country by deducting estimated procurement from other sources (e.g. meat and fresh vegetables in Australia) from their total needs. The military services have gained considerable experience in estimating their needs since the early days of the war. Their representatives have participated in allocation meetings with representatives of the War Food Administration and the other claimants thereby becoming acquainted with the supply situation, the shortages, and the kind of adjustments that are called for. Studies have been made of waste and ways to prevent it. Their estimates of requirements are taken for production planning purposes as essential needs that should be met.

Military requirements, in general, reach their peak in the early part of 1944 and then level off or even decline slightly. This is because stocks will have been built up to the approximate level necessary to support the maximum number of men to be sent overseas. When stocks no longer have to be increased, requirements will be approximately equal to current consumption. There is a change in the kind of products needed as a larger proportion of the forces move overseas. Canned or dried fruits and vegetables largely replace fresh supplies. Processed meat replaces fresh, and other changes to less perishable and more concentrated types of foods are necessary.

Lend-Lease Requirements

Food is made available to our Allies to help feed their fighting men and the civilians at home who produce the materials of war. For a time, it was possible to supply all of the food that our Allies could lift with the shipping available to them. They were in the position of choosing between guns, tanks, or ammunition and food as cargoes for the ships. Gradually, more

shipping became available, and in many cases the supply situation rather than shipping became the limiting factor. By negotiation and adjustments among the various claimants, the supply program of each has become fairly well established. The United Kingdom, for example, is able to provide a nutritionally adequate but a very economical and monotonous food supply for her people through increased and carefully balanced domestic production, lend-lease from the United States and imports from other countries. Our contribution is a small but vital part of the total. Requirements for 1944 and 1945 have been estimated as the quantities necessary to continue the United Kingdom supply program at approximately the current level. This will enable the British to maintain rationed foods at the present ration levels. Any substantial reduction in shipments would make adjustments in the rations necessary.

In the case of Russia, the second largest recipient of lend-lease, shipping has been the most important factor limiting the volume of aid. The Russian needs for food are large, but they must make the choice between food and guns so their takings of food are limited mostly to concentrated energy foods for the Red Army. Their requirements were estimated on the basis of a continuation of present requests although it is certain that much more food would be needed to provide the Russians with an adequate food supply. Already there have been large increases in Russian wheat and sugar requests.

Other Lend-Lease Requirements

Relatively small quantities of lend-lease food are going to North Africa, Greece, Australia, British Caribbean islands, Iceland, West Africa, and several other countries. Many of these countries are bases for Allied military operations. The quantities of food are relatively small, but in each case they meet a definite need and are directly related to the conduct of the war. Requirements to be met from 1944 production are estimated at approximately the level of current shipments.

Liberated Areas Requirements

Great uncertainty attaches to the food needs for the liberated countries, both as to extent of the needs and time when they will arise. However, there can be little doubt that considerable needs will confront us in 1944 and 1945. Experience in North Africa and Italy has demonstrated that meeting the most urgent food needs in liberated areas is a military necessity.

Estimates of total needs from external sources for the liberated areas of Europe, prepared by OFFRO, were available. These estimates were intended to indicate the quantities of food necessary to supplement local supplies and bring the total per capita food supply up to a minimum subsistence level of approximately 2,000 calories. Since this is a joint responsibility of the United Nations, only a part of the needs would be met from this country. The resulting estimates of requirements from the United States are moderate in size, totaling about three million tons in 1944 and two and one-half million tons in 1945.

Obviously, estimates of needs for liberated areas must be subject to revision from time to time. In fact, changes have been made since the estimates for goals purposes were prepared. Needs may actually be greater in 1945 than in 1944, but we should be prepared for a favorable course of military developments, which might result in greatest needs in 1944.

Neutral and Friendly Nations Requirements

Small quantities of food are exported to various neutral and friendly nations. These countries supply us with other kinds of food and with other commodities which we need. This trade is mutually advantageous, especially since pre-war sources of the supply of many products have been cut off. Estimates are made of the future volume of these exports of agricultural products. Likewise prospective imports are estimated so that they may be deducted from total requirements in calculating the volume of domestic production needed. In a number of areas, production of food for export is increasing, thus making available more for shipment to the United States or to other countries which we are now supplying.

U. S. Territories and Possessions Requirements

Our outlying territories and possessions, such as Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands have suffered serious disruption of their normal economic life and trade. In Puerto Rico, for example, food shipments from the mainland have been necessary to prevent starvation, rioting, and general demoralization. Continuation of such shipments is provided for in the requirement estimates.

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Total Requirements

Total requirements for some of the more important foods in 1944 and 1945 estimated in the manner described above are larger than total 1943 supplies by the percentages indicated below:

	1944	1945
All meat	6	5
Dairy Products	3	2
Edible fats, excluding butter	11	8
Eggs	4	4
Irish potatoes	14	13
Canned vegetables	8	9
Canned fruits	7	8

To the extent that imports can be increased, the increase necessary for domestic production will be reduced, but imports are not large for any of these items. It will be noted that larger requirements are indicated for most items in 1944 than in 1945. This is chiefly attributable to the trend in military and relief requirements. Military requirements are estimated to decline in 1945 because the stock building phase of the supply program will have been essentially completed, and requirements will more nearly equal current consumption. Whether relief requirements actually decline in 1945 will depend on whether they begin in volume early enough to have started to taper off by that time. No requirements for relief in the Far East have been included in these estimates.

III U. S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY

Claims on United States food supplies have to be balanced against the capacity of our agricultural production plant. This in turn is largely dependent on the amount of labor, machinery, supplies, and processing and transportation facilities allocated to agricultural production.

An appraisal of agricultural production capacity in the United States to meet the wartime need for food and other farm products has been made by representatives of the Department of Agriculture in cooperation with agricultural agencies operating in each State. In making this appraisal of production capacity, the following assumptions were made regarding the factors affecting production:

Manpower: It was assumed that up to 70,000 additional year-round workers would be available to agriculture from other occupations; that through a vigorous program of redistribution up to 250,000 underemployed farm workers would be placed on farms greatly in need of year-round help; and that extra help at peak seasons would not exceed 110 percent of the number of workers hired in the corresponding peak months of 1942.

Fertilizers: Nitrogen, 477,000 tons, enough for minimum needs; potash, 535,000 tons, probably short of minimum needs, increased production unlikely; phosphoric acid, 1,122,000 tons, probably enough for all essential needs.

Feed Grains: Net inshipments (7,123,000 tons) into Northeast, Appalachian, Southeast, South Central and West. Net outshipments (3,965,000 tons) from Great Plains, Corn Belt, Lake States. Foreign imports, 3,158,000 tons. Industrial use, 12,664,000 tons (mostly in Corn Belt, Lake States).

Insecticides, Fungicides: Supplies at least equal to 1943. A small supply of pyrethrum (4 to 5 million pounds) for agricultural and essential civilian uses. Rotenone, 4 to 5 million pounds, compared with 3½ million in 1943. Adequate supplies of nicotine sulphate (around 4 million pounds), cryolite, barium fluosilicate, copper sulphate, sulphur, and petroleum derivatives.

Seed: Despite special efforts to obtain adequate seed supplies, shortages in 1944 seem likely for cabbage, onion, beet and carrot seed, Northern grown alfalfa, alsike clover and hairy vetch.

Transportation, Processing: Number of refrigerator and heated cars same as in 1942, but generally tighter rail transportation. Moderate improvement in truck transportation. Continued scarcity of wood containers; tins and steel plate available to can at least as much in 1944 as in 1942.

On the basis of these assumptions the capacity of the agricultural plant was estimated to be as follows:

TABLE 1.--FARM LAND: ACREAGES IN PRINCIPAL USES, MAXIMUM WARTIME CAPACITY, WITH COMPARISONS

Use of Cropland	Crop Acreage		Wartime Capacity		Percentage	
	1942	1943	1944	Maximum	1944 of 1943	Maximum of 1943
	Thousand Acres				Percent	Percent
1. Corn	91,011	96,818	96,304	97,570	99	101
2. Sorghums, except sirup	15,889	17,220	16,253	16,356	94	95
3. Soybeans, grown alone	14,222	15,434	17,200	18,764	111	122
4. Cowpeas, grown alone	3,407	2,574	2,814	2,876	109	112
5. Peanuts, grown alone	4,384	5,002	6,477	8,873	129	177
6. Cotton, all	23,302	21,995	21,850	22,404	99	102
7. Tobacco, all 1/	1,379	1,471	1,466	1,448	100	98
8. Sugarcane for sugar 1/	297	304	322	326	106	107
9. Sugar beets	1,045	636	928	877	146	138
10. Irish potatoes	2,793	3,444	3,899	4,695	113	136

Use of Cropland	Crop Acreage		Wartime Capacity		Percentage	
	1942	1943	1944	Maximum	1944 of 1943	Maximum of 1943
	Thousand Acres				Percent	Percent
11. Sweet potatoes	708	923	1,093	1,609	118	174
12. Beans, dry edible	2,135	2,807	3,061	3,322	109	118
13. Processing vegetables	2,100	2,086	2,275	2,470	109	118
14. Fresh vegetables 1/	1,659	1,524	1,796	2,088	118	137
15. Other intertilled 1/	1,658	1,596	1,616	1,506	101	94
16. Total lines 1-15, inc.	165,989	173,834	177,354	185,184	102	107
17. Adjust. double crop 2/	2,872	2,488	3,736	4,315	150	173
18. Total land used for intertilled crops	163,117	171,346	173,618	180,869	101	106
19. Oats	42,662	42,654	40,222	38,835	94	91
20. Barley	19,448	17,893	18,296	18,331	102	102
21. Wheat, all	52,533	54,159	64,578	66,627	119	123
22. Rye for grain 1/	3,837	2,875	3,272	3,257	114	113
23. Flaxseed	4,691	6,289	5,687	5,864	90	93
24. Hemp, all	51	237	262	274	111	116
25. Peas, dry field	501	748	966	1,237	129	165
26. Rice	1,505	1,538	1,569	1,696	102	110
27. Buckwheat	406	499	482	474	97	95
28. Other close growing 1/	1,031	806	289	490	36	61
29. Total lines 19-28, inc.	126,665	127,698	135,623	137,085	106	107
30. Adjust. double crop. 2/	513	1,306	1,066	964	82	74
31. Total land used for close growing crops	126,152	126,392	134,557	136,121	106	108
32. Hay, all tame, except soybean, cowpea, peanut and small grain 1/	49,510	48,633	51,049	52,174	105	107
33. Seeds, hay and cover crops, all	4,492	4,428	5,352	5,997	121	135
34. Total lines 32 and 33	54,002	53,061	56,401	58,171	106	110
35. Adjust. double crop 2/	6,077	6,183	8,194	10,224	133	165
36. Total land used for hay and seed crops	47,925	46,878	48,207	47,947	103	102
37. Total land used for crops 3/	337,194	344,616	356,382	364,937	103	106

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Use of Cropland	Crop Acreage 1942	Crop Acreage 1943	Wartime Capacity 1944	Wartime Capacity Maximum	Percentage 1944 of 1943	Percentage Maximum of 1943
		Thousand Acres			Percent	Percent
38. Summer fallow and idle	50,408	46,318	36,703	32,090	79	69
39. Adjust.multiple use 2/	30	0	836	729	0	0
40. Total fallow and idle	50,378	46,318	35,867	31,361	77	68
41. Total cropland	387,572	390,934	392,249	396,298	100	101
42. Plowable pasture 4/	131,062	128,545	123,686	121,920	96	95
43. Adjust.multiple use 2/	8	16	12	10	75	62
44. Total land used for plowable pasture	131,054	128,529	123,674	121,910	96	95
45. Wild hay	6/12,533	12,436	12,482	12,543	100	101
46. Other land in farms 5/	544,820	543,794	546,943	544,706	101	100
47. Total land in farms	1,075,979	1,075,693	1,075,348	1,075,457	100	100
			Livestock			
Milk production (million lbs.)	119,240	118,302	121,700	128,544	103	109
Milk cows (1,000)	25,159	25,669	26,082	26,855	102	105
Milk per cow (pounds)	4,739	4,609	4,666	4,787	101	104
Egg production (1,000,000 doz.)	4,018	4,517	4,562	4,599	101	102
Chickens raised (1,000)	794,787	925,652	858,356	870,958	93	94
Hens and pullets (1,000)	426,226	487,089	494,159	492,094	101	101
Broilers, commercial (1,000)	204,060	248,576	198,529	201,360	80	84
Turkeys raised (1,000)	33,157	33,113	34,925	33,589	105	101
Sows to farrow, Spring (1,000)	9,657	12,140	10,158	10,068	84	83
Sows to farrow, Fall (1,000)	6,825	8,515	6,755	6,773	79	80
Cattle and calves on farm end of year (1,000)	78,170	75,415	75,253	75,697	96 7/	97 7/
Beef cows (end of yr. 1,000)	12,663	11,992	11,991	12,029	95 7/	95 7/
Sheep and lambs (end of yr., 1,000)	54,847	52,597	52,043	52,163	95 7/	95 7/
No. ewes (end of yr. 1,000)	37,335	36,247	35,960	36,243	96 7/	97 7/
Wool produced (1,000 lbs)	392,373	377,532	366,216	368,930	97	98

1/ Harvested acreage. All others are planted acreages.
2/ In making the adjustment for multiple use of land by crops within the same group and in two or more groups the first use within the crop year was considered to be the primary use.
3/ Exclusive of orchards, vineyards, small fruits, market gardens and rotation pasture.
4/ Including rotation (cropland) pasture.
5/ Including orchards, vineyards, small fruits and market gardens.
6/ Includes 4 acres in Florida.
7/ Percent 1944 of 1942 and maximum of 1942.

Unless a substantially larger proportion of the productive resources of the Nation are allocated to agriculture than now appears in prospect, total agricultural output cannot be increased more than a small percent within the next two years. The maximum increase over 1943 in the land used for crops is estimated at six percent, and with average yields, maximum agricultural production including the production of livestock products is estimated as only 3 to 4 percent over 1943.

There still exists, however, the opportunity to make additional shifts in the pattern of agricultural production so as to provide adequate food for a much larger number of people. This would involve growing more crops of the kind suited for direct consumption and reducing both feed crops and the output of livestock products. Theoretically, the nutritive value of food production could be doubled with the resources now allocated to agriculture if the quantity of livestock products in the diet of our Armed Forces, our civilians and our Allies were reduced to the minimum levels nutritionists report as being necessary to maintain the physical well-being of the population.

According to a preliminary draft report on Agriculture's Maximum Wartime Production Capacity 1/ skim milk fed to hogs returns only one-tenth as much protein in edible form as does skim milk used directly as human food. Probably 10 billion pounds or approximately one-fourth of the skim milk now fed to livestock could be utilized for human consumption without excessive cost in the establishment of additional facilities, although some increase in prices now being paid for skim milk products would be required. If this amount were made available to civilians, the nutrients added to the food supply would be equivalent to increases of four percent for protein, 13 percent for calcium, and nine percent for riboflavin over the quantities contained in the 1943 civilian consumption.

The cereals suitable for human consumption that are fed to livestock constitute a large source of potential food supply which might be utilized if the need should arise. Considered together, less than 20 percent of the grains--wheat, barley, oats, corn, and rice--are consumed directly as human food. When used directly, the larger part of the energy would be in the form of carbohydrates and protein and less in the form of fat. Output of essential minerals and vitamins also would be increased, provided production of milk for use in whole form was maintained from roughage feed supplies. The effects on the output of selected food nutrients of using corn in different ways are shown in Table 2.

1/ Agriculture's Maximum Wartime Capacity, United States Department of Agriculture in cooperation with the Land Grant Colleges, Washington, D. C., October 1943. Preliminary draft.

TABLE 2.--NUMBER OF PERSONS THAT CAN BE SUPPLIED WITH RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCES OF FOOD NUTRIENTS FROM 1 BUSHEL OF CORN USED IN DIFFERENT WAYS.

One bushel of corn used in the following ways	Will supply daily recommended allowances of these food nutrients to the indicated No. of persons						
	Food energy	Fat	Protein	Calcium	Thiamine	Ribo-flavin	Niacin
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
Consumed as corn meal	23	3	23	2	26	2	7
Fed to livestock and consumed as:							
Milk	5	10	12	29	4	17	1
Pork and Lard	7	24	5	1/	23	2	12
Eggs	2	5	8	2	5	9	1/

1/ Less than one.

It is estimated that shifting 175 million bushels of corn from livestock feed to human consumption would result in an addition of 11,300 billion calories of energy to the human food supply. This is sufficient to provide the recommended annual allowance of food energy for 11 million people.

Some striking differences also exist between products in converting resources into food. One acre of average land, for example, devoted to milk production will produce 350 thousand calories of food energy. An average acre in terms of potatoes would produce 2.3 million calories. Similar differences may be realized in the use of labor.

In the production of eggs, for example, 100 hours of labor will produce 313 thousand calories of food energy and 56 pounds of protein, while in terms of white flour, it will produce 9.2 million calories and 621 pounds of protein.

For many obvious reasons, it is impossible to make these extreme shifts in food production and consumption. The psychological and physical barriers are inescapable. Existing ration levels of meat consumption, for example, are creating serious problems in consumer acceptance. The agricultural production goals for 1944 consequently are based upon considered judgments as to the extent consumers will accept shifts in the makeup of their diets in 1945 and 1946 and the extent producers can shift the pattern of production in 1944.

IV. U. S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION GOALS FOR 1944

A summary of agricultural production goals for 1944 is shown in Tables 3 and 4 in terms of acreage and production responsibility. Acreage goals by States for selected crops are shown in Appendix C. Shown also are actual production in 1935-39, and 1942, and estimated production in 1943. The 1944 goals have also been expressed as a percentage of the maximum 1944 production capacity shown in Table 1 (Section III) and as a percentage of the estimated yearly requirements as shown in Appendix A.

At a series of meetings in October and November, State goals were established by State agricultural leaders, including representatives of State agricultural organizations, farmers' organizations, and regional and State personnel of the Department of Agriculture. There was available for consideration at these meetings suggested goals which had been developed after careful consideration of the requirement estimates; the productive resources of the State; and information as to the adequacy of labor, machinery, fertilizer, transportation, storage, containers and other production and marketing factors; and information as to expected commodity returns.

The States reviewed these facts and arrived at their 1944 production goals. For some commodities, State goals were conditioned upon certain recommended changes in price and other programs being carried out. Establishment of definite goals for these commodities is therefore tied up with the situation as to what can be done about price supports. It will be necessary to follow through and develop programs to bring about the necessary adjustment in price relationships for these commodities before definite goals can be determined. The goals for the following commodities are affected: milk, soybeans, peanuts, flax, and dry beans. There are other instances in which the State goals exceed the suggested goal. The goals for sugar beets and tobacco will need further review as to whether these increases are consistent with the most desirable wartime use of land and other production resources.

Since there is a considerable degree of substitution possible both as among agricultural products produced and among foods consumed, 1944 production goals for certain individual crops appear to be in excess of capacity. These "excesses," however, are offset by other crop goals which are less than estimated maximum capacity. Likewise, certain foods appear to be in excess of requirements, but these are offset by other individual foods which are less than requirements.

It must be kept in mind, too, that the 1944 production goals assume average yields, whereas yields in both 1942 and 1943 were above average for most crops. Acreage goals for many crops in 1944 are in excess of the acreage devoted to these crops in either 1942 or 1943. Comparisons on an acreage basis are shown in Table 3.

Livestock production goals are particularly susceptible of misinterpretation. In the aggregate, those for 1944 contemplate a lower level of livestock production than in 1943, but supplies of livestock products available for consumption in 1944 will be larger than in 1943. The goal for the number of pigs to be farrowed in 1944 is 16 percent less than the number actually farrowed in 1943. The pork available for consumption or reserves in 1944 will be larger than in 1943 because it will be produced from the record pig crop of 1943. Supplies of beef for consumption are scheduled to be larger in 1944 than in 1943, not because the production goal for cattle is to be larger but by reducing the number of cattle on

farms through slaughtering more cattle than the number of calves to be born. Poultry meat supplies will be larger in spite of a decline in the chickens raised in 1944 as compared to 1943 because 1944 goals propose a reduction in the number of hens and pullets in laying flocks during the year.

In other words, meat supplies available for consumption will be made larger in 1944 than in 1943 by reducing inventories of livestock and poultry on farms during the year. This reduction in inventories results in part from shifting more agricultural resources to the production of direct-consumption foods, and in part from the disappearance of the large ever-normal granary stocks of feed grains on hand at the beginning of the war.

There will be few, if any, direct controls on agricultural production in 1944. The State goals in many instances will be broken down into county goals, so that farmers may be able to interpret these goals more specifically in terms of their own farming operations. Every effort will be made to fully inform all farmers of the kind and quantity of agricultural production most needed to meet the demands of the war, and production supplies, labor, machinery, fertilizer, etc., will be made available insofar as possible so as to give impetus to the achievement of these goals. Major reliance, however, will be placed on returns to farmers to encourage the desired pattern of agricultural production.

TABLE 3.-- ACREAGE GOALS FOR 1944 WITH COMPARISONS

Commodity	Average 1935-39	1942	1943 Indicated	1944 Goal 1/	Percent Goal is of: 1943 Indicated	Requirements	Maximum Capacity
	Thousands of Acres						
Wheat	73,235	52,533	55,109	66,775	121	97	100
Rye 2/	6,750	3,837	2,777	2,406	87	93	74
Rice	1,007	1,505	1,531	1,525	100	102	90
Corn	97,055	91,011	97,136	100,233	103	101	103
Oats	40,586	42,662	42,858	39,478	92	102	102
Barley	13,364	19,448	17,329	17,375	100	99	95
All Sorghums (except sirup)	15,029	15,889	17,291	16,747	97	102	102
Soybeans for beans 2/	3,042	10,762	10,820	13,644	126	97	
Peanuts (grown alone)	2,173	4,384	5,202	6,044	116	93	68
Flaxseed	1,938	4,691	6,320	5,895	93	94	100

continued

TABLE 3.-- ACREAGE GOALS FOR 1944 WITH COMPARISONS continued

Commodity	Average 1935-39	1942	1943 Indicated	1944 Goal 1/	Percent Goal is of: 1943 Indicated	Percent Goal is of: Requirements	Percent Goal is of: Maximum Capacity
	Thousands of Acres						
Hemp (seed and fiber)		51	236	271	115		99
Broomcorn	317	235	272	406	149	102	
Dry Beans	1,917	2,135	2,734	3,030	111	96	90
Dry Peas	281	501	832	895	108	129	72
Potatoes	3,123	2,793	3,430	3,514	102	94	75
Sweet Potatoes 2/	804	708	898	1,056	118	106	66
Sugar Beets	892	1,045	619	951	154	110	108
Sugar Cane (Seed & Sugar) 2/	287	317	322	333	103	99	
Cotton	28,496	23,302	22,151	22,277	101		99
Tobacco, Flue-cured 2/	981	793	846	1,029	122	98	(
Tobacco, Burley 2/	371	351	395	479	121	101	(
Tobacco, other domestic 2/	292	235	221	248	112	105	(121
Processing Vegetables	1,383	1,968	2,080	2,204	106	88	89
Fresh Vegetables	1,745	1,659	1,560	1,689	108	87	81
Cover Crop Seeds 2/		504	418	362	87	78	
All Tame Hay 2/	55,770	60,211	61,016	62,768	103		
	Thousands of Head						
Milk Cows 3/	23,548	25,159	25,669	26,160	102		93
Chickens raised	664,000	794,787	925,652	892,983	96		102
Hens and Pullets 4/	364,400	426,226	487,089	526,093	108		107
Broilers, Commercial	69,700	204,060	248,576	210,004	84		104
Turkeys raised	27,000	33,206	33,176	32,041	96		95
Sows to farrow, Spring	6,817	9,657	12,140	10,392	86		103
Sows to farrow, Fall	4,306	6,825	8,515	6,910	81		102
Cattle & calves on farm 5/	66,684	78,170	80,800	76,964	95		102
Beef Cows 5/	10,496	12,672	12,466	11,980	96		100
Sheep and Lambs 5/	51,462	55,089	52,000	51,892	100		99

1/ Based upon reports from States.
2/ Harvested acreage.
3/ Average number on farms during year.
4/ On farms January 1.
5/ On farms end of year remaining after slaughter goal is reached.

TABLE 4.--AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION GOALS FOR 1944 WITH COMPARISONS

Commodity	Average 1935-39	1942	1943 Indicated	1944 Goal 1/	Percent Goal is of: 1943 Indicated	Percent Goal is of: Requirements
	Thousands of Units					
Wheat (Bu.)	758,623	974,176	836,298	828,020	99	97
Rye (Bu.)	44,917	57,673	30,781	29,824	97	93
Rice (Bu.)	49,852	64,549	70,025	73,001	104	103
Corn (Bu.)	2,315,539	3,131,518	3,076,159	2,906,757	94	
Oats (Bu.)	1,045,329	1,349,547	1,143,867	1,088,661	95	
Barley (Bu.)	238,616	429,187	322,187	329,809	102	
Soybeans for beans (Bu.)	56,167	187,155	195,762	236,940	121	98
Peanuts, grown alone (Lbs.) 2/	2,229,204	2,211,535	2,561,610	3,455,258	135	94
Flaxseed (Bu.)	10,991	41,053	52,008	45,611	88	98
Broomcorn (Tons)	41	35	28	49	175	100
Dry Beans (Cwt.)	14,550	19,035	21,799	23,873	110	93
Dry Peas (Cwt.)	2,570	7,408	10,870	10,101	93	122
Potatoes (Bu.)	355,513	370,489	464,656	447,590	96	94
Sweet Potatoes (Bu.)	67,927	65,508	72,572	92,558	128	114
Sugar Beets (Tons raw sugar)	1,427	1,613	938	1,784	190	
Sugar Cane (Tons raw sugar)	474	460	554	585	106	
Cotton (Bales)	13,149	12,817	11,478	10,738	94	
Tobacco, flue-cured (Lbs.)	863,600	811,690	790,878	987,000	125	93 3/
Tobacco, Burley (Lbs.)	315,900	343,509	385,386	470,000	122	101
Tobacco, other domestic (Lbs.)	279,700	253,518	227,011	266,000	117	105
Processing Vegetables (Tons)	3,505	5,818	4,981	6,070	122	88
Fresh Vegetables (Tons)	6,385	7,013	6,508	6,619	102	85
Cover Crop Seeds (Lbs.)		251,000	230,000	178,106	77	82
All Tame Hay (Tons)	74,244	92,207	87,264	82,344	94	
	Millions of Units					
Milk Production (Lbs.)	103,624	119,240	118,282	120,499	102	95
Egg Production (Doz.)	3,335	4,018	4,516	4,597	102	92
Wool Produced (Lbs.)	425	459	477	462	97	
Lard (Lbs.)	1,630	2,455	2,930	3,070	105	99
Beef Slaughtered (Lbs.)	6,924	8,675	9,058	9,788	108	99
Veal Slaughtered (Lbs.)	1,037	1,107	1,045	1,314	126	115
Mutton and Lamb Slaughter (Lbs.)	871	1,036	1,109	861	78	91
Hog Slaughter (Lbs.)	7,337	10,642	13,085	13,648	104	101
Chickens (dressed wt. lbs.)	2,325	2,989	3,800	3,970	104	105
Turkeys (dressed wt. lbs.)	350	497	480	468	98	112
Total Meat (Lbs.)	18,844	24,947	28,452	30,049	106	101

1/ Based upon reports from States.
2/ Peanut hay production included in All Tame Hay production.
3/ Requirements available only for flue-cured tobacco.

V. PRICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Support prices, for needed crops and classes of livestock, are an integral part of the war food program. Generally announced in advance of the time when farmers must plant their crops or plan their livestock production, they assure farmers of specified returns and are the farmers' equivalent of the contract prices which cover the operations of producers of other war material such as guns, ammunitions, ships, tanks, airplanes, clothing, etc. Moreover, the relative levels at which these support prices are established constitute the most important device available to the War Food Administration for encouraging the pattern of agricultural production represented by the production goals.

The chief legislative bases for the support price program are Section 302 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as supplemented by Section 8 of the Act of October 2, 1942, and Section 4(a) of the Act approved July 1, 1941, as amended by the Act of October 2, 1942.

It should be noted that the legislation requires that the "basic" crops be supported at 90 (or 85 in the case of corn, wheat, and peanuts, upon a finding by the President) percent of parity if marketing quotas have not been disapproved, regardless of whether a support at such level is necessary to obtain needed wartime production. Prices must also be supported at not less than 90 percent of parity for any non-basic commodity for which it is necessary to encourage a substantial expansion of production. These requirements of law that agricultural prices generally be supported at about 90 percent of parity have made it necessary to establish support prices for some of the more urgently needed commodities at levels considerably above parity in order to assure prices attractive enough to obtain the necessary shifts in production.

So far, the Secretary of Agriculture or the War Food Administrator has announced under the Steagall Amendment an expansion in production of hogs, eggs, chickens (excluding broilers or chickens weighing less than three pounds live weight), turkeys, butter, cheese, dry skim milk and evaporated milk, dry peas, dry edible beans, soybeans, flaxseed, and peanuts for oil, potatoes, and American-Egyptian cotton.

In addition to the commodities for which support prices have been formally proclaimed under the so-called "Steagall Amendment" or for which loans are specifically required by legislation, support prices or loans have been announced for a number of commodities, including cottonseed, sweet potatoes, grain sorghums, barley, vegetables for processing and a number of processed fruits.

Support price programs are implemented through purchase programs financed by funds available to the War Food Administration, including the 30 percent of the tariff revenues appropriated by Section 32 of Public Law 320, 74th Congress, or through loans, purchases and other operations conducted by Commodity Credit Corporation.

Current support prices for crops and livestock are summarized in Appendix D. In general, these support prices as announced extend through the period June 30, 1944. That is, these are chiefly support prices for 1943, and support prices for 1944 will be announced on or about January 1, 1944. So far, only one support price has actually been announced for 1944 -- the price of $12.50 per cwt. average for good to choice butcher hogs weighing 200 to 240 pounds at Chicago for the period October 1, 1944 through March 31, 1945.

The increasing emphasis being placed by the Administration on the anti-inflation program and on stabilization of the cost of living has created many problems and made necessary the initiation of numerous programs designed to maintain or increase agricultural production. Losses under these programs have been absorbed by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

As of December 16 the War Food Administration was subsidizing a considerable number of commodities. Altogether it is estimated that the cost of these subsidies for 1943 will total about $350,000,000, and that subsidies for 1944 on the basis of the prices and programs now being considered will run about $625,000,000, provided the necessary authority and funds are continued. A summary of each of the subsidy programs now in effect follows:

Low Cost Feed. The United States had large supplies of grain on hand at the beginning of the war. Livestock products were urgently needed so the Department of Agriculture consciously embarked upon, and the War Food Administration continued, a program designed to keep feed prices low relative to livestock prices. Stocks of corn amounting to more than 200,000,000 bushels acquired under the corn loan program were sold at market prices, and by December 1943 about 500 million bushels of feed wheat had been sold from CCC granary stocks since January 1942. The losses on feed wheat in 1943 are estimated at about $70,000,000.

From January through June 1942, the Corporation sold 35 million bushels of feed wheat for livestock feed at the CCC selling price of corn. Congress authorized the continuance of this program during the 1943 fiscal year by the sale of 125 million bushels of wheat at not less than 85 percent of the parity price of corn, and subsequently the sale of 150 million bushels at the parity price of corn. Practically the entire 275 million bushels were sold by July 1, 1943. In the 1944 Agricultural Appropriations Act, Congress authorized the continued sale of feed wheat at the parity price of corn but put no limitation on the quantity to be sold. Approximately 200 million bushels of wheat were sold from July 1 to November 30 under the 1944 program.

Unsold stocks of wheat November 30, 1943 were about 87 million bushels, of which 50,000,000 bushels are being held for sale to the Foreign Economic Administration. Therefore, continued sales of feed wheat in volume will depend on the quantity of domestic and Canadian stocks of wheat which can be purchased for this purpose. Purchases of Canadian wheat in turn are dependent upon obtaining the necessary transportation. Livestock production is now substantially in excess of current feed production and reserve stocks of grain have been used up, so considerable adjustments in livestock production must be made.

Milk Prices. The War Food Administration operated milk purchase and resale programs in New York, Chicago and Duluth last winter so as to maintain the supply of milk in these metropolitan markets at no advance in price to consumers. On January 1, 1943 the consumer prices in these areas were adjusted and the subsidy programs were discontinued. Subsequently, similar programs were instituted in Washington, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Wilmington, Harrisburg (Pennsylvania), and Alexandria (Virginia), and reinstated in New York. The cost of this program in 1943 was approximately $5,000,000.

Pending agreement on a more adequate milk production program the War Food Administration is making payments to dairy producers on all milk and butterfat sold between October 1, 1943 and December 31, 1943. The rate of payment is based primarily on increased feed costs since September 1942. Consideration was also given to the difference between prices now being received for milk and those received during the immediate prewar years. Thus, the payment is higher in areas where the quantity of purchased feed is larger and feed costs have advanced the most, and where the advance in prices received for milk since the period immediately preceding our entry into the war has been the least. The lowest rate of payment established under the program is 30 cents per hundredweight of whole milk delivered, and the highest rate is 50 cents per hundredweight. When butterfat rather than whole milk is delivered, the minimum and maximum rates are four cents and six cents per pound of butterfat, respectively. Expenditures under this program for the last 3 months of 1943 are estimated at about $60,000,000.

Bread Prices. Last winter when the market price of wheat had risen to a point where flour millers were requesting an increase in the ceiling prices of flour, a program was developed which would permit farmers to redeem loan wheat at prices which would enable them to sell the wheat in line with the ceiling prices on flour and thus to prevent a rise in prices of bread. This program involved a ten percent rise in flour ceiling prices, the maximum increase that could be made under existing bread ceilings, and a CCC commitment to support prices of mill feeds to flour millers at $1.50 per ton below OPA ceilings on mill feeds. During the first month of this program $165,000 was paid out covering price commitments on 199,000 tons of mill feed. The price of mill feeds then advanced and held at ceiling levels during the remainder of the season thus making unnecessary any additional payments. On June 19, 1943, the War Food Administration announced discontinuance of this program. Effective December 1, 1943, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation instituted a program under which payments will be made to flour millers based on the quantity of flour produced. Such payments are necessary to make it possible for flour millers to buy wheat at the current near-parity prices and sell flour at the existing ceilings.

Canned Vegetables. Currently, the War Food Administration is paying part of the cost of supporting prices to farmers and of holding down consumer prices of canned vegetables. Because of increased production costs, farmers were assured of prices for the principal canning crops approximately 25 percent higher than 1942 prices. For tomatoes the support price for 1943 averages $24.25 per ton for the entire country as compared with $19.57 in

1942. Prices for other canning crops are: green peas $81.50 per ton compared with $63.93; sweet corn $18.00 compared with $14.25; snap beans $91.00 compared with $75.33. In order to maintain price ceilings, the War Food Administration purchases that portion of the pack sold for civilian use at the 1943 support prices and resells to processors at prices equivalent to the raw material costs reflected in the civilian ceiling prices. These raw material costs approximate the 1942 season average prices received by farmers. It also has agreed to absorb that portion of approved wage increases necessary to permit processors to obtain net returns in line with net returns in average pre-war years. It is expected that the cost of this program will be approximately $30,000,000.

Dry Beans. Early this season a loan and purchase program designed to increase the production of dry beans and peas as needed sources of vegetable protein for military and civilian consumption was announced. The War Food Administration offered to make loans on 1943 crop thresher-run beans and peas stored on farms or in warehouses and to purchase beans and peas at specified support prices. The purchase prices for 1943 crop beans are higher than existing OPA ceilings, the difference being absorbed by CCC on beans sold for civilian consumption. Losses on 1943 crop beans to be used for domestic civilian consumption are estimated at $8,000,000.

Cheese. The Department of Agriculture announced in December 1942 that it would buy all American Cheddar Cheese delivered to factories, on the basis of 27 cents per pound at Plymouth, Wisconsin, and then resell the cheese tc factories at 23¼ cents. An extra ¼ cent per pound is being paid on cheese having a moisture content of 35¼ percent or less. Under this program designed to stimulate the production of cheese and to hold down the prices to consumers, the factories are required to pass on to farmers the difference between the sale and repurchase price. The cost of this program in 1943 is approximately $25,000,000.

Vegetable Oils. Prior to Pearl Harbor the War Food Administration sought to increase the production of vegetable oils, cake and meal through the sale of seed stocks of soybeans and peanuts at reasonable prices to farmers, and by offering price supporting loans to farmers on the resultant vegetable oilseed crops. After Pearl Harbor the vegetable oilseed production goals were raised. Farmers produced in 1942 a record supply of soybeans and peanuts for processing into vegetable oils for civilian and military consumption, and the production of oilseed meal and cake for livestock feeding was correspondingly increased.

Processors of vegetable oils agreed to pay farmers not less than the stipulated support prices for oilseeds, to sell the vegetable oils within price ceilings, and to sell meal and cake at the relatively low prices stipulated by the War Food Administration for the purpose of increasing the production of meats, milk and eggs. The CCC on its part agreed to relieve the price squeeze on processors in the amount of ½ cent per pound of vegetable oils, and to purchase soybeans at the support price and resell them at lower prices based on their processing value to the particular processor. It was also necessary in this program to ship large quantities of soybeans from the Middle West to southern, eastern, and

western crushing plants, since the capacity of the mills in the Middle West was insufficient to process the record quantities of oil and meal needed in the war program.

In view of the even greater need for vegetable oilseeds in 1943 and the higher prices prevailing for alternative crops, support prices for the oilseed crops were increased, and it is currently estimated that losses on the 1943 oilseeds program will total about $60,000,000. This season the War Food Administration is buying all peanuts at prices averaging producers about $140.00 per ton, and it will sell peanuts at a net gain for edible purposes and at a loss for oil and feed uses at ceiling prices. It is contracting with processors of soybeans for similar purposes--to support prices to farmers and preserve ceiling prices on vegetable oils, meal and cake. Subsidy programs to reduce the price of peanut butter to the September 1942 level and to avoid an increase in the price of vegetable oil shortenings are also in effect.

Potatoes and Sweetpotatoes. On August 24 the War Food Administration announced a nonrecourse loan on potatoes at approximately 92 percent of parity, the loans to be callable in whole or in part on demand. In this program, the War Food Administration reserves the right to permit redemption of potatoes by producers, shippers, and others below the loan value. The purpose of this program is to make available ample supplies of potatoes the year around at reasonable prices to consumers, and at the same time to fulfill the Government's commitment on support prices to growers. A support price program was announced for cured sweetpotatoes marketed after January 1, so as to encourage farmers to cure and store as much as possible of this year's expected crop of 72 million bushels. The War Food Administration has also offered loans on sweetpotatoes to associations and dealers who pay the support price to growers and cure and store the sweetpotatoes in approved warehouses. It is estimated that the cost of the program for 1943 crop potatoes may be as much as $20,000,000.

Coffee. For the purpose of preserving the OPA ceiling price on coffee, the Commodity Credit Corporation has been paying a part of the increased wartime cost of importing this commodity into the United States. All coffee is brought into the country by importers who hold licenses issued by the War Food Administration. After a shipment has been completed, and all cost of making the shipment computed, the importer bills the Corporation for the cost of war-risk and marine insurance and ocean freight, which were in excess of normal peacetime rates. The Corporation also paid 75 percent of any excess rail freight charges on shipments of coffee within the United States due to the diversion of such shipments from normal ports of entry. Payments of part of the excess ocean costs were discontinued August 25 as a result of the lowering of these costs because of improvement in the shipping situation. It was also announced that payments of part of the transshipment costs within the United States would be discontinued October 1.

Offshore Sugar. All sugar imported by the United States is under the control of the WFA, the Commodity Credit Corporation paying the increased costs of marine and war-risk insurance, ocean freight, handling charges, and internal rail transportation in order to permit sugar to be sold to

consumers at existing ceiling prices. Offshore raw sugar purchased by the Corporation is sold to U. S. refiners on a delivered basis at the prevailing ceiling price. Refiners act as agents of the Corporation in the importation of the sugar and are reimbursed by the Corporation for costs incurred in excess of the ceiling price.

Offshore refined sugar is not purchased by the Corporation but is imported by United States distributors who are reimbursed by the Corporation for excess ocean freight charges and excess rail freight for distributing this sugar in accordance with directions of the OPA. The 1943 cost of this program is estimated at about $30,000,000.

Domestic Sugar. In addition to the import operations carried out during the current fiscal year, a price-support program was announced in connection with the 1943 sugar beet crop. Under this program sugar beets are purchased from processors at an average price of $11 per ton, and then resold to processors at an average price of $9.50 per ton, if ceiling prices on sugar continue at their present level. Under this program the processors must agree to pay producers an average price of $11 per ton for beets. The cost of this program for the 1943 crop, including similar payments relating to sugar cane, will be about $11,500,000.

Prunes and raisins, processed dried. In order to maintain support prices to growers without increasing the cost to ultimate consumers, the 1943 pack for civilian consumption is being purchased from and resold to packers. The difference between the purchase and resale prices is expected to average from $50 to $55 per ton. The total cost of the program is estimated at about $14,000,000.

Miscellaneous. Payments are made to canned fruit processors to cover approved wage increases for peaches and pears, and special hardship cases, on that part of the 1943 pack that is allocated for civilian use.

In order that growers in the Pacific Northwest may obtain returns for their shipments equivalent to those received by growers in other areas, payments are made to eligible shippers on apples shipped from the Pacific Northwest to the central and eastern States, during the period October 17, 1943-July 31, 1944, at the applicable freight rates in excess of average shipping costs. Payments range from 19.5 to 49 cents per box on standard wrapped apples, and 39 to 98 cents per cwt. on apples shipped in bulk, loose-packed, or non-standard packed.

Processors of canned grapefruit juice will be paid the amount of the increase in prices to growers of the civilian portion of the 1943-44 pack.

A portion of the freight cost on onions shipped from the Rocky Mountain States into eastern States after January 1, 1944 will be absorbed by the Commodity Credit Corporation in order to maintain existing f.o.b. producer prices.

Altogether, it is estimated that the costs of these several miscellaneous programs (and the coffee program) will run about $16,000,000.

VI FOREIGN FOOD PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

Before the war the United States obtained a relatively small though important part of its food supplies from abroad (coffee, tea, spices, sugar, bananas, vegetable oils). During the war the objectives of the program have been: (1) to procure such foreign food supplies for domestic use as shipping space would permit being imported; (2) to procure foreign food supplies for other United Nations, in part to relieve the drain on domestic food supplies, and in part as a result of agreements to act in certain countries as sole purchasing agent for the United Nations; and, (3) to prevent food supplies being purchased by the Axis Nations.

In the early period of the war certain food products continued to be imported, but shipping was the bottleneck at that time and agricultural commodities were perforce compelled to compete for cargo space with such strategics as copper, chrome, manganese, and other minerals, the tanning materials such as quebracho, and the hard fibers.

Now as the sinkings have diminished and additional cargo-carrying vessels are continually being built, the transportation problem has become easier. Unfortunately, however, the foreign reservoirs of food commodities which originally existed have since been drained due to a variety of causes, the only significant exceptions being the wheat stocks of Canada, Australia, and Argentina, and the sugar of the Caribbean area, which has been included in the supply program.

At the outset of the war, domestic food stocks were so abundant that emphasis was placed on those strategic foreign agricultural commodities which had an industrial end-use. Certain of the vegetable oils were required as component parts of lubricants or protective coatings essential to the war effort. Food commodities other than those of a tropical or semitropical nature, such as coffee, cocoa, and sugar, were permitted to flow into the United States in their normal manner as shipping permitted.

At first the approach to the foreign supply and production problem was made on a direct commercial basis. If an item was required and was offered for purchase at a price which represented its fair value, and if transportation was available, it was bought. Questions of policy and the effect of such purchase upon the internal economy of the countries of origin were given minor consideration.

With the depletion of domestic food supplies and the increase in military and lend-lease demands, the list of commodities under foreign purchase was expanded, in many cases, up to the limit of the availability of shipping. Various government-to-government contracts for the purchase of the entire exportable surplus of certain commodities were negotiated. Difficulties were occasionally encountered, such as the creation of local shortages resulting from the desire of foreign merchants to make sales regardless of domestic requirements. In some cases, government selling monopolies were either formed or contemplated.

Shipping quotas for 1944 food imports are shown in Appendix E.

VII. FOOD DISTRIBUTION

If foods that are produced and imported are to be shared equitably among the various claimants and if they are to be used in the ways most effective for prosecuting the war, their use must be systematically planned and controlled. This involves three broad programs:

Allocations: Estimates of requirements and supplies of all important foods are periodically brought together and adjusted to provide a consistent plan for food distribution.

Government supply: The War Food Administration and the Army Quartermaster General jointly procure and handle the foods for the military forces, Lend-Lease, and other war purposes. In addition, to assure needed Government supplies, various controls are imposed on the utilization and movement of foods in civilian trade channels, and special programs are carried on to develop the processing and packaging of food products in special forms to meet particular requirements for the Armed Forces or for shipment abroad.

Civilian distribution: To overcome wartime maladjustments of domestic food marketing, various programs have been instituted, and more are being developed to assure proper distribution of supplies between localities, areas, and regions and between the different population groups within each locality, area, or region. In addition, extensive educational work is carried on among consumers to explain wartime food problems and help them adjust their diets to the changes that wartime conditions require.

THE ALLOCATIONS PROGRAM

Broad, long-range allocations of foods to the various claimant groups are, of course, basic to the planning of production as outlined in Section II. But actual supplies inevitably deviate more or less from those planned. Likewise, the actual requirements of the different claimants change substantially from the rough estimates, 12 to 18 months in advance, that are used as a basis for the production program. Hence a system of quarterly allocations has been developed to provide continuous revision of both the current and the longer-range distribution plan.

Once every three months the War Food Administration estimates prospective supplies of food for the four succeeding quarters and allocates these supplies to the various claimant agencies. For the first quarter, firm allocations are made that have the status of actual commitments. For the succeeding three quarters, since estimates are less precise and definite, tentative commitments are made. Appendix F shows these allocations for all important food products, by claimant agencies, for the four quarters beginning October 1, 1943. (Similar allocations for the calendar year 1944 will be available shortly after January 1, 1944.)

Table III, Appendix F, also shows per capita civilian supplies compared with those of previous years.

While, as previously mentioned, Government procurement will account for about one fourth of U. S. food production in this period, percentage allocations of individual commodities vary widely. All of

the dried eggs, for example, have been allocated for military use or export, substantially all of the dehydrated vegetables, over half of the dried fruit and dehydrated soups, and nearly half of the canned fruits and juices, excluding citrus; likewise nearly half of the dry beans and over two-thirds of the dry peas, and well over half of the rice to be milled. Nevertheless, because of increased production, U. S. civilians will be getting more eggs than they consumed in all forms either in 1935-39 or in 1942, and more dry beans. Civilian supplies of canned vegetables likewise will be greater than in 1935-39, and their anticipated supplies of citrus fruits will partially compensate for decreased supplies of others. Civilians are getting about 80 percent of the butter supply, but this still represents about one-fourth less butter than in 1935-39. The Armed Forces and Lend-Lease and other exports have been allocated most of the dried milk, over half of the evaporated milk, and nearly half of the cheese. On the other hand, civilian fluid milk consumption in this country has increased steadily throughout the war and the present program calls for stabilizing this consumption at the level of last June. As for meats, the war programs call for about one third of the pork and lamb and mutton to be produced in the allocation period, about a fourth of the beef and a fifth of the veal. This averages out to 70 percent of total allocable supplies of these meats. It still leaves civilians with about 4 percent more meat than in 1935-39, although a little less than in 1942. Except for rice, none of the food grains are shown in the table; supplies are expected to meet both civilian and military and other export demand.

The first step in working out these allocations is the preparation of supply estimates. This is done by commodity committees made up of the men who are responsible for programs affecting supplies or who maintain supply statistics. The "allocable supply" consists of production and imports adjusted for prospective or desirable changes in stocks.

Estimates of the quarterly requirements of all claimants are likewise brought together and examined for consistency and reasonableness. A trial balance between supplies and requirements is then prepared. If a deficit is evident, all possibilities of increasing supplies are examined. If this does not eliminate the deficit, the various claimants or their representatives are asked to adjust their claims downward or to substitute commodities of which supplies are more plentiful. A suggested allocation is prepared which represents the most equitable sharing of available supplies that can be devised.

These suggested allocations are reviewed by a committee of representatives of the United States claimant agencies and, when the commodity is of international importance, by the Combined Food Board. Final allocations, based on all the recommendations, are made by the War Food Administrator.

One aspect of this allocations procedure that is becoming increasingly important as supplies become more restricted is the analysis of requirements submitted by the various claimants to determine their relative urgency or essentiality. Progress has been made in developing objective criteria for comparing requests to determine the relative priority that should be attached to them. Broadly speaking, it is the policy of the War Food Administration to attach first priority to the requirements for the Armed Forces, second to the essential needs for U. S. civilians, and third to the requests from our Allies. Account is taken, however, of the special needs of each group for particular

commodities in particular forms, and of the relative possibilities for making substitutions or otherwise adjusting their takings in the light of the supply situation.

In detail, therefore, each commodity allocation presents a problem that must be worked out in the light of the special conditions affecting that commodity and the commodities related to it. The various agencies concerned have shown a laudable spirit of cooperation in working out realistic allocations that are acceptable to all claimants.

GOVERNMENT SUPPLY PROGRAM

In making the allocations effective, the WFA is responsible for assuring to the several claimants the supplies that have been promised them.

Procurement Program

This means Government procurement of all the foods for all of the non-civilian programs in the quantities allocated to them as shown in the accompanying tables. For the four quarters covered by these tables, roughly one-fourth of the total food production of the United States will actually be purchased by the Government.

To coordinate procurement on this scale and prevent competition between Government agencies, arrangements have been made whereby substantially all of the purchases are made either by the Army or by the War Food Administration. These agencies then transfer supplies to other agencies as needed. Army and WFA consult closely on the planning and scheduling of purchases and the handling of stocks.

The magnitude and complexity of this problem is illustrated by the fact that the War Food Administration is currently buying some eight million dollars' worth daily of over 300 different commodities, to supply 40 individual programs. The current schedule of commodities lists over 1500 separate items, counting different sizes and packs.

Contracts for these purchases are placed with vendors, deliveries ordered, necessary storage and transportation arranged for. Movements are planned to make each lot reach the right port at the right time to meet shipping schedules, which are often varied on short notice. This complex process has been so organized that the War Food Administration is keeping up to date almost without exception in meeting shipping schedules for all the different programs that it is supplying.

Obviously it is not possible to manage a procurement program of this magnitude simply on the basis of accepting offers for the various commodities as and when they are needed. With civilian demand under price control far exceeding supply for most foods, and with distributors desirous of maintaining as much of their civilian business as possible, it has been necessary to impose controls on the utilization of many commodities to make supplies available for Government procurement. Conversely, it has been essential to plan the placing and timing of procurement operations so as to minimize their disturbing effect on civilian distribution. Finally, the special needs for the Armed Forces and for shipment abroad have required developing or expanding the production of numerous processed foods and arranging for special methods of packing and special types of packaging.

Control of Supplies

Most of the measures used to control supplies of foods in order to assure their availability for Government procurement are embodied in food orders. Numerous regulatory techniques are in use. The most direct is the set-aside order requiring handlers or processors of a commodity to reserve a certain percentage of their volume for Government purchase or for manufacture into commodities wanted by the Government. An alternative technique is to restrict commercial sales, usually to quotas set at certain percentages of base period volume. Sales to Government agencies are then exempted from the quota restrictions. Similar restrictions are imposed on particular uses of certain foods in order to divert them into the manufacture of more essential products. In some cases certain non-essential uses are prohibited entirely. For some commodities in critically short supply, even closer control is provided by requiring processors or handlers to obtain permits or specific authorizations for the purchase, sale, or utilization of a product.

Some commodities are subject to variations or combinations of these types of orders, or to different types at different stages of processing and marketing. In a rough way, however, the following list lumps together the commodities under regulation according to the chief types of control to which they are subjected. (Listed here are only the cases where Government procurement is, directly or indirectly, a primary objective; commodities regulated primarily for the control of civilian distribution are discussed under that heading later on.)

a. Set-asides: Cheese, butter (current percentage zero), dry skim milk; meat (currently only beef) and canned fish and shellfish; canned fruits, vegetables, and juices; apples; dried fruits; dehydrated vegetables; rice; dry edible beans; and linseed and fish oils. Set-asides on dried eggs, citrus concentrates and citrus fruits for processing, lard, and certain vegetable oils have been dropped.

b. Limitations: Frozen dairy foods; livestock and meats (slaughter quotas currently suspended); raisin grapes, peaches, pears, apples and Texas grapefruit (diversion from fresh sale); production and sale of citrus juices and concentrates; sale of sauerkraut; shipment of dry onions; and processing and distribution of fats and oils (except butter and certain minor types) generally, and certain oils individually. Inventory controls on various rationed commodities and on corn, and restrictions on use of frozen and shell eggs, shipment of potatoes, and sale of turkeys have been discontinued. Restrictions have also been placed on certain uses of cold storage space.

c. Specific allocations: Most animal and vegetable fats and oils, domestic and imported, and raw sugar.

Stockpiling and Timing of Procurement

The magnitude of the Government procurement operations and especially the long-range nature of the Army supply program obviously require maintenance of sizable operating inventories. In addition, the uncertainties of various requirements, such as the irregular availability of shipping or the indefinitely anticipated needs for feeding occupied territories, require contingency reserves of foods to provide for special needs that may arise.

Allocations to general contingency reserves are shown in Appendix F. Especially for certain staple commodities like dry peas, dehydrated vegetables, dried fruits and canned fish, they represent substantial percentages of the allocable supplies. These general reserves are actually purchased by the Government only when necessary to assure their availability. They are over and above specific, operating reserves provided for in allocations to the individual agencies.

Finally, certain commodities are deliberately bought in excess of requirements on a seasonal basis in order to minimize the impact of Government purchases on civilian supply. For example, the War Food Administration and the Army have jointly undertaken to concentrate their purchases of meat, dairy products, and many other foods in the season of heavy production, in order to reduce purchases or stay out of the market entirely in the season when supplies are light. This permits the total short-season production to go directly into civilian channels.

For certain commodities, this policy of seasonal procurement is implemented through the food orders. For example, the percentage of butter production required to be set aside has been varied from month to month, and is now reduced to zero for the winter slack season of production. Government stocks accumulated during the season of heavy production will meet requirements throughout the winter, and no further purchases are anticipated until next spring. As shown in Part I, the supplies thus made available for civilian use are comparatively uniform throughout the year.

CHART 1.-CIVILIAN SUPPLIES AND GOVERNMENT PURCHASES OF BUTTER UNDER THE SET-ASIDE ORDER



* Tentative estimates creamery butter production subject to change

971-44

There has been some public criticism from time to time about the size of Government food stocks. While there have inevitably been cases of over-stocking due to changes in requirements from those originally anticipated, the stocks maintained have with few exceptions been justified from the standpoint of intelligent wartime management of food supply and, as just pointed out, have frequently been an essential part of the program to stabilize civilian supplies. Where stocks prove larger than necessary, it is the policy to turn them back for civilian use. Furthermore, the increasing coordination of stockpiling by the various Government agencies has made possible substantial pooling of reserves, avoiding duplication and reducing the strain on storage facilities. Close integration of Government procurement is reducing Government stocks to the minimum consistent with sound food management.

Special War Products

The special nature of military and Lend-Lease requirements has required great expansion in production of various processed or packaged food products, particularly highly concentrated foods through which a maximum amount of vital nutrients can be shipped in a minimum of space. War Food Administration has therefore encouraged marked expansion and, in some cases, virtual creation of industries for the manufacture of dehydrated foods, and also for canned meats, various enriched or reinforced food products, citrus concentrates, and vitamin preparations. Table 6 lists the expansion in production of some of these special wartime foods yearly since 1940 along with the projected production for 1944. Production of powdered whole milk and canned meat has already been multiplied by four, production of dehydrated eggs by nearly forty. The dehydration of pork and most vegetables and the manufacture of soya flour represent, practically speaking, the growth of new industries.

TABLE 6.--INCREASE IN PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PROCESSED FOODS IN 1940-44

Product	Unit	United States Production		
		1940	1943 (estimated)	1944 (expected)
Edible dry skim milk	thous.lbs.	321,843	454,000	470,000
Powdered whole milk	"	29,409	125,000	150,000
Dehydrated eggs	"	7,487	275,000	350,000
Dehydrated vegetables	"	---	115,000	227,500
Dehydrated pork 1/	"	---	13,500	36,000
Canned meat 2/	"	530,212	2,320,000	2,250,000
Edible soya products (flour, flakes, grits)	mil.lbs.	---	700	1,000
Citrus concentrates 3/	thous.gals.	1,300 3/	6,100 3/	4,100 3/

1/ Includes small quantities of other dehydrated meats.
2/ Federally inspected only.
3/ Crop years as follows: 1937-41 avg; 1942-3; 1943-4.

For most of these industries, no further expansion of productive capacity is called for, although in several of them 1944 production is planned to exceed 1943, capacity has already been built up sufficiently to take care of this increase. Allocations have definitely been made, however, for additional milk drying plants (140 roller and 33 spray dryers) to be built in the twelve months beginning October 1 in areas where skim milk is not now being used for human consumption.

Further saving in shipping is being made possible through the development of new methods of compressing foods to reduce their bulk. In addition, new packages have been developed to meet special requirements for shipment, storage and utilization of military and Lend-Lease foods.

Trade Relationships

To utilize the experience of industry in the food management program, The War Food Administration has set up some 70 Industry Advisory Committees. These committees assist officials of the War Food Administration in solving the joint problems that Government and industry face in the war food program. They are most helpful in working out the sorts of regulatory controls that will achieve the ends desired without unnecessary burden on the industries affected. They likewise cooperate closely in educating members of their industries as to the purpose, meaning and necessity of the food orders, and convey to the Government officials suggestions from the trade for amendments or improvements in the orders to make them function more efficiently or to adjust them to changing conditions. Arrangements have been worked out with the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration whereby the same industry advisors serve all three agencies, thus making possible a desirable coordination of industry contacts.

A further technique recently developed for industry relationships is the establishment of commodity boards. The War Meat Board, the first group of this kind set up, has already rendered valuable service in facilitating rapid coordination of procurement operations. Through it, representatives of the meat packing industry meet across the table with responsible officials of WFA, the Quartermaster General's Office, and the Rationing and Price Divisions of OPA to advise them in making current decisions on war meat programs. A Poultry and Egg Procurement Board has been established, and boards are being developed for dairy products 1/ and vegetable procurement and for storage coordination, also a procurement price panel; all as subcommittees of the Interagency Food Procurement Committee.

In administering the food orders, it is the policy of WFA to make compliance rather than prosecution its chief objective. An extensive program of food order education has been initiated. Simple, readable literature explaining the orders is disseminated throughout the trade. The assistance of trade associations and the food industry advisory committees is enlisted in getting information about the orders to everyone concerned. Meetings are held with State and local trade groups to discuss the aims and purposes of the orders and the methods of carrying out their provisions locally.

1/ The Dairy Products Board is now in operation.

Where violations are discovered, every effort is made to obtain the cooperation of the violator in correcting the situation. Actual administrative or judicial sanctions are undertaken only in the case of persistent or serious violations of the orders.

While it is anticipated that more food orders will have to be issued as scarcities of various foods become more severe, it is the policy of the War Food Administration to continue food orders in operation only as long as is necessary to serve their purpose and to modify, suspend or terminate them as rapidly as conditions justify.

The termination of restrictions on shell eggs, potatoes and chicory has already been mentioned. The quotas that were imposed on slaughtering of livestock in order to control meat supplies have also been suspended temporarily and experimentally in anticipation that the rationing program will suffice by itself to provide the needed control. General improvement in the fats and oils situation makes it appear likely that the very close controls that have been in operation on these commodities can gradually be relaxed; the first step in this direction was suspension on October 1 of restrictions on delivery to refiners of crude cottonseed, peanut and corn oil. In numerous other instances minor adjustments have been made in regulatory controls in order to simplify them or adapt them better to the purposes for which they are intended, and to reduce the burdens they impose on the industry.

The relationships with industry which these policies of War Food Administration have brought about and the resulting cooperation of industry have made the work of the administration much less difficult and contributed a great deal to the effectiveness of the various food programs.

CIVILIAN DISTRIBUTION

At present legal price levels, the civilian public alone would gladly buy all the food currently produced in the United States, in spite of increased production. The problem has not been to make available to them their allocated share of this supply. Rather, as previously described, the problem has been to restrict civilian consumption to levels approaching pre-war, so that Government agencies might be able to procure the supplies allocated for the Armed Forces, Lend-Lease, etc.

But this does not mean that the foods that are made available for civilians will be properly distributed. Controlled prices help keep foods within the reach of everyone, but by that very token they leave demand in excess of supply. Hence to assure orderly and equitable distribution, rationing of many foods is necessary, both directly to ultimate consumers and at earlier stages of marketing.

In addition, controlled prices have been to inflexible to direct the flow of foods properly between different areas and different uses, or to assure proper storage to even out consumption throughout the year. Increasingly, special measures are required to overcome seasonal and geographic dislocation in food distribution and to assure meeting the food needs of hospitals and other institutions, and of special groups like workers in heavy industry.

Finally, a broad program is being carried on to make fullest use of foodstuffs that are available for civilians by reducing food wastes, by developing new food products to substitute for or supplement those that war has rendered scarce, and by democratizing present-day knowledge of nutrition so that people in all areas and all classes can adjust their food consumption intelligently to the changing conditions that confront them.

Rationing

A number of foods are being rationed among civilians. For essential foods or groups of foods that are required in roughly equivalent amounts by all consumers, and the supply of which can be reasonably well controlled, this is unquestionably the most satisfactory method of orderly distribution under price ceilings. Individual consumer rationing is now in effect on beef, veal, pork, lamb, mutton, canned meats, and canned fish; cheese, canned milk, and butter; margarine, lard, and salad and cooking fats and oils; canned fruits and vegetables, including canned infant foods and soups, canned juices, frozen fruits, frozen vegetables, and certain dried fruits; preserves, jams, and jellies; and sugar.

The determination of the need for, the time and the extent of rationing is determined by the War Food Administration, while actual administration is the responsibility of the Office of Price Administration. The War Food Administration informs that Office periodically of the quantities of foods available for civilian consumption and consults with it on the allocation of these foods between different civilian uses and the adjustments needed in permitted levels of consumption.

Two additional commodities are currently being considered for rationing: fluid milk and soap. Both of these would be difficult to ration and it is hoped that other measures now being taken will obviate the necessity of rationing them. For milk, dealer quotas are being imposed for various classes of purchases in all the larger marketing areas. For soap, allowances of fats to soap-makers are being increased, and soap-makers are being required to extend fats with rosin in all soaps and include builders in laundry soaps and flakes.

For many commodities there are serious difficulties in rationing at the consumer level. For non-essential foods or those that are bought infrequently by consumers - spices, for example - the administrative burden of rationing is hardly justified. For other foods, individual requirements or customary consumption may vary so widely that no uniform ration allowance would be satisfactory. Fluid milk is an example of this. Discriminatory rations would certainly be necessary to assure adequate supplies for infants, children, expectant and nursing mothers, and invalids. Furthermore, customary consumption of fluid milk varies so widely from one area to another, and the marketing is so localized, that rations for fluid milk would inevitably have to be varied from one marketing area to another. Finally, for commodities that are produced and sold locally in most parts of the country, the difficulty of controlling supplies might well make rationing almost impossible

to administer effectively. Fresh fruits and vegetables and eggs are examples. Even with meats this has been a serious problem and War Food Administration found it necessary at least temporarily to back up meat rationing by imposing quotas on slaughterers in order to stop the great diversion of livestock from Federally-inspected to local slaughterers.

On a number of basic foods WFA hopes to avoid the necessity of rationing by assuring civilian supplies in large enough volume substantially to saturate the market. A number of other commodities are rationed within the trade, though not to ultimate consumers. Processors, dealers, or other handlers' volume is restricted, usually by quotas based on percentages of business in a base period, in order to assure all regular trade channels their fair share of supplies. In some cases, prohibitions or special restrictions are imposed on non-essential uses of the commodities. With basic distribution thus controlled, equitable distribution to ultimate consumers is left to trade responsibility.

Trade rationing is applied to several imports (tea, cocoa beans, certain spices, and salt fish), edible molasses, rice, certain tobaccos, and to fluid milk in the larger marketing areas. Restrictions have been imposed on certain uses of cocoa beans, honey, figs, apples, Concord grapes, and walnuts; on the composition of pet foods and soap; on the sale of heavy cream and the use of milk solids in ice cream and other frozen dairy foods; on the use of most fruits for alcoholic products, and of malted grains, malt syrup, and rice for brewing; and on the distribution of oil of peppermint.

Further Control of Civilian Distribution

In general, the programs just outlined have provided reasonably satisfactory civilian distribution. In some cases, however, rationing or alternative controls have been insufficient as substitutes for free prices in achieving the most desirable distribution of foods between the different regions of the country. In part, this is due to the inflexibility of regulated prices; in part to the slowness of the trade in adjusting to changing conditions.

For example, foods have tended to be consumed locally and to move in less than normal proportions from surplus to deficit producing areas. Even under rationing, meats and butter, for example, have been short in coastal areas when supplies were fully adequate in Midwestern producing areas. Centers of war activity where population has grown rapidly have had particular difficulty in getting sufficient food. Some outlying communities have been reported that were left virtually without supplies of certain foods as a result of wholesalers' contraction of delivery areas because of trucking restrictions and the greater profits in markets closer by. Some hospitals and other institutional buyers have had difficulties because their practice of purchase on the basis of bids leaves them with no established sources of supply of whom they can claim to be "regular" customers.

In the case of rationed commodities, responsibility for distribution problems of this kind rests with the Office of Price Administration. The memorandum of understanding

between that office and the WFA defined responsibilities of the latter to extend only to the processor level. Actually, the two agencies have worked together on an informal basis in dealing with many of these problems. In the case of non-rationed commodities, full responsibility resides in WFA.

So far, the WFA has confined itself chiefly to dealing with problems of this sort locally and specifically as they have arisen. Cooperation of trade groups has been requested in specific measures to alleviate difficulties - through increasing shipments into certain areas or communities, for example, or through accepting the accounts of buyers unable to find sources of supply. Priorities have been authorized to help hospitals obtain needed food, but their use has so far not been found necessary. Figures on population changes as indicated by ration book registrations have been distributed among the trade to guide them in making adjustments.

A special distribution problem has arisen in areas where population has grown so rapidly as to overburden existing food distribution facilities, especially retail stores. Opening up of new stores in such areas has been discouraged by difficulties in getting food supplies, fear that the expansion of markets will be only temporary, and alternative opportunities for making money that are more attractive than distributing food under controlled margins. Some assistance has been given the trade in such areas in obtaining sources of supply for new outlets and in presenting to local manpower boards the need for declaring retailing an essential field of employment.

While WFA believes that, taking the Nation as a whole, civilian distribution of food has been relatively satisfactory, it also recognizes the desirability of a more positive program for preventing or alleviating the spot problems that do arise. For one thing, some of the Food Distribution Orders, which have been nation-wide in application, may have accentuated regional shortages, The butter set-aside, for example, has applied to deficit - as well as to surplus-producing areas: exemption of deficit-producing areas might make them more nearly self sufficient. A thorough analysis of all the food orders is being undertaken to examine their impact on civilian distribution.

Another need is to obtain earlier and more complete information on supply conditions in all areas rather than wait for specific complaints as a basis for action. War Food Administration is working with local Food Advisory Committees of distributors in all parts of the country to develop an adequate reporting service for this purpose.

A further program currently under consideration would provide for issuing certificates authorizing the release of Government-controlled food (set-aside or other restricted stocks) to individuals presenting the certificates to a processor or agency holding such stocks. Such certificates could be used to meet emergency shortage situations, to assure supplies to certain preferred groups (hospitals, school lunch programs, industrial feeding projects, etc.) and to promote better equalization of food supplies between areas. A very small portion of the total civilian allocation, distributed through such a plan to specific points of need, would suffice to relieve the sorts of

spot problems that are being encountered. Such a program could well be carried on cooperatively with the OPA to relieve shortage problems in rationed foods, also. In this case, of course, the certificates would not be extra-ration, but would be required to be accompanied by ration points in making purchases.

If such a program is undertaken, it would be desirable to make specific allowances in future set-asides or other food orders in order to provide stocks against which the certificates might be issued.

A related problem is the difficulty in moving local surpluses of some perishable crops - for example, the surplus of new potatoes when the delayed crop finally came on last spring. In considerable part such problems are due to lack of trade incentives to make the adjustments that would normally speed the movement of such surpluses. Prices tend to remain at ceiling levels to protect margins, rather than be reduced to develop volume. War Food Administration responsibilities for maintaining support prices further complicate the situation.

A program centering around "Victory Food Selection" campaigns has been developed for getting the surpluses into consumption. As soon as they are anticipated, a campaign is planned through the trade and through other promotional channels by which the abundant supply of the surplus commodity will be publicized and consumer attention called to its nutritional value and the variety of ways in which it can be used. The trade is asked to cooperate also through adjusting prices for the commodity and otherwise arranging to move it in large volume. This sort of campaign has been very successful this fall, for example, in relieving the potato problem caused by lack of commercial storage facilities, thus minimizing the necessity of price support purchase and diverersion programs.

Special Food Needs

Another distribution problem is to adjust or supplement rationing to provide for special needs of certain groups - for example, workers in heavy industry. There have been complaints that such workers were not able to get enough meat, especially, and in some instances additional ration points for meat have been allowed them. The Office of Price Administration has taken the position, however, in which the War Food Administration concurs, that the distribution of extra ration points is undesirable and should be avoided wherever possible.

A better solution of the problem of industrial workers is to assure them the opportunity to buy an adequate (off-the-ration) mid-shift meal. Where commercial restaurant facilities are inadequate, as is the case particularly in many centers of war activity, institutional feeding facilities should be set up in the plants themselves.

To carry out a program for this purpose, an Inter-Agency Committee on Food for Workers has been formed under War Food Administration leadership and including representatives of War Production Board, Office of Price Administration and War Manpower Commission. Surveys are being made of the adequacy of feeding facilities for workers in industry and the extent of the need for

providing additional facilities. Educational and advisory work is being carried on with management and labor groups in industry and specific active assistance is already being given several plants interested in the establishment of facilities. Such assistance includes cooperation in planning the installation and operation of in-plant food services; aid in getting priorities for and obtaining necessary materials, equipment and supplies; help in recruitment and training of employees; and provision of food. Arrangements have been made for providing financial assistance where necessary in establishing facilities, using Lanham Act funds. In addition, the program calls for establishing of standards for food services and maintenance of prices at reasonable levels. Finally, nutrition education will be carried on in war plants and closely integrated with in-plant food service operations.

Another group whose special needs must be borne in mind is infants, children, and expectant and nursing mothers. So far no serious problem has been encountered here, but a problem will definitely arise if it becomes necessary to ration fluid milk. A problem has arisen in the case of invalids or other persons requiring special diets. So far local ration boards have been given wide discretion in dealing with such cases. To permit more orderly and uniform handling of them, and to provide a basis for preventing abuses, a Committee on Medical Food Requirements has been appointed by the National Research Council at the request of the War Food Administration. This committee will determine the specific diseases that require special allowances of rationed foods, the kinds and quantities of foods they require, and the best procedure for certification of individual cases.

Another type of complaint of inequity under rationing has to do with the unfair advantage it gives families with children who are entitled to full rations but eat less than adults, and to families who have nonrationed sources of foods available through home gardening, canning, etc. Conversely, it is complained that sugar rationing is unfair to farm families, who do more food preparation at home and have less ready access to stores selling baked goods and other processed foods containing sugar. These inequities are recognized; there is no end, however, to the administrative burden that might be involved in tailoring ration allowances to all sorts of individual variations of needs, and it seems wise to avoid going any farther in that direction than is necessary to remedy gross inequities.

School Lunches

One other important distribution program, the Community School Lunch Program, deserves special mention. This is one of the several programs for making foods available to underprivileged groups that the Department of Agriculture developed for disposing of agricultural surpluses. The other programs have been largely discontinued. The long-range social value of school lunches and school milk has been so widely recognized, however, that the Congress authorized the expenditure of $50 million for continuance and expansion of this program during the 1944 fiscal year.

Under the program as now operated, eligible schools and child care centers are reimbursed for expenditures for specified foods up to a certain number of cents per meal. The maximum allowance varies according to the adequacy of the lunch, and is higher for lunches including milk than for those not including milk. A limited payment is given schools serving the children milk only. It is estimated that this covers roughly 50 percent of food costs, on the average. The rest of the food costs and all service costs are the responsibility of local sponsors (in some cases with the help of State appropriations).

Any public or non-profit private school is eligible to participate if need for Federal assistance in serving nutritious lunches is shown. All children in the school may participate, but children unable to pay for the lunches receive them free or at less than cost, and no distinction is permitted between paying and non-paying children.

It is estimated that around five million children will be participating at the peak of the program this school year.

Food Enrichment

The program for enrichment of foods by adding vitamins or minerals is aiding substantially in overcoming deficiencies in nutrients of which there is danger that substantial segments of the population would otherwise have too low a daily intake. Enrichment of all white bread with thiamin, niacin, and iron has been made compulsory as a war measure. This order has hastened the practice of bread enrichment that had spread rapidly on a voluntary basis. Consideration is being given to extending this requirement to make enrichment of all white flour compulsory. Some States have laws requiring the enrichment of white flour and bread and also corn grits and degerminated cornmeal. It is estimated that about 1/3 of the white flour now used for civilian consumption is neither enriched in milling nor combined with enriching ingredients in the bakery.

The War Food Administration is actively encouraging, though not now requiring, enrichment of white flour and also of corn grits and cornmeal, cereals, and macaroni-type products. Progress is being made in overcoming technical difficulties in the enrichment of polished rice and it is hoped that a program may be possible to induce enrichment of this product.

Bread and other cereal products provide a very favorable medium for improving diets through enrichment because they are cheap basic foods one or another of which is consumed in large quantity by practically everyone. Such enrichment is of particular importance in wartime to protect the diets of those who, because cereal products are relatively cheap and abundant, increase their consumption of them in relation to their total daily food intake.

The most important other food enrichment practice that is widespread is the enrichment of margarine with vitamin A. This practice has become particularly important with the wartime shortage of butter and increase in margarine consumption. About 90 or 95 percent of the margarine being manufactured at present is enriched with vitamin A. Consideration is being given to the desirability of enriching some canned foods with synthetic vitamin C.

A related program promotes domestic distribution of soya flour, flakes, and grits. Production of these new products was originally promoted to provide them for military and Lend-Lease use. Capacity now exists for supplying the domestic market as well; estimated civilian supplies for the October 1 allocations year are 300 million pounds. Soya flour is one of the few vegetable products the protein in which compares in nutritional quality with animal proteins. Its use in commercial baking and in ground meat products is being encouraged, although difficulties have been encountered in connection with Food and Drug and Meat Inspection regulations. Soya flour is also being packaged for direct retail distribution.

Food Conservation and Economy Measures

As a further measure to make fullest use of the foods that are available, a food conservation program is being actively carried on, under such slogans as the "Clean Plate Club," which brings home to housewives and their families the importance to the war effort of eliminating all kinds of food wastes. Specific suggestions are given on food conservation practices ranging from how to prepare foods so as not to lose vitamins and minerals and how to use left-overs, all the way to wasteful rules of etiquette that should be suspended for the duration. Emphasis is placed on improvement in the family's home diet that can be achieved at the same time that the Nation's food supply is being augmented.

A somewhat different conservation program is embodied in food orders regulating practices in the distribution of bread and of milk. Wasteful trade practices like consignment selling of bread and the return of unsold milk are prohibited. These orders were issued in part to help hold down prices of these commodities by eliminating unnecessary distribution costs, but they likewise help to cut out wastes of the foods themselves and of resources and materials used in distributing them. A similar purpose is served in an order preventing shipment of low quality California plums, and in minor provisions in some of the other food orders.

Consumer Education in Nutrition

To tie together and implement the numerous phases of the war food program as they affect civilian consumers, the War Food Administration is working with more than 2600 local and county committees throughout the United States in carrying out a program of nutrition education. These voluntary committees have the job of informing housewives of the principles of nutrition and food conservation, and helping them apply these principles in adjusting consumption to rationing and other wartime changes in food marketing. They teach housewives how to prepare and conserve the foods that are available so as to take full advantage of them nutritionally.

The committees sponsor nutrition courses, canteen courses, and canteens, carry on wartime demonstrations, conduct nutrition surveys, and establish programs for the improvement of nutritional status. They promote school lunch programs and set up community centers for preserving the produce of victory gardens.

The nutrition committees play a vital part at the local level in such programs as the current "Food Fights for Freedom" campaign for informing the public regarding the war food program and the "Clean Plate Club" campaign for food conservation, the "Basic Seven" campaign for popularizing modern knowledge of nutrition; and the program for broadening consumption of enriched bread, flour, and other cereals. These committees at the local level, and coordinating committees at higher levels, enlist the support of public health agencies, the food industries and distributors in the over-all program for promoting better nutrition. As one result, many large industries and utilities are forwarding the program through contributions of educational advertising, organization of cooking schools and classes, assistance in the industrial feeding program, and in other ways.

VIII. FARM LABOR

The record production of 1943 has been achieved in the face of a serious shortage of skilled help. Since April 1, 1940, approximately 4,000,000 actual or potential workers have left farms or taken nonfarm jobs while continuing to live on farms. Approximately 1,000,000 of these farm workers entered the armed forces. Some replacements have, of course, been made, but a great part of the loss consisted of younger men, the most highly skilled and the handiest with farm machinery.

To compensate for this loss of experienced manpower, the American farmer has been driven to extreme measures. He has increased his own working hours. He has brought his wife and children into the working force. He has trained inexperienced city youth, women and men, to help him pull through his seasonal peak labor periods. He has used foreign workers, troops and prisoners of war. He has eliminated some crop operations and maintenance work necessary to keep up the farm plant, such as repairs on farm houses, on fences, etc.

The estimated number of man-days required to achieve the 1943 production totaled 2,168,940,000, as compared with 2,051,115,600 man-days required for the 1939 production. The increase in 1943 above 1939 is equivalent to the work performed by 471,280 men, each working 250 ten-hour days per year. Actually, there were fewer farm workers in 1943 than in 1939. Farmers had 398,000 fewer workers on hand in January, 1943, than they had employed in January, 1939; 609,000 fewer in April, 792,000 fewer in June, and 878,000 fewer in September. Moreover, these employment figures do not accurately reflect the 1943 farm labor situation, because the composition of the seasonal working force was unusual. It contained large numbers of inexperienced women, children and older men who manned jobs left by workers who had been drawn from the farms into the armed forces and war industries.

Requirements. The 1944 production goals (See Section IV) will require 71,900,000 more man-days than were required for the 1943 production program as shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7.
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS REQUIRED FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1943-1944

Item	1943 Man-Days	1944 Man-Days	Additional Man-Days 1944 over 1943
Major Crops1/	872,900,000	924,630,000	+51,730,000
Major Livestock2/	677,640,000	689,060,000	+11,420,000
Other3/	618,400,000	627,150,000	+ 8,750,000
Total	2,168,940,000	2,240,840,000	+71,900,000

1/ Man-days for 1943 are based on estimated crop acreages achieved and man-days for 1944 are based on acreage goals.
2/ Meat and livestock products. Man-days for 1943 are based on estimated livestock numbers, while those for 1944 are based on production goals.
3/ Home and market gardens, fruits, berries, nuts, miscellaneous crop acreages, horses and mules, ducks, geese, goats, bees, pasture, woods, and farm maintenance.

This additional work-load will require the equivalent of 267,000 additional men, each working 250 ten- hour days per year. On a seasonal basis, it is estimated that approximately 80,000 more farm workers will be needed in January, 1944, than were on farms in January, 1943; 320,000 more will be needed in April; 400,000 more in June; 350,000 more in July; and 400,000 more in September, than in the corresponding months of 1943. These approximations are based upon normal weather and crop maturity conditions.

We cannot expect to meet these additional farm labor requirements by a further increase in the working hours of farmers, members of their families and regular hired help. As a matter of fact, it may not be possible another year to equal this year's lengthened work days. One reason for a pessimistic outlook, is that 828,251, or 14 percent, of the farm operators reporting their ages at the time of the 1940 census, stated that they were 65 years of age or older. In normal times, many of these older operators would have retired and turned over their farms to younger men. The great movement of younger men from agriculture noted above, has prevented this in many cases. It must be obvious that an over-age farm operator, using an aging set of farm machinery, cannot indefinitely maintain production. His chances of meeting the increased 1944 food and fiber production goals depend upon the vigorous prosecution of a realistic farm labor program which demands able-bodied men to perform production tasks.

The margin of labor supply is so narrow on most of the Nation's commercial farms, that unfavorable weather conditions, or other emergencies, may at any time create needs that cannot be met by local labor resources.

Program for 1944. To help farmers meet their 1944 farm labor needs, plans for 1944 call for continued deferments for draft-age farm workers, for the complete mobilization of all local and State farm labor resources and where these are not sufficient, for the movement of interstate and foreign workers to areas of critical need in sufficient numbers at the right time.

DEFERMENT OF DRAFT-AGE FARM WORKERS

The exodus of draft-age workers from agriculture reached such proportions last year, that on November 13, 1942, Congress passed the Tydings Amendment to the Selective Service Act. This Amendment provides for the deferment of workers necessary to, and regularly engaged in, an agricultural occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort so long as they remain so engaged and until such time as a satisfactory replacement can be obtained. The Amendment supplanted earlier efforts of an administrative nature, designed to halt the drain of essential workers from dairy, livestock and poultry farms.

Since the passage of the Tydings Amendment, approximately 1,600,000 deferments have been granted to agricultural workers between the ages of 18 to 37, inclusive; these are about evenly divided into the II-C and III-C classifications. In interpreting these figures, it should be borne in mind that not all of those individuals would have been called by now if they had been taken in the order of their draft numbers. Furthermore, when due allowance is made for probable rejections for physical and mental handicaps, it will be seen that the number deferred solely because of the Tydings Amendment is considerably less than the total cited above.

The situation on the Nation's farms is such that the deferment of workers employed substantially full-time on productive farms is imperative if the production goals for 1944 and subsequent war years are to be met. This is especially true of those areas where agriculture is conducted on a year-round basis, including dairy, livestock, poultry and general farms.

RETURN OF WORKERS FROM NON-ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY TO AGRICULTURE

Several attempts have been made by the War Manpower Commission to encourage experienced dairy and general farm workers to return from non-deferrable occupations to farms. Some of these directives have induced considerable numbers of workers to return to farms for temporary periods. Upon learning that the directives carry no effective penalties, many of the workers involved have again left agriculture. Special tabulations of the Bureau of Census indicate that during the first quarter of 1943, the actual number involved in the shift from industry to farms was smaller this year than last. It would be highly desirable, and in the national interest, to devise effective means, by legislation or otherwise, for implementing the return to agriculture of experienced farm workers, now employed in jobs not essential to the successful prosecution of the war.

WFA RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT PROGRAM

On April 29, 1943, the President approved legislation (Public Law 45, 78th Congress), appropriating the sum of $26,100,000 to remain available until December 31, 1943, to be expended by the War Food Administrator for the purpose of assisting in providing an adequate supply of workers for the production and harvesting of agricultural commodities essential to the prosecution of the war. Half of the amount was ear-marked for allocation among the several States to enable the Agricultural Extension Services, under the supervision of the Administrator, to recruit, train, transport, and place farm workers. In a number of States where the U. S. Employment Service had well-developed farm placement programs, the Extension Service entered into contracts with the USES providing for the continuation of these activities. Twenty-nine State Extension Services have entered into cooperative agreements with the USES. In some States the agreement calls for little work to be performed by the USES, as witnessed by the sums allocated for this purpose: In Maine, $1,305; in Massachusetts, $2,100; in Nevada, $4,581. On the other hand, in States like Montana, New York, Oregon and Washington, the USES has taken a major role. The sums turned over by the Extension Service in these States are $33,668, $95,702, $67,274 and $82,127, respectively.

The other half of the appropriation was made available to the Administrator to operate the interstate and foreign phases of the program and to supervise Extension Service farm labor activities.

Contingent upon the appropriation of funds, the following program is projected for 1944 under this legislation:

Local Mobilization. Major emphasis will be placed on the mobilization of local people for farm work. To facilitate this campaign in 1943, approximately 650,000 volunteer neighborhood and group leaders cooperated with the county agricultural agents in arranging for the pooling of labor and labor-saving machinery. The major portion of these local efforts resulted in direct arrangements between farmers and workers and hence are not reflected in placement records. However, recruitment and placement

offices report that during the six months, May-October, inclusive, approximately 3,478,000 placements were made. Of these, about 3,332,000 were seasonal workers and the remainder of about 146,000 were year-round workers. It is estimated that these placements involved 1,500,000 different workers and the filling of approximately 1,000,000 orders from farmers.

In 1944, this program of local mobilization will be pushed even more vigorously than it was this year.

Intra-State Transportation of Workers. During the six months ending October 31, the State Extension Services have paid all or part of the cost of transporting 42,251 agricultural workers from areas of temporary surplus to areas of critical need within the respective states. Plans for 1944 provide for the transportation of 35,000 intra-state workers.

Interstate and Foreign Workers. The 1943 program of interstate and foreign recruitment and transportation of workers will be expanded in order to meet anticipated critical labor needs in achieving production goals. The projected 1944 numbers of interstate and foreign workers are as follows:

Interstate seasonal workers	50,000
Interstate year-round workers	10,000
Mexican Nationals	52,000
Bahamians	5,000
Jamaicans	2,000
Other West Indians	7,900
	126,900

From January 1, 1943 to December 16, 1943, a total of 13,950 domestic seasonal workers had been transported from 26 States having available workers at certain times to States having serious shortages of farm workers. Up to December 18, 1943, 5,058 year-round (full-time) workers had been transported and placed on dairy, poultry and general farms.

To obtain foreign workers, the War Food Administration, through the State Department, has negotiated agreements with the Governments of Mexico, the Bahama Islands and Jamaica. By November 27, 1943, 55,477 workers had been imported from Mexico; 4,698 from the Bahama Islands; and 8,828 from Jamaica. As of November 27, 23,667 Mexicans, 2,822 Jamaicans and 3,827 Bahamians were working in agriculture. These foreign laborers have worked in 30 States cultivating and harvesting truck crops, potatoes, fruits, sugar beets, and other agricultural commodities.

Interstate and foreign workers in 1944 will be used as they have been in 1943, to supply help to farmers in areas of critical labor shortages. The nature of farm production in certain localized areas of the country is such that considerable numbers of out-of-state workers are needed for limited periods of time. The Maine potato area, the spring wheat area, cotton and peanut areas, citrus fruit areas and vegetable areas may be cited for examples. With the exception of the year-round workers, most of them will be used in more than one area.

Two legal obstacles to the interstate movement of farm workers need to be removed if this projected program is to be fully achieved.

(a) Public Law 45 states "No part of the funds herein appropriated shall be expended for the transportation of any worker from the county where he resides, or is working, to a place of employment outside of

such county, without the prior consent, in writing, of the county extension agent of such county, if such worker has resided in such county for a period of one year or more immediately prior thereto, and has been engaged in agricultural labor as his principal occupation during such period." This language has the effect of making it difficult to recruit labor from known labor surplus areas. To some extent, the barrier set up by this language is psychological and some interstate movement has occurred in spite of it. It would be desirable, however, to have this language modified, and Congress is being requested to change it.

(b) Twelve States have legislation which tends to discourage interstate movement of workers. They are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Most of these laws require large annual license fees for private recruiting agents and carry severe penalties for violation. To some extent, State officials have tried to use these laws to restrict interstate recruitment of workers by public agencies. These laws do not promote the general welfare of the Nation and as a wartime measure, it would be desirable for them to be altered to permit shifting of labor from surplus areas to areas of need.

Other Sources of Farm Labor. In addition to the local recruitment, transportation of interstate seasonal and year-round labor and foreign importation, arrangements were made during May, June, July, August, and September, 1943, for the use of approximately 12,600 Japanese internees; 4,400 inmates of corrective and penal institutions; 2,500 conscientious objectors; 54,500 members of the Military Service volunteering for farm work on passes of from one to three days' duration, and 7,425 soldiers (detailed by unit from the War Department) to assist in agricultural work during the current year. Up to November 31, 1,208,000 man-days of Prisoner of War labor had been used in agriculture. All of these sources of labor will be utilized in 1944 to the extent available to meet labor needs in excess of those that can be taken care of by local labor.

Specialized efforts have been made toward securing more effective utilization of farm labor and labor-saving practices, and distributing pamphlets and educational material in other forms, relating directly to methods of meeting farm labor needs.

Farmers have been sufficiently impressed by the quality of work performed by prisoners of war to be willing to pay prevailing wages for their services. Now that Italy has surrendered, the War Food Administration has received numerous requests that Italian prisoners be made available in large numbers with fewer guards. The Australian system of billeting war prisoners has been recommended for study. Under this plan, individual prisoners are placed with farmers and military force is not employed unless they attempt to escape.

The certification procedure, requesting troops for emergency work in agriculture, is unduly complicated. This procedure needs clarifying and streamlining, to assure immediate action in preventing serious loss of food and fiber essential to the successful prosecution of the war.

Operation of Farm Labor Supply Centers. In order to furnish feeding, housing and other facilities necessary for use of foreign and interstate workers, farm labor supply centers have been operated by the War Food Administration on 151 sites. These centers have accommodations for a total of about 20,000 families, or on the basis of single workers, from 70,000 to 80,000. These centers include those formerly utilized by the Farm Security Administration, former CCC camps, NYA camps, renovated community buildings, fair buildings, standard equipment borrowed from the Army and other facilities.

For 1944, the program for farm labor transportation involving some 126,900 individuals will be exceedingly difficult without additional labor supply centers to serve as reception points, placement centers, and sites for housing and subsistence of the transported workers, especially in those essential crop areas in which private housing facilities do not permit the necessary numbers of workers to live on the land of the growers who employ them.

The labor supply centers program for the calendar year 1944 is intimately and indivisibly linked with the farm labor transportation program. The extent to which transportation at Federal expense can be effective in terms of the number of days of labor supplied to growers, depends very largely on the existence of adequate housing facilities.

During the current year (calendar 1943), it has been possible to operate in some cases on a makeshift arrangement, either using inadequate facilities or in some cases using such facilities as may have been available in areas not immediately adjacent to the area of need. This creates problems, however, in that in the former case, where adequate housing cannot be assured, it is difficult to get interstate workers to move into the area of need and, in addition, in many cases local health and medical authorities have raised serious objections to the facilities used. In the case where the camp is not near the area of need, there is much loss of manpower involved in long hauls between camp and work, as well as additional use of, and expense for, gasoline, tires and other travel requirements. In other cases, there is simply no housing available even within a reasonable distance of the area of need. In order to effectuate a better distribution and utilization of workers, a request has been made for the construction and equipment of 14 additional portable shelter type (frame) centers, including site developments and the purchase and/or construction of and equipment for 35 portable tent type centers, including site development at 70 localities.

WAGE STABILIZATION

Under war conditions, involving shortage of manpower in the face of unprecedented demand for productive forces, it is inevitable that farm wages, which in the past have suffered under the influence of a surplus labor supply, should tend to rise. It is likewise inevitable that the rise of farm wage rates should be of uneven character, affecting some branches of production more than others. However, in the interest of war production and the maintenance of national morale, it is necessary that wage increases, whether on the farm or elsewhere, should not give rise to inflationary tendencies. Farm wage rates must be maintained in a proper relation to wage rates in processing plants and in industrial employment, as well as in relation to the prices of farm products. Control of farm wage rates is also highly desirable as a means of avoiding loss of working time through excess labor turnover and the "pirating" of farm labor from one grower by another, especially in seasonal crop operations. Hence, the need for measures looking toward wage stabilization.

Authority to stabilize agricultural wages has since November 30, 1942, been in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture and the War Food Administrator. This authority was based on the Act of October 2, 1942, (Public Law 729, 77th Congress) and the subsequent Executive Orders 9250 and 9328. Under the regulations of the Economic Stabilization Director, as revised on August 28, 1943, employers of agricultural labor are free to raise wages up to $2400 per annum at their

own option, unless and until the War Food Administrator determines that such increases may no longer be made without his approval. This freedom of agricultural wage rates from limitations placed by the Economic Stabilization Director upon all nonagricultural wage rates was justified on the grounds (1) "that the general level of salaries and wages for agricultural labor is substandard," (2) "that a high disparity exists between salaries and wages paid labor in agriculture and salaries and wages paid labor in other essential war industries," and (3) "that the retention and recruitment of agricultural labor is of prime necessity in supplying the United Nations with needed foods and fibers."

The regulations also provide that "no employer shall decrease wages and salaries paid to agricultural labor below the highest salary rate or wage paid for such work between January 1, 1942, and September 15, 1942, without the approval of the War Food Administrator." The penalties for violation of wage stabilization orders are severe. Violators, whether employers or employees, are subject to a fine of not more than $1000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year or to both penalties. In addition, where wages or salaries have been increased in contravention of a wage stabilization order, the amount of the salary or wage paid at the increased rate is disregarded by all agencies of the Government for the purpose of determining production costs of the employer in relation to price control, income tax returns, or contracts with the Government.

During the period of more than a year that agricultural wage rates have been under the jurisdiction of the Department, what has been done toward stabilization has been with a view to promoting orderly utilization of the labor supply. Up to December 15, 1943, wage ceiling orders had been issued by the War Food Administrator with reference to five groups of workers. Four of these orders were based on the recommendations of the California USDA Wage Board, the fifth on that of a similar board in Florida. The first, issued April 14, 1943, established maximum wage rates for harvesting asparagus for canning and freezing in five California counties; the second, issued August 24, 1943, related to the harvesting of canning tomatoes in 20 California counties; the third, issued August 26, 1943, set maximum rates for picking sun-dried raisin grapes in eight California counties, and the fourth, issued October 2, 1943, established ceilings on cotton picking in six California counties. The Florida order, issued November 25, 1943, established maximum wage rates for persons engaged in harvesting tangerines, oranges, and grapefruit.

Detailed reports on the California programs have been issued only with reference to asparagus. It appears that all four programs have won general approval. Labor turnover has been reduced; efficiency of labor on the job has been increased; wage rates have been prevented from rising to the high levels characteristic of the previous season. To what extent these beneficial developments have been due to the wage stabilization program, to what extent to an improved condition of labor supply, involving the employment of a considerable number of Mexican nationals, is not yet clear. At any rate, the operation of the program has been such as to give rise to a demand on the part of growers for an extended system of wage ceilings in California in 1944. The Florida program is still of too recent origin to permit generalization concerning results.

During the 1943 season, it has become increasingly clear that in a number of instances, particular farm wage rates were rising to such

a degree as to cause dislocations in food processing and industrial wage structures. The food processing industry has complained about the difficulty of keeping workers in the plants because of the high wages to be made on the farms. Similar observations have been made by Regional War Labor Boards. Between October 1, 1942, and the same date a year later, the farm wage rate index increased by 60 points, the greatest rise ever recorded within a year's time. In the Pacific area, the rise was one of 72 points. On October 1, 1943, farm wage rates had increased 117 percent over those of July 1940.

Despite rapid rises during 1943, farm wage rates in general are still substandard, whether measured in relation to farm income or in relation to industrial wage rates. The relationship between farm wage rates and net farm income in 1943 was roughly that of the years 1935-39, a period when farm wages were depressed by heavy unemployment and restricted movement of farm people to the cities. Figures of the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that on September 1, 1943, earnings in all manufacturing industries were 99.3 cents per hour, $7.40 per day, and $44.39 per week. At the nearest comparable date for which figures of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics are available, viz., October 4, 1943, hourly earnings of hired agricultural workers were 34.3 cents, daily earnings were $3.51, and weekly earnings were $17.15. Even the lowest paid of the manufacturing industries, namely cotton manufacture and cottonseed crushing, were well above the agricultural level. At these same dates, hourly farm wage rates were only 47 percent of the wage rate paid for common labor in road building in the United States, while daily rates on the farm were only 53 percent of the daily rate paid in road work.

Despite the fact that farm wage rates are still, for the most part, of a substandard character, it is anticipated that the year 1944 will call for more extensive measures of wage stabilization. It is expected that Wage Boards will be established by the War Food Administrator in all States in which during 1943 farm wages arose to undesirably high levels or in which it is anticipated that in 1944 they will do so. It will be the duty of the State Wage Boards to make recommendations to the War Food Administrator with respect to the setting of maximum wage rates for specific crop operations in carefully defined areas. Attention will be paid to regional and area differentials. It will also be the duty of the Wage Boards to make adjustments necessary on account of hardships caused by the wage stabilization program, and to administer the program with a view to securing compliance from all concerned. In this, the Wage Boards will have the active cooperation of State and County War Boards.

FOOD INDUSTRY LABOR PROBLEMS

The labor problems of the food processing industries are of concern to the War Food Administration, because many, if not most, farm products must be processed before they can be properly classified as food. Increased farm production would be futile if foodstuffs were allowed to go unprocessed because of inadequate manpower.

The 1944 labor requirements of the food industries will probably be the largest on record. A high proportion of the 1944 agricultural production (See Chapter V) will have to be processed so that it can be stored and/or shipped, so as to be available to the military forces, to civilian population of this country, as well as other countries, when and where needed.

The labor supply available to the industry has not increased in proportion to the increased demands for processed foods. On the contrary, in some of the food industries, employment has actually declined. Furthermore, the productive output of the available labor force is far less than that of a comparable number of pre-war employees, because greater numbers of women, children and older men are now employed by the food industries.

Fruits and Vegetables. The labor problems of processors and packers of fruits and vegetables are due largely to the existence of a seasonal pattern of operation coupled with a relatively low wage scale. Large numbers of unskilled workers are required during peak periods and relatively small numbers during other periods. Employment in canning and preserving plants varied from 95,000 in January, 1943, to 159,000 in July, 1943. Relatively few skilled or permanent employees are employed.

Many of the fruit and vegetable processing plants and packing houses utilize workers interchangeably with agriculture, and there has been a rather close relationship between farm and processing wages. Since the advent of industrial wage stabilization under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended by the Act of October 2, 1942, this relationship has been somewhat disturbed, because fruit processing wages are stabilized at September 15, 1942, levels, whereas agricultural wages are generally subject only to a $2400 annual ceiling.

Many fruits and vegetables are highly perishable and must be processed as soon as possible after harvesting in order to prevent food losses. For example, tomatoes harvested for canning purposes, deteriorate rapidly as shown in Table 8. This emphasizes the necessity for adequate processing labor when and where crops are ready for processing.

Table 8. LOSS IN WEIGHT, QUALITY AND VALUE PER TON OF TOMATOES DUE TO HOLDING

Time Lapse Before Canning	Weight Original	Weight After Canning	Loss Quantity	Quality U. S. 1	Quality U. S. 2	Quality Culls	Value Per Ton
7 hrs.	2000	2000	0 lbs.	70%	30%	0%	$24.25
31 hrs.	2000	1977	23 lbs.	57%	31%	12%	20.76
55 hrs.	2000	1964	36 lbs.	48%	19%	33%	16.38

(Value based on $28.00 for U.S.1 and $15.50 for U.S.2 grades per ton)

A. D. Radebaugh - Chief, Raw Products Division, Research Division of American Can Company

The U. S. Employment Service is responsible for the recruitment and placement of labor for fruit and vegetable processing. It would be highly desirable to permit the WFA to supplement the recruitment activities of the U. S. Employment Service in the event of critical labor shortages. Under the authority given to the War Food Administration (Public Law 45, 78th Congress), the WFA is not authorized to place workers transported for agricultural field labor in commercial canning and food processing plants; whereas, the 1943 experience demonstrated time and again that agricultural workers recruited under the Farm Labor program described above (pages 1-10) could be more efficiently used if they could be made available for limited periods of time interchangeably in the processing of certain perishable agricultural commodities. Congress has been requested to provide to WFA this additional authority.

As indicated above, wages in this industry have been stabilized as of September 15, 1942, levels and these levels have proven to be such as to make retention and recruitment of adequate labor difficult. Furthermore, seasonal food processors are exempted from overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, except as specific plants are authorized by the Wage and Hours Division of the Department of Labor and/or the War Labor Board to pay overtime. Because of the existence of substandard wages in many plants, it would be desirable to allow the payment of time and a half for overtime under the regulations governing other industries.

The seasonal pattern of operation makes it virtually impossible for employers to ascertain in advance what wages will be necessary to attract sufficient labor to process the crop during the operating months. Canners have, in many cases, waited until a month or six weeks prior to the canning period to file wage applications and many times these wage applications have not been processed by the time the season begins. It is recommended, therefore, that the War Labor Board give immediate consideration to wage applications filed by seasonal and perishable food processors. It would be desirable if an employer could be notified of a decision on his application not later than a week after the date of its receipt in the regional office of the War Labor Board.

The wage bracket procedure of the War Labor Board sets levels of wages for the various industries. There has been considerable reluctance on the part of the War Labor Board to permit unskilled labor in the food processing industries to receive the same hourly rate that is paid to unskilled labor in the other war industries in the area. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for the food industries to obtain sufficient labor until, and unless, cannery wages are permitted to rise to the levels paid for similar work by other industries in the area.

Meat Packing and Slaughtering. The meat packing industry is experiencing a manpower shortage which threatens to curtail output. During September, 1942, there were 177,500 workers in meat packing plants, while in September, 1943, total employment had dropped to 159,300 workers. The situation is likely to be especially critical as operations reach a seasonal peak during the next four months. Table 9 shows that increased slaughter is already taking place.

Table 9. Number of Livestock Slaughtered in Principal Federally Inspected Centers, Selected Weeks.

		Oct. 1941	Oct. 1942	Oct. 1943
Hogs	1st wk.	632,700	617,050	815,258
	2nd wk.	606,871	568,575	578,057
Cattle	1st wk.	177,549	192,020	201,519
	2nd wk.	181,079	196,994	202,948
Calves	1st wk.	79,746	87,541	93,838
	2nd wk.	86,046	88,717	99,073
Sheep & Lambs	1st wk.	304,347	457,485	455,613
	2nd wk.	281,213	450,728	491,031

Source: War Meat Board

The manpower situation in the meat packing industry is complicated by the fact that nearly half of the plants are located either in critical labor shortage areas, or in areas where labor shortages are expected within the next six months. Roughly, a fourth of the industry is centered in Chicago, which is designated by WMC as a number 2 critical labor area.

Inasmuch as the need is for larger numbers of unskilled laborers for a temporary period, the War Food Administration has requested the State Agricultural Extension Services, through the county agents, to lend every assistance to the local U. S. Employment Service offices by making known to them those workers who can be spared temporarily from agriculture for work in the meat packing industry as well as in other vital non-farm activities. It is probable that an agressive campaign of recruitment of temporarily under-employed farm workers will help materially in meeting the immediate problem in most of the meat packing plants.

In Chicago, a temporary local arrangement was made permitting the use of soldiers on three day passes.

The situation warrants greater recruitment efforts on the part of the U. S. Employment Service. Meat packing should receive a high labor priority rating in order to assure that workers will be referred by the U. S. Employment Service to the packing plants.

Milk Assembly Service. The labor problems of the dairy products processing industry have not been critical with the exception of a situation that has recently developed in connection with the transportation of milk from the producer to the processing plant or point of assembly. Milk is usually hauled from the farms by a person who owns a truck and who, in addition, is a part-time farmer. Rates for other types of trucking have risen without a corresponding rise in rates for hauling milk. As a result of this condition, there has been a steady exodus of workers from this type of employment.

There is no immediate solution to the problem. It could be largely met by permitting a rise in the rates for hauling milk from producers to assembly points or processing plants, but this would result in a demand for a rise in the price of milk, which would be inflationary. The problem is presented here because it may become more critical in the future and require special consideration.

OTHER LABOR PROBLEMS

There are several agricultural input industries and industries supporting food processing, which are encountering grave manpower problems. These are commercial feed production, fertilizer production, seed processing, container production, the maintenance of agricultural machinery and trucks, and food warehousing.

Feed. Supplies of commercial feed are insufficient for the present production of livestock and poultry and the lack of manpower is a limiting factor in the processing of available supplies of ingredients. This is especially true in the Southeast where the industry has not paid high enough wages to keep labor from being attracted to defense industries. To secure adequate manpower for this industry, it will be necessary to bring about wage adjustments that will bring wages in line with those paid by other local industries.

Fertilizer. The fertilizer industry, including the Agricultural liming materials industry, is operating under capacity because of labor shortages. The fertilizer industry is located primarily in the port areas and shortages are caused by competition from other defense industries in the ports. The industry requires wage adjustments, which will bring wages in this industry into line with the prevailing wages of competitive industries in the same area.

Food Warehousing. In many cases both refrigerated and dry storage food warehouses are being prevented from operating to capacity because of insufficient labor. Additional space could often be utilized in a warehouse if the labor were available for restacking products. The ice manufacturing and car icing industry also is confronted with a similar labor problem.

Warehousing and ice manufacturing require a type of labor which cannot be readily performed by women or by men who are physically unfit for heavy work. Unskilled labor is being attracted away from the food warehousing industry by more lucrative employment in other industries.

Manpower surveys based on numbers of workers may show no shortage of labor in an area where there is a serious shortage of able-bodied men. The Army and Navy have offered some relief in certain cases, by allowing men on leave to aid in unloading, loading, stacking and related tasks. Also, some use has been made of war prisoners. However, this relief is at best very local; it is neither permanent nor adequate.

Some of the current labor turnover could be prevented if appropriate action were taken to recognize that jobs in the storage and ice manufacturing industries are equally as critical as those in other industries. At present in Activities and Occupations Bulletin No. 26, of the War Manpower Commission, warehousing occupations are recognized as essential and the industry itself is recognized as essential. The ice industry is listed as essential, but some of the occupations within the industry are not. In practice, these industries are still victims of labor piracy, and labor continues to shift to other industries.

Agricultural Machinery and Truck Maintenance. There is a serious shortage of competent mechanics to install parts and make necessary repairs, in locations accessible to the farmer. The over-age agricultural machinery and trucks are left standing for want of repairs, because cross-roads garages and service stations are closed. Obviously, when trucks and agricultural machinery are required to operate many more hours than previously, before replacement, more repair work is necessary. It would appear, therefore, that deferment of mechanics in rural and semirural communities is essential to production and to the continued movement of perishable foodstuffs from the farm. Milk, in particular, is in danger from this standpoint, and large numbers of trucks carrying milk to market are already running into serious difficulties because of the absence of local mechanics capable of making necessary repairs.

Seed Processing. Grading, sorting, storing and packaging of seeds is vital to agricultural production. This is especially true with respect to vegetable seeds and certain specialized seeds such as hybrid corn. It has been reported that many seed processing plants are falling behind schedule because of insufficient labor. The industry is seasonal in character and most of the need is for unskilled workers.

Containers. The fresh fruit and vegetable industry required about 163 million baskets and hampers during 1943. Next year, the need will undoubtedly be greater. About 61 million of the containers used in 1943 were used twice. There will be a definite need in 1944 for salvaging greater numbers of used containers. Manpower is one of the chief drawbacks to salvage operations. It is possible that community salvage campaigns may provide considerable volunteer labor. Additional requirements must be met through recruitment efforts by the U. S. Employment Service.

IX MATERIALS AND FACILITIES

An adequate supply of machinery and equipment, materials and facilities is one of the several conditions necessary to achieve 1944 food goals.

These materials and facilities are needed for the major programs, such as farm machinery, food processing machinery, metal and other containers and closures, building construction and repair, and for fertilizers and chemicals.

To produce the essential machines, equipment and materials, the War Production Board must make available:

1. Steel, copper, and aluminum ("controlled materials") for the construction of nearly all the items named above.

2. Other critical materials, such as glass, paperboard and wood for containers.

3. Standard fabricated components for farm and processing machinery, such as electric motors, antifriction bearings, carburetors, gears, axles, etc.

4. Raw materials for fertilizers and insecticides.

5. Fabrication capacity to produce the completed product at the time when it is needed.

Furthermore, the allotments of these materials must be translated into finished products in time to meet the food program requirements.

The 1944 food program will encounter difficulties and fail to reach its goals if:

1. Allocations of materials and component parts are inadequate and

2. Actual production of finished products from these allocated materials is delayed.

The current materials situation may be summarized as follows:

1. The allotment of critical materials (Steel, copper, and aluminum) by WPB is relatively satisfactory. The steel allotment for the first quarter of 1944 is as follows:

Items	Tons
Farm machinery	318,000
Food containers and closures	508,000
Processing machinery	20,000
Construction	15,000
Fishing boats	1,500
Total	862,500

2. Component parts for farm machinery (motors, gears, magnetoes, etc.) are not adequate, and unless immediate action by WPB is taken, farm machinery, particularly tractors, will fall well behind the 1944 schedule. This action cannot be delayed without danger because it takes months before manufacturers get allotments, place orders at mills, and get final delivery of the component parts. Thus, a satisfactory allotment of materials means little if component parts are not adequate for completion of the end product.

3. Component parts for food processing machinery are also short and, again, energetic action by WPB is required.

The material supply situation, therefore, is spotty. So far as allocations of critical materials go, conditions are tolerable; so far as component parts go, conditions are bad; and much the same can be said of some of the food container materials.

Food needs in 1944 will be greater than in this or past years. With limited farm labor supply, we need more farm machinery and fertilizers to maintain and increase output. Labor-saving farm machinery is the flexible element in the production outlook. Machinery production at a possible 80 percent of 1940 does not restore the rate of agricultural mechanization going on at that time. Yet, the need is for an accelerated rate of mechanization to achieve the flexibility in food production required by war conditions.

Component parts shortages threaten the 80 percent program for farm machinery and for food processing for the 1944 food program.

An allocation of adequate controlled material for farm machinery to cover tractor needs is valueless unless the bronze bushings, magnetoes, and gears are obtained, without which no tractor can run. Much food machinery is wholly useless without the gauges, thermometers, and recording instruments by means of which its operation is regulated.

In general, the problem is this: Components, such as gearheaded motors, ball and roller bearings, gasoline engines, and malleable iron castings are "critical" because tremendous quantities are required for the implements of war. The priority rating for all critical equipment is AA-1 as against a basic rating of AA-2 for farm machinery and AA-3 for most food and other agricultural processing machinery.

Without emergency action when needed, these priority ratings can have the effect of postponing delivery of the completed farm implement or processing machine beyond the seasonal crop period for which they were needed. But what makes it even more serious is that when the supposed delivery date of the component arrives, the machine manufacturer is often informed that since his original order was placed additional higher rated orders have been received and that delivery cannot be made for another several months.

This has one of two consequences: either the machine manufacturer refuses to begin fabrication until he has the needed components on hand or he finds himself with dozens or hundreds of tractors or other machines, complete except for one or more essential parts without which they cannot operate. In either event, the lack of the critical component acts as a bottleneck to prevent the completion of important processing or farm machinery programs.

However, a fairly sizable amount of AA-1 authority is now available to the farm machinery manufacturers who need it in order to place orders and receive prompt delivery of critical components in competition with the highest rated military orders. This should result in alleviating for farm machinery much of the above-mentioned component difficulties. Without this authority delivery cannot be made in most cases in less than 3 to 9 months, depending on the particular component involved.

In the case of processing machinery the following components are the most critical.

Components	Rating	
	AA-3	AA-1
	Delivery time (Months)	
Electric motors		
Fractional and geared head	6-7	4-5
Special and shield	7-9	4-6
Gauges	6-9	3-6
Thermometers	5-9	3-6
Recorders	5-9	3-6
Bearings		
Ball	3-6	1-3
Roller	6	2
Bronze bushings	5-6	2-4

These figures represent not actual delivery time after one or more postponements but the initial "promises" which manufacturers of these components were making in October. Except for motors, which may in this case be somewhat affected by unusual specifications, these delivery times are regarded as typical.

Illustrative of the seriousness of the situation, roughly 85 percent of canning machinery and 65 percent of dairy, egg, and poultry machinery includes one or more of the above critical components.

Machinery of these and the other more important food processing industries was first programmed by the War Food Administration for the third quarter of 1943, both with respect to needed replacement of worn out machines and the expanded capacity required to process expanding crop goals. Much of this machinery must be delivered in the first or second quarter of 1944 (4 to 9 months after the beginning of the fourth quarter) to be of much use in processing 1944 crops.

Farm machinery needs are of two sorts--critical components for repairs and critical components for new machinery. For a great range of farm machinery items little or no components are needed, hence for a good part of this program there should be no difficulty in meeting production schedules. It is in the production of heavy powered items such as larger combines, sprayers and earth-working equipment, and others where shortage of components may seriously retard production schedules.

The more important critical components needed for repairs are:

Components	Some of the Machines Affected
Magnetoes	Tractors, combines, sprayers, pick-up balers
Bearings and bushings	Tractors, combines, threshing machines, feed mills, sprayers, peanut pickers
Gears	Especially tractors
Forgings (crank shafts, connecting rods, crane shafts, etc.)	Tractors, combines, sprayers, pick-up balers
Valve stems and heads	Tractors, combines, sprayers, pick-up balers

The more important critical components for new machines are:

Components	Some of the Machines Affected
Same list as "repairs" plus the following -	
Carburetors	Tractors, combines, sprayers, pick-up balers
Malleable castings	Nearly all machines and implements
Disc blades	Disc plows, harrows, and cultivators
Gasoline engines, water-cooled	Tractors, combines, sprayers, pick-up balers
Electric motors, fractional	Milking machines, milk coolers, water systems

The War Food Administration feels that this component part situation is the most serious problem in the entire machinery and equipment production programs.

CONTROLLED MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 1944

Estimated requirements for controlled materials for 1944 compared with the estimated quantities used in 1943 are shown in Appendix G. These requirements, projected on the basis of minimum needs to meet food goals, show substantial increases over 1943 especially for replacement of machinery and equipment. During 1942 and the early part of 1943, used equipment, inventories, and the extension of existing equipment by repair made it possible to get by with a smaller rate of production. This practice cannot be continued without grave danger to the food program. Replacement must be made at a much higher rate in 1944 in order to maintain the necessary level of food production.

Somewhat less restrictive allocations in the last quarter of 1943 offer some indication that the War Production Board is now recognizing the essential needs of the food program.

Farm Requirements

Farm Machinery: Production of farm machinery is controlled by the War Production Board. The farm machinery order covering the year beginning October 1, 1942, originally limited new machinery production to about 23 percent of 1940 and later permitted manufacture of about 40 percent of 1940 production. But not even this quantity was produced, because of delays in allocating critical materials and because priority ratings were too low. Beginning with the third quarter of 1943 the original order was superseded by order L-257, which permits production for 1944 use of about 80 percent of the 1940 level. If manufactured, this will amount to about 285 million dollars of new equipment at 1940 valuations and 134 million dollars for repair parts.

The War Food Administration requested the War Production Board to amend the order to permit the manufacture of additional quantities of harvesting equipment required by the larger 1944 acreage goals for wheat, corn, potatoes, dry beans, dry peas, soybeans, hay, etc. This request was granted recently, raising the production level for farm machinery to about 84 percent of the 1940 level. As a safety factor against schedule failures on tractors, three manufacturers who indicated their ability to take on additional production were given extra quotas totaling 34,000 tractors.

Following is an index of purchases of farm machinery and repair parts based on 1940 and on the average 1920-41.

Table 10

Index of Farm Machinery Purchases, 1927-43.

Year	1920-41=100	1940=100	Year	1920-41=100	1940=100
1927	109	76	1936	116	81
1928	107	75	1937	150	105
1929	125	87	1938	126	88
1930	106	74	1939	120	84
1931	56	39	1940	143	100
1932	23	16	1941	189	132
1933	24	17	1942	167	117
1934	48	34	1943*	76	53*
1935	86	60	1944*	144	101*

* Based on estimates supplied by Farm Machinery & Supplies Branch; assumes the same rates of repair parts to machinery as was sold in 1942. Figures for 1944 and 1945 are for manufacturers' years beginning July 1, 1943, and July 1, 1944.

The farm machinery authorized under L-257, together with the additional harvesting equipment, will be sufficient (with the possible exception of tractors) to provide minimum requirements for meeting 1944 crop goals. The tractor program is necessarily based on the remaining productive capacity of the industry after essential military needs have been satisfied. Because it is a minimum program, any failure to produce the authorized output for want of adequate component parts might result in a failure to meet the 1944 goals. However, as previously stressed, there is no assurance that the farm machinery schedules now outlined will be met.

Farm machinery purchased since the close of World War I is estimated to be within the following age brackets:

Number of years old	Percent
Less than 6	32
6-12	14
12-24	54

About 25 percent of the farm machinery inventory is now in the average discard age--15-18 years--and any failure in the production program may be extremely serious.

Distribution and Rationing: In 1943 production and distribution factors necessitated rationing and distribution controls over 91 types of farm machinery. In 1944 better production and distribution conditions have made it possible to reduce the number of types of machinery over which distribution controls will be maintained to only 46 types, and over which rationing controls will be maintained to 31 types.

The new rationing and distribution program provides for a minimum control over distribution. More normal trade relationships do exist between farmers, dealers, and manufacturers. Only the most essential equipment is rationed. While a few types of machines may not be vital to all sections of the country, each type is of major importance to some areas and essential crops.

Fertilizers: A considerably improved fertilizer situation is in store for farmers in 1944. In the 12 months ending July 1, 1943, farmers used about 10.5 million tons of chemical fertilizers. Over all, about 10 percent more is expected to be available for the 1943-44 crop season. There will be about 40 percent more nitrogen, 15 percent more superphosphate, but less potash.

With the exception of approximately 700,000 tons of nitrogen-carrying fertilizer imported from Chile and 341,000 tons from Canada, with about 3,000 tons of phosphate also coming from Canada, our supplies of commercial fertilizers are of domestic production as indicated in the following table.

Table 11

Supplies
(Tons)

	Used 1942-1943	Anticipated Use 1943-1944	Imports 1942-1943 Actual	Imports 1943-1944 Estimated
Nitrogen (with carrier)	1,976,000	2,345,000	200,000 (Canada)	341,000 (Canada)
			1,000,000 (Chile)	700,000 (Chile)
Phosphoric Acid (with carrier)	5,800,000	7,000,000	3,000 (Canada)	3,000 (Canada)
Potash	980,000	950,000	Insignificant	Insignificant
Total	8,756,000	10,295,000	1,203,000	1,044,000

Insecticides and Fungicides: Processing facilities are adequate. The problem is the supply of raw materials. Lead and calcium arsenates, sulphur and mercurials should be available in adequate quantities as should also copper sulphate if supplies of scrap copper prove sufficient after military and export needs are met. Rotenone will continue inadequate although there is likely in 1944 to be 2½ times this year's supply. There will be very little pyrethrum for the duration. Increased quantities of nicotine sulphate, cryolite, and organic thiocynates are proving effective substitutes for rotenone and pyrethrum for some purposes, and experimental work is being done with other chemical substitutes.

Milk Cans: Until the first year of the war, average annual production of milk cans was approximately 1,000,000. Limitation and conservation orders combined with manufacturers' difficulty in securing steel sharply curtailed milk can production at a time when milk production was sharply rising. To make up this two-fold deficit, 1,431,000 cans were manufactured during the 12 months ending July 1, 1943 (goal 1,500,000), and 1,700,000 cans are scheduled for the 12 months ending July 1, 1944.

Merchant Steel Products: Present indications are that the 1944 supply of the following items will be adequate to meet farm needs: barbed wire, woven wire, bale ties, nails and staples, pipe. There will be more poultry netting than in 1943.

Copper Wire: Because of the direct relation of electric power to farm production in the operation of such equipment as milking machines, feed grinders, water pumps for livestock, brooders, etc., the elctrification of farms has been continued throughout the war period, subject to the restriction that the farmer must have a sufficient number of animal units (1 cow, 10 beef cattle, 75 laying hens, etc.) to make effective use of electrical equipment. Originally set at 10 animal units, effective March 24, the minimum requirement has been reduced to 5 animal units to qualify a farm for an electrical connection. This easing of the restriction will make it possible for many small farms to secure electrical service.

On-farm Storage: On-farm storage facilities are about sufficient to handle the 1944 production goals as now outlined. Additional storage warehouses will be needed next year, however, both on and off farms for holding potatoes and sweetpotatoes. Completion of this program will be handicapped by shortages of labor and lumber, with up to 20 million board feet required.

Farm Construction: During the 10 years prior to 1940 new farm construction lagged considerably behind depreciation so that at the start of World War II facilities were inadequate to protect crops and livestock properly. In 1940 and 1941 it is estimated that expenditures for farm construction averaged about 635 million annually, 60 percent of this amount being spent for maintenance and repairs. Thus for the first time in over 10 years expenditures exceeded depreciation.

Due to present material shortages and building restrictions it is anticipated that in 1943 about half of the 1940-41 annual average will be expended. More than half will be for new construction. During 1944 it is expected that at least the same amount of farm construction will be required for the food production program.

Lumber: 1943 began with a severe shortage of lumber for farm use--about 50 percent of 1940. Considerable relief was given by the granting by the War Production Board of AA-2 rating to farmers for 500,000,000 board feet of soft wood lumber from June through December, rationed to them through the County War Boards. Assisted by a War Food Administration program to encourage greater production of forest products from farms, it is anticipated that the 1944 lumber supply will be comparable with the later months of 1943. This should be adequate to take care of all necessary farm construction.

Irrigation and Drainage: The War Food Administration and the War Production Board have recently substantially agreed upon a new irrigation and drainage program, which will require approximately 14,000 tons of carbon steels. In 1943 materials were obtained to begin work on some of the irrigation and drainage projects where the land can be put to productive use in 1944 and 1945. Through irrigation and drainage, work started in 1944 and completed that year or early in 1945, approximately a million additional acres can be brought under a high degree of cultivation during 1944 and 1945, and drainage systems can be made effective or supplemental irrigation water can be provided for approximately the same acreage. This work is expected to add from 150,000 to 300,000 tons of critically needed foodstuffs.

Food Processing Requirements

Processing Food Machinery: Processed food is up approximately 30 percent over 1939, an increase largely necessitated by demands of the armed forces, lend-lease, and other non-civilian agencies which in 1944 will require at least one-fourth of all food processed.

From the spring of 1942 to date fabrication of machinery for most food processing industries approximated 20 percent of such manufacture in normal years. With greatly increased wear and tear on machinery due to longer running hours and poorer maintenance of equipment by inexperienced help, War Production Board and War Food Administration officials realized that unless provision was made for the manufacture of essential machines for replacement and expansion purposes far enough in advance of actual needs, breakdown in many segments of the food industry would be inevitable.

In June 1943 was published WPB Order L-292, which set the production level for the processing machinery of most food industries at 50 percent of the 1939-41 average, with the further provision that this percentage would be amended when the War Food Administration established the need at a greater or lesser amount.

With the War Production Board approval in the first quarter of 1944 the War Food Administration took over the programming of machine requirements of the major food processing industries. The following table shows the allocations of carbon steel secured for the production of new machinery in that quarter, with the percentages for replacement of worn-out machines and for expansion of processing capacity.

Table 12

Allocations of Carbon Steel for Food Processing Machinery

CMP Code	Industry	Carbon steel allocated by WPB 1st quarter-1944 (tons)	Estimated percentage distribution	
			Expansion	Replacement
200	Baking	2,500	8	100
201	Canning	2,131	23	77
202	Cereal	2,442	5	95
203	Dairy	3,472	30	70
204	Meat	2,332	28	72
205	Sugar	350	-	100
247	Oils (vegetable, animal, fish)	2,257	30	70
676	Commercial fishing equipment	255		
	Total 1/	15,739		

1/ Of the above amount of controlled materials allocated, 80 percent is for the manufacture of machinery for replacement, 20 percent for expansion purposes.

These allocations were sufficient to fulfill the fourth quarter needs of the above industries, and we believe that allocations for future quarters will continue to be adequate. But, as stressed earlier, unless the component part situation can be corrected promptly the situation may become extremely critical.

Expansion shown in the dairy, meat, and canning industries is largely due to heavier military demands.

Containers and Packaging: The 1944 outlook is dark for some types of containers. Corrugated and fiber shipping containers for canned, glass, and other foods; wooden containers, principally for fresh fruits and vegetables; and tight and slack cooperage offer the more pressing problems. Labor, materials, and, in some cases, fuel are restricting the output of desired food jars.

Tin and Glass Containers: M-81 and M-104 are the two WPB orders controlling tinplate and metal closures for glass containers. These orders have resulted in the desired channeling of that portion of our food output normally preserved in hermetically sealed containers and thus limit the two kinds of containers that require over 90 percent of controlled materials needed for this purpose. Scores of canned food items have been eliminated and the necessary supplies of steelplate devoted exclusively to products needed in the war effort or considered essential for civilians. Vital items are permitted unlimited packs, the output being confined only by existing processing facilities, assuming crops, labor, and such factors are ample. The production of other items, principally for civilian consumption, is limited to specific percentages of previous packs in line with nutritional needs.

Requirements as now outlined for next year call for the use of about 2,000,000 tons of steelplate for tin and glass containers against approximately 1,750,000 expected to be used in 1943. Timely approval of rolling schedules will permit the can and closure fabricators to meet this program without serious difficulties. The output of glass containers next year is likely to fall below needs owing to labor shortages, a shortage of shipping containers, and troubles in obtaining the materials and facilities for conversion and expansion.

Fiber and Corrugated Boxes: Demands for these products are at all-time high, with processing facilities available but with shortages of raw materials definitely in sight due to lack of woods labor. Foods take 60 percent of the supply.

Wooden Shipping Cases: Both wooden boxes and veneer boxes are in extremely short supply, with food shipments being delayed from time to time by their lack. The basic reason is the same as with corrugated and fiber boxes--shortage of lumber camp labor. Vegetable and fruit crates, both for use in the areas of production and for shipping, have been the earliest to feel the pinch, with produce spoiling in some areas because of inability to secure the necessary shipping containers.

X TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE

Transportation

The railroads have been doing an excellent job, although rail capacity is now being taxed to very nearly its final limits.

It is strongly recommended that full support be given to whatever programs the railroads and the Office of Defense Transportation feel it necessary to advance for new equipment and materials for maintenance in 1944. The expansion of the refrigerator car program to the extent recommended below, and the completion of an adequate number of new box cars and locomotives is, we believe, an absolute requirement for 1944.

Steps are now being taken to curtail as far as is reasonably possible, on a voluntary basis, cross hauling and unnecessarily long hauls in the movement of freight in the hope of providing some reserve capacity. These measures will be vigorously pressed.

To assure the transportation of essential foods and supplies in the event of a transportation emergency, a list of less important products that might be embargoed has been prepared.

RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION

Box cars: This class of equipment is currently very short and this is being keenly felt in connection with the tremendous movement of grain. Prospects for 1944 indicate full need for all the box cars that can be obtained. A program for the construction of about 8,000 cars has been approved by the War Production Board, and with the recent elimination of differences between that agency and the railroads over the particular types of cars approved, the full quantity of box cars authorized by the War Production Board should be procured and placed in service as rapidly as possible.

Refrigerator cars: Extreme difficulty is expected in satisfying peak requirements, and commodities that ordinarily move in refrigerator cars are being diverted to box cars where it is possible to do so without undue hazard. The War Food Administration, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the railroads are taking such steps to meet the situation as are considered practicable.

Due to the perishability of commodities carried in refrigerator cars and lack of sufficient expansion of the type of storage required to hold them under protection for an extended time, the past year has seen periods of acute seasonal shortages in this type of equipment. Fresh fruits and vegetables, in particular, must move rapidly during the peak of harvest, or suffer serious risk of spoilage and loss. The 1944 construction program includes only 850 new cars.

In order to meet probable requirements, we believe a program should be undertaken to provide a minimum of 5,000 new refrigerator cars in 1944 to avoid undue hazard to the prompt marketing of perishable crops.

Tank cars: Currently, tank car requirements are being met by very careful scrutiny and control of their use. After January 1 the use of additional pipe lines for handling petroleum should free a substantial number of these cars, and except for unforeseen developments there should be no serious trouble in 1944.

Motive power: The situation is tight due to a general shortage of manpower for practically every purpose, including maintenance; also to a shortage of locomotives in some areas. The number of freight and switching locomotives in service as of September 1, 1943, totaled 31,936. It is estimated that approximately 540 new locomotives will be added in the last 4 months of 1943, and an additional 800 in 1944. We believe this is a minimum program which must be completely carried out to avoid serious trouble next year.

TRUCK TRANSPORTATION

The supply of trucks used for transporting food products and farm supplies is deteriorating rapidly. A crisis is likely to face us in 1944, unless steps are taken much beyond those already planned.

Truck replacements: To maintain the existing fleet, approximating 1,000,000 farm trucks and 500,000 trucks for hauling from farm to market, and supplies back to the farm, will require an estimated 150,000 new trucks during 1944.

Compared to this, the total truck production the Office of Defense Transportation has asked for is 79,633 and of that number, agriculture probably will not get over 30,000, or roughly only 20 percent of the anticipated need. No 1/2-ton or 3/4-ton trucks whatever are now scheduled for manufacture whereas agriculture will need 50,000 of these, as part of the total requirement of 150,000 trucks. Today new heavy trucks for western livestock movement are virtually non-existent, and support should be given the War Production Board to see that the current small production of heavy trucks is expedited.

We believe there will be serious trouble ahead unless immediate steps are taken to meet this situation, considerably beyond the plans that have now been laid.

Truck parts: The average age of the farm trucks now in operation is seven years. Obviously, parts will be needed in increasing numbers to keep the fleet in operation. The original recommendation of the Office of Defense Transportation was approved only in part by the War Production Board, and it is understood that actual production does not equal even the reduced program. Shortages of parts are already developing, and unless something is done about it, the situation may take thousands of trucks out of operation. It is our strong belief that the program for truck parts should be increased to meet the full Office of Defense Transportation recommendation, and that there be close follow-up to insure actual production.

Truck tires: The truck tire situation is critical and in large measure is a tire fabricating problem.

The War Production Board has approved a material expansion of facilities of the industry for making tires, because it takes much longer to manufacture a synthetic than a gum rubber tire, and additional manufacturing facilities will be needed to meet requirements. This program must be followed up vigorously to expedite completion of the plants.

WATER TRANSPORTATION

Great Lakes Grain Movement: In 1942, 114 million bushels of grain moved on the Lakes in vessels of U. S. registry. This year, barring

an unusually early close of navigation, the movement from the head of the Lakes to the Buffalo area in U. S. vessels for domestic consumption was approximately 165 million bushels. In audition, Canadian vessels hauled about 35 million bushels for U. S. consumption, as well as a substantial amount for export.

Even with excellent cooperation from the grain trade and processors in its distribution, this increase in supply has been barely sufficient to meet the greatly increased consumption of grains in the Northeast. Given a fair movement of corn into the area, close-of-navigation stocks should be sufficient to carry through the winter, supplemented by amounts that can move in by rail, but if the corn is not available, the feed position will be in serious danger. While limited amounts may come from Argentina, apparently, the primary source of relief would have to be a long all-rail haul of feed wheat from western Canada. This would place an unusual burden upon Canadian and U. S. rail facilities.

Looking to 1944, it is hardly conceivable that lake operating difficulties could be more unfavorable than they have been in 1943. With present lake tonnage, it should be possible to move more grain next year, but the movement will probably be inadequate to meet the anticipated requirements.

Drastic measures were taken in 1943 to meet essential needs (principally grain and iron ore) as far as possible by curtailing the lake movement of other important traffic, and by throwing a heavy burden upon the railroads, of which they should be relieved. A similar condition exists with respect to Canadian traffic.

It is our opinion that conditions in 1944, particularly if there should be a heavy movement of relief grain, will require the movement into the Lakes of sufficient vessels to assure the carriage of 285 million bushels of grain next year. WFA has joined with ODT in requesting the War Shipping Administration to return to the Great Lakes ten package freighters that were removed for ocean service early in the war. These boats would be in audition to four package freighters returned in the fall of 1943.

Ocean and Coastwise Shipping: Has been tight but is improving, and with the progress of the ship construction program, we believe it may become important that additional vessels be assigned to coastwise and, if possible, intercoastal movements, in order to relieve the tremendous burden now being borne by the rail carriers.

STORAGE AND ICE MANUFACTURE

The increased production of foods has increased the demand for storage space to protect them. Additional problems have been created in the storage industry by the necessity of handling foods for Lend-Lease purposes and also because of limited transportation facilities. To meet these problems two things are needed: (1) Improvement in labor supply (see Chapter IX) and, (2) Replacement of worn out machinery and provisions for new facilities for essential expansion.

In order to provide additional cold storage space several steps already have been taken. A complete survey has been made of the total cold storage capacity of the country and reports are received semi-monthly showing the occupancy of the space. The armed forces and the War Food Administration have established a joint office in order

to insure better coordination of their activities. Orders have been issued restricting the use of cold storage space for commodities that do not necessarily require refrigeration and also restricting use of freezer space for certain commodities.

Ice shortages have occurred, particularly in the southeastern, southern, and southwestern parts of the country, with isolated shortages occurring in other sections. These have been due primarily to increased crop production, unusually hot weather, and to concentration of civilian and military population in the affected areas. Ice has been rationed where necessary. A survey of shortage areas is being made with the assistance of the Ice Industries Association, and priority assistance is being given for plant expansion to increase the supply of ice.

Cold Storage: Additional machinery, if available, could relieve the labor situation by performing certain operations of labor. The War Production Board should release additional quantities of critical materials for the production of hoists, conveyors, stacking equipment, et cetera, to the full extent recommended by the War Food Administration in each case.

In addition to the need for labor-saving machinery, expansion and replacement in both the warehousing and ice manufacturing industries are necessary.

Careful application of critical materials has made it possible to bring into use, with a minimum expenditure of such materials, cold storage facilities that were not being used before the war. An industry advisory committee has been created which is working very closely with the Food Administration in finding solutions to problems in particular areas. It is expected that such action will result in maximum use of available facilities to store perishable foods, but in spite of this some expansion of facilities is necessary. It is estimated that cold storage space has been increased between 15,000,000 and 20,000,000 cubic feet since July, 1942, and approximately the same additional amount is expected to be required by the end of 1944.

Essential maintenance was neglected or delayed during the depression years. The MRO quotas approved under the controlled materials plan are in many cases based upon these years of curtailed operations. With the increases taking place in the production of food, such quotas will have to be raised.

Although every effort is being made to use all idle or second-hand equipment to the fullest extent, and to improve production of the plants by improving the efficiency of their operation, a very sizable amount of new refrigeration and ice-making equipment will be required within the next three or four months. This will entail an increase by the War Production Board in the amount of machinery and equipment which the manufacturers are allowed to produce.

There has been some congestion in port areas caused by moving back-logs of perishable commodities into freezer space in these areas and holding such back-logs for several months. Refrigerated facilities in certain ports must carry a very heavy export load plus current civilian requirements. When back-logs are held in these areas, congestion is inevitable. FSCC has made a determined effort to store perishable commodities owned by that corporation at inland points and to move these commodities into the port areas in accordance with current liftings. Furthermore, the FSCC is now moving substantial

quantities of perishable commodities directly from inland points to shipside. It would appear that for the duration the industries using cold storage, together with other Government agencies, should hold reserve stocks farther inland and move the commodities into port facilities only to fill current demands.

Dry Storage: The problem of grain storage during certain recent years has been acute due to the acceleration of production programs. During the 1942 season an extensive program to provide storage for grain was undertaken, and continued in 1943. However, the grain stocks have been reduced enough to relieve the storage situation, except in the northwestern area where a heavy crop was imposed upon facilities still burdened with a large carry-over from 1942. It is expected that increased consumption will prevent a recurrence of this condition in 1944.

About 20 percent of the commercial elevator space is now being supervised by the Food Administration, with the consequent practical elimination of loss from deterioration and spoilage in these houses.

Although careful supervision would effect great reductions in the spoilage of foods in other houses, adequate funds are not available for expanding the work. Nevertheless, the War Food Administration is maintaining a very strict supervision over the warehousing of all products which it is purchasing with Government funds, held not only in dry storage, but refrigerated and freezing space as well.

XI. THE WORLD FOOD SITUATION

The United States food program must be examined in focus with the world food situation. Our food supplies and requirements must be geared with United Nations food supplies and requirements, just as our military resources and strategy must be geared with the United Nations.

Food production in 1943 in the Western Hemisphere, British Dominions elsewhere and the United Kingdom has been materially higher than in any previous year; but in continental Europe including European Russia production is reduced. The level of world production as a whole may be somewhat higher, or at any rate not materially different, than pre-war.

This large production will include a somewhat larger than usual percentage of livestock products in the surplus food exporting countries of the United Nations. The reverse will be true in the United Kingdom. There the effort is to get the maximum food nutrients from the available human and natural resources, and controlled production there has resulted in more of the crops that are directly consumed as food rather than those that are fed to livestock. While Britain has greatly increased total food production including dairy products, meat animals have been reduced.

As for actual food supply, in the areas accessible to the United Nations, the total food production and the existing transportation facilities are apparently adequate to meet the present food rationing schedule in those countries which are under rations, except in Russia, and to meet the usual food requirements of those countries that are not under food rationing.

For 1944, food production in the non-Axis countries, assuming average weather conditions and assuming adequate price assurances to producers, will probably be as large as that of 1943, and this will include a larger proportion of the direct-consumption food crops.

In the Axis controlled countries the total over-all food production this year will probably be adequate to meet the relatively low wartime standards of requirements, but because of transportation difficulties and uneven distribution of the total supply, there will be serious shortages in some particular areas of those countries. In the Axis controlled countries there will be a much larger than usual proportion of direct food crops.

Requirements For Liberated Areas

A principal problem facing the United Nations is that of adequate reserves of food for the liberated countries. The President has stated that our food responsibilities are likely to increase as we occupy additional territories and that we must be prepared to share with those who, without our help, might be faced with want. He added that everything that we in the United States can do to increase production and make distribution more efficient will further our objective.

At this date and in view of the unknown number of countries that will be liberated during the coming year, it is difficult to make definite estimates of requirements for 1944 and 1945, but they will be substantial, even if only part of Europe is occupied and if a minimum dietary basis of only 2,000 calories a day is provided.

Most of the estimated relief requirements were taken into account in developing the U. S. production goals for next year. In the case of beans, fats and oils, wheat, sugar, fish, potatoes, meat and dairy products, it has been assumed that foreign sources of supplies must be tapped for additional supplies, if European relief requirements are to be met satisfactorily.

In the case of beans, the U. S. production goals assume the availability, mostly for European relief, of six million bags of foreign produced beans.

The total United Nations supply of fats and vegetable oils (excluding butter) is expected to be slightly larger in 1944 than in 1943, but the increase will be materially inadequate if it is necessary to supply a large number of liberated areas. Studies indicate that fats and oils requirements for liberated countries of Europe may total about a million tons. It is possible that approximately half of this could be made available if absolutely necessary, but it would reduce United Nations stocks to a very low level.

The U. S. has become a substantial importer of wheat in 1943 and promises to continue to be a large importer in 1944 due to the greatly increased utilization of wheat for feed and industrial alcohol as well as for food. Under the International Wheat Agreement the U. S. share of the 100 million bushel relief pool established in 1942 amounts to 50 million bushels. Despite the expanded production goal for 1944 no increase in supplies for export for relief is expected unless (1) yields considerably above average are attained and (2) the livestock feed and industrial alcohol programs are sharply curtailed. Accordingly it is quite apparent that other countries having surplus wheat supplies will need to be called upon to supply the major quantity of wheat moving into the liberated areas.

Since the U. S. depends to a large extent on imports of sugar to meet domestic needs, no provision was made for relief requirements in the U. S. production goals.

Only a portion of the relief requirements for fish is included in the U. S. production goals, it being assumed that the balance will be obtained elsewhere.

Similarly only a part of the requirements for potatoes is included in the U. S. production goals figures. Limited dehydration facilities here suggest an effort to meet requirements either from production in Britain or continental Europe itself.

The United States clearly cannot supply all of the meat required for European relief. Since it is not possible to increase foreign production to meet the balance, if substantial relief requirements materialize they can probably be met only by reducing supplies to U. S. and U. K. civilians, and by substituting vegetable proteins in the form of beans.

Expanding Foreign Food Production

It is apparent that the food requirements for the liberated areas are greater than the United States alone can supply. But the United States has a share of the responsibility for seeing that at least a minimum quantity of food is provided. Hence, we must make every reasonable effort to see that food production in foreign countries is expanded to help meet the requirements of the liberated areas.

It is necessary, then, to decide (1) in what foreign areas the United States should take the lead in this effort, (2) what particular products are most needed for relief use, and (3) which combination of areas and product would seem to offer the best results.

As for areas, through decisions already taken as a result of Combined Food Board recommendations, responsibility for obtaining maximum supplies from most of the world's food producing areas has been allocated either to the United States or the United Kingdom. This includes the responsibility for encouraging increased production where feasible. The United States has been given this responsibility in Latin America in the case of most commodities, as well as for fats and oils in Portuguese Africa, Liberia and the French Pacific Islands and Tahiti. In the case of Canada, where considerable increases have resulted, we work closely with the Canadian authorities and have established a standing joint commission for this purpose. In the liberated areas, of which North and West Africa are now of the most importance, the responsibility is exercised by combined U. S. - U. K. committees, which are now actively increasing production.

As for products to which attention may profitably be given now, the list is limited by some practical considerations which include the production possibilities of the product, its shippability and its adaptability for relief uses. The list may be reduced to only five categories, namely, oil seeds, edible legumes, cereals (particularly wheat), sugar and salt fish. Of these, the supply of wheat is in excess of shipping possibilities, the problem being transportation, both internal and external, rather than increased production. There are shortages of the other four categories, but considerably larger supplies may be secured in foreign areas.

While the animal proteins are very much to be desired they are now in short supply relative to even non-relief requirements so there seems to be little possibility of a substantial increase in production over the 1943 level.

Efforts to increase the production of salt fish, oilseeds and edible legumes should be carefully limited to those countries where these crops have been efficiently produced, in exportable quantities, in the past. There are reasons for this. First, these are the areas which have the technical experience, the equipment, and the various natural conditions to produce effective results. Second, these are the areas where these products can be produced at prices in line with the prices which the United States is guaranteeing home producers. Third, expansion in these areas would cause the minimum economic and social dislocations after the war both in those countries and in the United States.

Salted Fish: A substantial increase in the 1944 production of salted fish for United Nations and free neutrals could be effected if additional manpower and equipment were available. The principal salted fish producing countries are Newfoundland, Canada, Iceland, Greenland, St. Pierre and Miquelon.

The world supply in 1939 of 400,000,000 pounds was more than three times the 1943 output of 122,000,000 pounds available in non-Axis areas.

Operations have been curtailed in the Newfoundland area until recently because of the demands for manpower for the construction of air bases there, and fishing boats are not now working over the deep Grand Banks area to any extent, because of naval restrictions and submarine danger.

Production could be increased by adding dragger or trawler boats to the Canadian fleet and by supplying certain kinds of marine engines in Newfoundland. A release by naval authorities of fishing vessels not urgently needed also would help materially. Other needed equipment is netting and gear.

The liberation of Norway would greatly increase the supply of salted fish for the United Nations. Norway in 1939 produced about 92,000,000 pounds of salted ground fish and nearly 85,000,000 pounds of salted or pickled herring.

Because the non-cod species, due to their oil content, do not keep as well as cod, even in dried form, they are of little use for relief purposes where cold storage cannot be provided.

Limited quantities of the non-cod species have been salted in the Caribbean-Pacific waters, but trained personnel and equipment are needed. There is no favorable subsurface continental shelf favorable to bottom-feeding fish like the cod.

For the present it would seem practical to concentrate assistance, mainly in the form of equipment and manpower, in the proved production areas such as Newfoundland and Canada. The United States is in a position to help, if it becomes feasible, by diverting marine engines and other equipment from military service.

Fats and Oils: Due to the shortage of fats and oils available to the United Nations in 1942-43, efforts have already been made to further the expansion of vegetable oil seeds. The British have set up production goals in British West Africa and joint Anglo-American developments in French West Africa are expected to make available large quantities during 1944. The United States is already encouraging an expansion in oilseed production in several Western Hemisphere countries. It is believed, however, that additional efforts would result, under normal weather conditions, in even greater production in 1945.

A survey of Latin American countries has already been made to determine areas where potential expansion is feasible. This study reveals that the greatest and most efficient results could be obtained in Argentina, followed by Brazil and Mexico.

In Agrentina, the United States Government has already promised to buy the surplus sunflower and peanut oils at specified prices. This information has been made known to the Argentine farmer and it is reported that sunflower and peanut acreages planted are the largest on record. Argentine farmers who have been requested to restrict their cereal acreages for several years, on account of the shrunken export market, are anxious to grow oilseeds which they already know how to produce and have the equipment for harvesting.

The Argentine crushing mills have sufficient capacity to crush the increased oilseed production, provided they are not engaged in crushing flaxseed for supplying local fuel supplies. It will be necessary for the United Nations to furnish Argentina with 20- to 25,000 tons of coal or fuel oil a month in 1944, if it is desired to obtain the maximum increase in the supply of vegetable oils. It is particularly important that the sunflower seeds be crushed in Argentina, on account of the bulkiness of the seed and the low feed value of the residue. It is probable that the United Nations can utilize more than half of the exportable surplus of flaxseed and all peanuts, in order to procure additional protein feed, as well as vegetable oils. As long as Argentine farmers are assured of a market for their oilseeds, it is believed that as much as 100,000 tons of

edible vegetable oils including the oil content of seeds can be secured above the 1943 exports from this area, in addition to the normal exports of flaxseed or linseed oil, provided the latter is not required for local fuel consumption.

In Brazil, it is considered that further expansion of peanuts in the southern States is feasible. This crop was expanded materially this past year, but the native population found this oil to their liking and none was available for export. By guaranteeing the price for the oil, as has been done in Argentina, it is believed farmers would expand peanut acreage to the extent that the supply of oil would be beyond domestic requirements. Sufficient crushing facilities are available in southern Brazil and the Government desires that the oilseeds be crushed within the country and export the oil. It may be necessary to supply some fuel oil for farm tractors in this area. It is estimated that 10,000 tons may be available in 1944 and it is possible this quantity could be more than doubled for exportation in 1945. The importance of getting babassu kernels out of Brazil, from the unlimited supply in the hinterland, needs to be stressed, in order to facilitate greater exports of this commodity. Brazilian castor beans have already been made available in larger quantities than we require but the current level of production should be maintained even though no further increase is desired.

Mexico which was a deficit fats and oils area, prior to the war, is expanding oilseed production in order to be self-sufficient and it is considered that, with further encouragement, this country will be able to export small quantities of linseed, peanuts, and castorseed in 1944 and 1945. Ample crushing facilities are available in Mexico to take care of an increased production for Mexican consumption, but most of the exports will be in the form of seed. Some mills, undoubtedly, may need repairs. One should not expect phenomenal exports from Mexico, however, as extensive farming such as is found in Argentina and southern Brazil is very limited. It does not appear feasible to obtain large quantities of farm machinery and equipment in an endeavor to get the small scale Mexican farmer into large commercial production.

In other Latin American areas, a few isolated cases are worthy of expending an effort to increase oilseed production, but in general, most of the countries have only limited districts and few farmers capable of producing such commodities on a commercial scale. The results obtained would not justify the expenditures of seed, techincal assistance, machinery, and equipment.

Canada, during 1943, materially increased her oilseed production--primarily flaxseed, and in a small way, soybeans, sunflower seed, and rapeseed. The total quantity of oilseeds available for export from this year's harvest will about equal, in oil content, Canada's import requirements.

Whaling in the Antarctic is a source that could contribute substantially to the animal fats supply. Plans should be started immediately for preparing several expeditions for the 1944-45 season as the oil will be needed for meeting anticipated relief requirements in Europe.

In expanding production of fats and oils at this time, it should be kept in mind that it will be necessary for these areas to readjust after the post-war relief has ended and the large supplies from the Far East are again available.

Edible Legumes: Increased acreage in foreign countries of beans, peas and other legume crops can best be secured where production for export has already been established, because the necessary experience, labor, equipment and marketing machinery are in existence now. French North Africa, Chile, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil offer the best opportunities for increasing production through procurement programs.

French North Africa has long been a major exporter of broad beans, chickpeas, peas and lentils, and it is probable that important surpluses may now be secured. A goal for production in 1944 has been suggested which if realized will result in an export surplus of 70,000 tons of broad beans, 40,000 tons of chickpeas, 35,000 tons of peas and 10,000 tons of lentils. To obtain these quantities it probably will be necessary to give assurances of a market with price supports and assistance in the procurement of some farm machinery, repair parts and fuel.

Chile for many years has been a large exporter of white beans, peas and lentils and has facilities for greatly expanded production. Normal production is about a million and a half bags, with exports averaging about 750,000 bags. Recently production has reached the two million bag level and can probably go as high as two and one-half million bags. To get the larger production, assistance would be required in securing some additional equipment, spare parts for tractors, and fuel. It also would be necessary to give assurances as to markets and price supports which may be done through purchase agreements. Negotiations are now under way with Chile to purchase exportable surpluses of beans and peas.

Canada can produce substantial quantities of white beans for export. Acreage has been declining recently and while some increase was planned for 1943, delay in announcing the program and unfavorable growing conditions resulted in a crop little more than sufficient for domestic needs. The Canadian production goals for 1944 call for a 10% increase in dried beans, and a 15% increase in dried peas in the Prairie Provinces.

Mexico is a large producer of colored beans, chickpeas and broad beans but has been a large exporter of chickpeas only. However, production of beans in recent years has been materially increased, and it is probable that some beans will be available for export, although unfavorable weather reduced the 1943 yield per acre considerably. For 1944, production probably could be further expanded under a purchase contract. A contract is now in force for the purchase of all surplus chickpeas produced in 1942, 1943 and 1944.

Brazil is not a major exporter, but probably could increase production of colored beans, particularly black beans, if a purchase contract were made giving market and price guarantees. During World War I, increased production provided for exports of 45,000 tons. It is probable that around 50,000 tons could be made available for export in 1944.

In considering the responsibility of the United States in meeting food requirements in the liberated areas (and for that matter general United Nations food requirements) it should be kept in mind that the United States is not the breadbasket of the world and has not been in this century. At the recent meeting of the UNRRA Council it was agreed that the United States could, and would be expected to, supply only its appropriate portion of the total requirements for the liberated areas. Table 13 indicates the United States' share of exportable agricultural commodities available to the United Nations.

TABLE 13

Comparison of U. S. with Total United Nations Exportable Supplies of Principal Agricultural Commodities

Commodity	Total	United States	U. S. as Percent of Total
	1943	1943	
Wheat and Flour (million bu.) a/	1,245	0 g/	0.0
Dried Beans, Peas, Chickpeas (thousand 100-lb. bags)	9,580 h/	4,500 h/	47.0
Rice (million lbs.) b/	1,580	560	35.4
Meat (million lbs.) c/	7,626	2,539.1	33.3
Salted Fish (million lbs.) d/	125	0	0.0
Canned Fish (million lbs.)	352	167.1	47.5
Dried Whole Eggs (million lbs.)	266	252	94.7
Butter (million lbs.)	454	65	14.3
Cheese (million lbs.)	613	186	30.3
Canned Milk (million lbs.)	668	592	88.6
Dried Whole Milk (million lbs.)	43	27	62.8
Dried Skim Milk (million lbs.)	248	234	94.4
Fats and Oils (thousand long tons) e/	2,709	643 i/	23.7
Vitamin A Fish Oils (trillion U.S.P. units)	66	48.9	74.1
Ascorbic Acid (thousand lbs.)	273	273	100.0
Sugar (thousand short tons) f/	9,799 h/	0 g/	0.0
Dried Fruits (thousand short tons)	528	242	45.8
Coffee (million lbs.)	6,084	0	0.0
Cocoa (million lbs.)	1,385	0	0.0
Fertilizers:			
Nitrogen as N (thousand short tons)	363.1 h/	0 g/	0.0
Phosphate rock as P_2O_5 (thousand short tons)	968.5	248.0	25.6
Soluble Phos. as P_2O_5 (thousand short tons)	125.0 h/	76.4 h/	61.1
Potash as K_2O (thousand short tons)	188.8 h/	60.4 h/	32.0

a/ Wheat equivalent. b/ Milled basis. c/ Dressed weight equivalent. d/ Codfish and related species, dry salt basis. e/ Oil equivalent. f/ Raw value. g/ Although there are some U.S. exports, U.S. is a net importer. h/ Excluding U. S. imports for reexport. i/ Although the U.S. imported in 1943 about 400,000 tons as compared with 643,000 tons exported, the imported oils were not exported, except about 90,000 tons of linseed.

Non-civilian estimated requirements for 1945
(In specified units, primary distribution weight)

Commodity	Unit	Total non-civilian	Military and war services	Lend-Lease				Other exports	U.S. Territories
				Total	U.K. and British services	U.S.S.R.	Liberated Areas	Other	
	1		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
DAIRY PRODUCTS										
Whole milk products:										
Fluid milk	Mil. lbs.	1,299.9	1,299.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cream	Mil. lbs.	8.3	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Butter	Mil. lbs.	460.0	313.0	139.5	0	139.0	0	.5	.5	7.0
Cheese, American	Mil. lbs.	550.0	110.3	426.9	217.9	33.6	175.0	.4	6.4	6.4
Cheese, other	Mil. lbs.	3.2	3.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Condensed milk	Mil. lbs.	84.9	0	79.0	0	26.9	35.0	17.1	5.8	.1
Evaporated milk	Mil. lbs.	2,233.0	1,105.1	855.7	422.8	0	411.4	21.5	19.6	52.6
Ice cream	Mil. lbs.	276.7	276.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malted milk	Mil. lbs.	1.0	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dried whole milk	Mil. lbs.	94.5	32.7	40.7	7.3	26.9	3.7	2.8	21.1	0
Skim by-products:										
Dried skim, edible	Mil. lbs.	475.4	64.1	406.6	135.3	53.8	217.5	0	1.1	3.6
Buttermilk, chocolate drink and other fluid skim uses	Mil. lbs.	a/ 65.1	a/ 65.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cottage cheese	Mil. lbs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Condensed skim	Mil. lbs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MEAT										
Beef	Mil. lbs. dressed weight	2,785	2,600	110	50	15	40	5	30	45
Veal	Mil. lbs. dressed weight	190	175	15	15	0	0	0	0	0
Lamb and mutton	Mil. lbs. dressed weight	320	115	200	200	0	0	0	5	b/
Pork	Mil. lbs. dressed weight	4,930	1,495	3,345	1,400	1,680	265	0	30	60
Total meat	Mil. lbs. dressed weight	8,225	4,385	3,670	1,665	1,695	305	5	65	105
LARD	Mil. lbs.	1,140	85	960	420	250	290	0	65	30

B

Non-civilian requirements estimates for 1945

(In specified units, primary distribution weight)

Commodity	Unit	Total non-civilian	Military and war services	Land-Lease				Other exports	to
				Total	U.K. and British services	USSR	Liberated Areas	Other	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
POULTRY AND EGGS									
Total eggs	Mil. doz.	1,366.4	532.4	810.7	414.6	234.0	162.0	.1	16.5
Dried whole eggs	Mil. lbs.	a/ 350.0	74.0	270.2	138.2	78.0	54.0	0	5.3
Chickens	Mil. lbs., dr. wt.	437.4	432.8	.6	0	0	0	.6	0
Turkeys	Mil. lbs., dr. wt.	61.2	61.1	.1	0	0	0	.1	0
FATS AND OILS									
Food requirements:									
Total, including butter and lard	Mil. lbs.	2,671.0	682.5	1,847.8	466.5	869.0	477.8	34.5	142.1
Butter	Mil. lbs.	460.0	313.0	139.5	0	139.0	0	.5	.5
Lard	Mil. lbs.	1,140	85	960	420	250	290	0	65
Oils other than butter and lard -									
Total	Mil. lbs.	1,071.0	238.2	748.3	46.5	480.0	187.8	34.0	76.6
Margarine (oil content)	Mil. lbs.	(1,071.0	(238.5	(748.3	(46.5	(480.0	(187.8	(34.0	(76.6
Shortening and other	Mil. lbs.	(	(	(	(	(	(	(	(
Industrial non-food requirements:									
Non-food - Total	Mil. lbs.	724.0	550.5	159.6	0	24.6	133.1	1.9	2.2
VEGETABLES (for fresh use)									
Potatoes, white	Mil. bu.	39.2	37.6	.1	0	0	0	.1	1.1
Potatoes, sweet	Mil. bu.	3.3	3.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tomatoes	Mil. lbs.	239.6	196.4	.3	0	0	0	.3	42.9
Onions, dry	Mil. lbs.	257.7	199.1	0	0	0	0	0	44.2
Leafy, green, and yellow vegetables	Mil. lbs.	1,181.4	1,045.5	.8	0	0	0	.8	135.1
Other than leafy, green, and yellow vegetables	Mil. lbs.	565.5	515.7	2.8	0	0	0	2.8	43.5
Melons	Thous. tons	112.0	107.5	0	0	0	0	0	4.5

Non-civilian estimated requirements for 1945
(In specified units, primary distribution weight)

Commodity	Unit	Total non-civilian	Military and war services	Lend-Lease					Other exports	U.S. territories
				Total	U.K. and British services	USSR	Liberated Areas	Other		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
VEGETABLES (for processing)										
Potatoes, white	Mil. bu.	18.3	9.9	8.3	4.4	2.3	1.5	.1	0	.1
Potatoes, sweet	Mil. bu.	2.5	2.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tomatoes	Mil. lbs.	e/1,920.8	1,710.3	132.9	62.1	28.4	41.9	.5	5.0	5.0
Onions	Mil. lbs.	371.9	142.3	218.7	3.3	27.1	187.0	1.3	.2	.7
Leafy, green, and yellow vegetables	Mil. lbs.	f/1,736.0	1,161.1	378.6	125.9	89.8	162.8	.1	2.1	5.7
Other than leafy, green, and yellow vegetables	Mil. lbs.	g/1,477.1	1,162.6	115.1	24.0	46.0	51.0	.1	3.8	16.8
Melons	Thous. tons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRY BEANS AND PEAS										
Dry beans	1,000 cwt.	11,500	3,600	6,100	200	3,000	2,600	300	1,200	600
Dry peas	1,000 cwt.	2,500	300	2,100	300	700	800	300	h/	100
GRAINS										
Wheat	Mil. bu.	96.0	52.8	21.2	i/	18.1	i/	3.1	17.5	4.5
Rye	Mil. bu.	1.2	.1	1.0	0	.5	0	.5	.1	0
Rice, milled	Mil. lbs.	1,046.0	118.2	237.6	71.1	98.6	45.5	22.4	360.0	330.2
Rice, rough	Mil. bu.	36.2	4.1	8.2	2.5	3.4	1.5	.8	12.5	11.4
Corn	Mil. bu.	28.9	3.9	16.8	11.5	0	4.6	.7	7.8	.4
Oats	Mil. bu.	11.8	2.9	8.0	k/	7.7	0	.3	.7	.2
Barley	Mil. bu.	4.5	.1	2.8	l/	1.3	1.4	.1	1.5	.1
SUGAR, BEET AND CANE	Thous. short tons raw	m/ 1,210	843	340	4	126	21	189	22	5

a/ Includes skim milk equivalent of cottage cheese.
b/ Included in Other Export figure.
c/ Eggs for drying at prospective level of production.

Non-civilian estimated requirements for 1945

d/ 1,000 pounds.
c/ Includes 106.6 million pounds contingency reserve.
f/ Includes 188.5 million pounds contingency reserve.
g/ Includes 278.8 million pounds contingency reserve.
h/ 60 thousand cwt.
i/ 7,000 bushels for British services.
j/ 50 million bushels for Liberated Areas held in Government stock.
k/ 19 bushels for British services.
l/ 4,000 bushels for British services.
m/ Includes direct and indirect.

Food Distribution Administration
Requirements and Allocations Control
October 28, 1943

Form No. ACP-8
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION

Appendix C - 8

Production Programs 194[illegible]
11-30-43

1944 State Goals of Selected Crops (1000 acres) 1/

State and Region	Corn	Oats	Barley	Sorghums (except syrup)	All tame hay	Soybeans	Peanuts grown alone	Flax seed	Rice	Dry beans	Dry field peas	Sugar beets	Irish potatoes	Sweet potatoes	Com. veg. Fresh	Com. veg. Processed	Wheat	Rye	Cotton	Tobacco	Sugar cane	Hemp seed & fiber	Cover crop seeds 2/	Broom corn	Flax fiber	Peanuts picked & threshed 3/	Total	State and Region
Maine	18	104	5	-	875		-		-	15	-	-	192	-	-	25.2	2		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,234.2	Maine
N. H.	17	15	-	-	345		-	-	-	-	-	-	10			.5	-	-	-	-	-		-		-	-	387.5	N. H.
Vt.	70	95	5	-	890		-	-	-	3	-	-	16	-	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	-		-		-	-	1,080.4	Vt.
Mass.	45	20	-	-	345		-	-	-	-	-	-	26	-	3.1	.7	-	-	-	5.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	445.6	Mass.
R. I.	9	3	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51.5	R. I.
Conn.	55	17	-	-	270	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	-	.2	-	-	-	15.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	380.7	Conn.
N. Y.	700	900	123	-	3,800	30	-	-		142	-	-	237		130.6	129.1	330	17	-	.8	-	-	2.0	-	-	-	6,541.5	N. Y.
N. J.	195	50	10	-	242	45	-	-		-	-	-	70	18	105.8	54.8	75	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	879.6	N. J.
Pa.	1,414	876	96	-	2,243	100	-	-		-		-	200	-	39.4	76.3	846	60	-	33.9	-	-	5.0	-	-	-	5,989.6	Pa.
N. E.	2,523	2,080	239	-	9,043	175				160			780.5	18	278.9	285.2	1,253	91		56.0			7.0				16,992.6	N. E.
Ill.	9,000	3,125	150	15	2,600	4,000	-	12	-	-	-	3	38	4	31.4	110.2	1,300	50	4	-	-	50	106.0	15	-	-	20,613.6	Ill.
Ind.	4,500	1,350	100	20	1,850	1,600	-	-	-	-	-	9	52	2	21.0	191.0	1,300	100	-	12.2	-	11	60.0	-	-	-	11,178.2	Ind.
Iowa	11,500	4,500	45	45	3,050	2,890	-	250	-	-	-	*5	57	2	4.5	76.4	200	10	-	-	-	55	237.0	-	-	-	22,926.9	Iowa
Mich.	2,000	1,200	250	-	2,700	150	-	5	-	1,000	4	135	245		39.0	69.0	750	60	-	-	-	-	46.0	-	-	-	8,653.0	Mich.
Minn.	5,700	4,000	1,400	20	3,177	300	-	1,800	-	25	-	30	285	-	7.7	149.1	1,200	123	-	.6	-	56	154.0	-	-	-	18,427.4	Minn.
Mo.	5,050	2,200	300	300	3,600	625	-	10	-	-	-	-	42	9	14.6	27.8	2,235	60	424	6.2	-	-	352.0	-	-	-	15,155.6	Mo.
Nebr.	9,000	1,875	2,125	800	1,000	100	-	12	-	100	-	65	100	-	-	6.1	3,400	410	-	-	-	-	31.0	-	-	-	19,024.1	Nebr.
Ohio	3,575	1,150	50	-	2,415	1,500	-	-	-	-	-	50	100		15.8	77.3	1,650	75	-	24.6	-	-	104.0	-	-	-	10,786.7	Ohio
S. Dak.	3,900	2,400	2,200	1,000	635	35	-	600	-	6	-	10	51	-	-	1.0	3,800	400	-	-	-	-	45.0	-	-	-	15,083.0	S. Dak.
Wis.	3,625	2,700	350	4	3,800	100	-	9	-	10	9	17	205	-	11.3	288.9	70	105	-	18.2	-	42	39.0	-	-	-	10,403.4	Wis.
N. C.	56,850	24,500	6,970	2,204	24,727	11,300		2,698		1,141	13	324	1,175.0	17	145.3	996.8	15,905	1,393	428	61.8		214	1,174.0	15			152,251.9	N. C.
Del.	143	4	9	-	71	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3.5	7.4	41.7	62	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	421.6	Del.
Md.	490	40	65	-	440	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	10	32.5	166.0	385	22	-	39.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,777.5	Md.
Va.	1,400	180	85	1	1,445	250	173	-	-	-	-	-	75	34	28.2	59.0	550	37	28	125.7	-	-	36.0	-	-	170	4,505.9	Va.
W. Va.	435	102	*12	-	810	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	2	-	2.0	130	4	-	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,544.0	W. Va.
N. C.	2,380	360	43	11	1,420	400	348	-	-	-	-	-	95	105	46.4	9.0	550	35	865	736.4	-	-	180.0	-	-	335	7,583.8	N. C.
Ky.	3,000	90	235	24	1,580	145	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	24	1.6	10.6	455	30	16	383.2	-	57	104.0	-	-	-	6,209.4	Ky.
Tenn.	2,884	238	143	51	2,035	150	20	-	-	-	-	-	57	60	12.7	27.2	430	32	792	136.1	-	-	165.5	-	-	20	7,232.5	Tenn.
E. C.	10,732	1,014	592	87	7,801	1,077	541						350.0	238.5	128.8	315.5	2,562	171	1,701	1,423.4		57	484.5			525	29,275.7	E. C.
Ala.	3,150	326	-	50	1,300	30	975	-	-	-	-	-	59	124	7.0	2.0	20	-	1,585	.3	-	-	53.0	-	-	750	7,681.3	Ala.
Ark.	2,175	400	20	125	1,400	375	150	-	260	-	-	-	55	35	15.6	66.8	35	-	2,000	-	-	-	12.0	-	-	106	7,124.4	Ark.
Fla.	775	40	-	10	160	-	300	-	-	-	-	-	35	30	185.0	27.0	-	-	46	20.0	33	-	-	-	-	150	1,661.0	Fla.
Ga.	3,700	800	10	60	1,800	17	1,500	-	-	-	-	-	35	140	51.0	*23.0	325	20	1,512	86.1	-	-	40.0	-	-	1,250	10,119.1	Ga.
La.	1,384	160	-	25	400	50	*58	-	640	-	-	-	60	125	36.0	7.0	-	-	1,029	-	300	-	-	-	-	30	4,279.0	La.
Miss.	2,950	426	28	35	1,108	205	81	-	-	-	-	-	36	100	29.0	12.5	12	-	2,630	-	-	-	20.0	-	-	60	7,672.5	Miss.
Okla.	2,000	1,300	450	2,020	1,400	12	1,000	70	-	-	-	-	45	15	13.5	27.5	5,800	90	1,600	-	-	-	-	164	-	170	14,007.0	Okla.
S. C.	1,450	872	27	21	1,290	15	110	-	-	-	-	-	40	95	56.6	9.1	318	31	1,155	108.0	-	-	65.0	-	-	100	5,662.7	S. C.
Tex.	5,575	1,900	600	7,000	1,600	28	1,315	38	400	30	-	-	75	100	268.7	39.8	5,000	15	8,050	-	-	-	-	30	-	1,250	32,064.5	Tex.
South.	23,157	6,224	1,135	9,346	10,458	732	5,459	108	1,300	30			440	764	662.4	214.7	11,510	156	19,607	214.4	333		190.0	194		4,566	92,266.5	South.
Ariz.	40	30	114	70	305	-	-	23	-	17	-	-	7	-	60.0	.1	25	-	180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	871.1	Ariz.
Calif.	80	470	1,700	180	1,740	-	3	280	225	500	-	160	90	16	290.0	186.6	700	10	265	-	-	-	28.0	-	-	3	6,923.6	Calif.
Colo.	1,050	200	900	865	975	-	-	-	-	500	52	175	90	-	47.5	19.1	1,650	60	-	-	-	-	10.0	90	-	-	6,683.6	Colo.
Idaho	50	150	325	-	1,012	-	-	2	-	185	313	70	180	-	11.3	8.0	1,000	5	-	-	-	-	9.0	-	-	-	3,320.3	Idaho
Kans.	3,640	1,550	1,500	3,250	1,000	350	-	250	-	8	-	9	33	3	.3	1.5	14,000	100	-	.2	-	-	107.0	38	-	-	25,940.0	Kans.
Mont.	225	450	550	15	1,350	-	-	435	-	35	60	80	22	-	-	5.5	4,100	410	-	-	-	-	14.0	-	-	-	7,371.5	Mont.
Nev.	4	10	25	-	192	-	-	-	-	*1	-	-	4	-	.2	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	256.2	Nev.
N. Mex.	220	35	30	550	200	-	11	-	-	300	-	-	4.8	-	14.2	4.7	400	10	96	-	-	-	-	69	-	11	1,944.7	N. Mex.
N. Dak.	1,400	1,900	2,400	150	1,000	10	-	2,000	-	5	10	15	200	-	-	-	10,000	300	-	-	-	-	22.0	-	-	-	19,412.0	N. Dak.
Oreg.	60	440	260	-	915	-	-	3	-	3	75	12	50	-	21.2	66.0	800	25	-	-	-	-	223.8	-	12	-	2,966.0	Oreg.
Utah	30	35	160	-	500	-	-	-	-	20	-	50	20	-	5.4	30.5	275	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,130.9	Utah
Wash.	40	250	350	-	1,000	-	-	2	-	5	370	14	51	-	23.2	64.9	2,300	20	-	-	-	-	24.6	-	-	-	4,514.7	Wash.
Wyo.	130	140	125	30	550	-	-	4	-	120	2	42	17	-	-	1.5	275	20	-	-	-	-	7.0	-	-	-	1,463.5	Wyo.
West	6,969	5,660	8,439	5,110	10,739	360	14	3,089	225	1,699	882	627	768.8	19	473.3	388.4	35,545	595	541	.2			445.4	197	12	14	82,798.1	West
																							31.0 (other States)				31.0	
Total	100,238	39,478	17,873	16,747	62,763	13,641	6,024	[illegible]	1,525	3,030	595	951	3,514.3	1,056.5	1,688.7	2,208.6	66,775	2,408	22,277	1,755.8	333	271	2,231.9	406	12	5,105	373,616.8	Total

1/ For a few States tentative goals were included in tabulation. (*) Indicates suggested acreage; no goal established.

2/ Includes: hairy vetch, common vetch, purple vetch, Austrian winter peas, Crimson Clover, common ryegrass, alsike clover, sweet clover, lespedeza and timothy.

3/ Peanuts picked & threshed; not included in state and national totals.

Appendix C

p. 2

Production Programs 1944
11-30-43

1944 State Goals of Livestock and Livestock Products 1/

State	Production per Cow (Lbs.)	Milk Cows on Farms (1,000)	Egg Production (Mil. Doz.)	Hens and Pullets (1,000)	Chickens on Farms (1,000)	Chicken Broilers (1,000)	Turkeys (1,000)	Sows to Farrow, Spring (1,000 Head)	Sows to Farrow, Fall (1,000 Head)	Cattle and Calves (1,000 Head)	Beef Cows (1,000 Head)	Sheep and Lambs (1,000 Head)	State
[illegible]	625	5,000	125	31.5	2,624	5,000	675	42	6	6	218	5	45	Maine
[illegible]	350	5,147	68	24	2,157	4,200	1180	62	2	2	118	1	9	N. H.
[illegible]	1,200	5,357	280	12	1,088	1,800	935	148	3	4	437	2	20	Vt.
[illegible]	840	6,000	140	62	5,191	10,000	2,327	210	14	11	201	1	8	Mass.
[illegible] I	140	6,364	22	6.2	552	1,000	169	24	1	1	29	-	2	R. I.
[illegible]	709	5,960	119	37	3,409	5,400	10,193	111	3	3	184	1	6	Conn.
[illegible] Y.	1443	5,453	1,365	175	16,921	25,000	4,574	371	35	39	2,188	7	358	N. Y.
[illegible] J.	1,015	6,591	154	78	8,060	11,000	1,808	134	14	12	212	1	7	N. J.
[illegible] a.	4,863	5,350	909	216	23,288	37,000	3,964	988	74	90	1,482	12	377	Pa.
[illegible] S.	17,485	5,495	3,182	641.7	63,285	100,400	25,825	2090	152	168	5,069	30	832	U. S.
Ill.	5,540	4,920	1,126	232	28,556	46,000	6,000	609	947	728	3,100	240	830	Ill.
Ind.	3,500	4,300	814	165	18,296	36,000	5,031	412	600	530	1,820	145	890	Ind.
Iowa	7,000	4,750	1,460	340	28,000	69,000	-	1,811	2,225	920	5,323	511	1,790	Iowa
Mich.	5,500	5,413	1,016	130	14,488	21,114	477	493	140	128	1,868	35	1,025	Mich.
Minn.	9,313	5,200	1,791	300	30,000	47,000	-	2500	910	350	3,793	114	1,400	Minn.
Mo.	4,066	3,800	1,070	237	26,332	43,000	2,000	1,300	540	480	3,375	650	1,825	Mo.
Nebr.	3,080	4,496	685	163	19,194	40,000	-	1,222	650	320	3,587	685	1,072	Nebr.
Ohio	5,011	5,511	1,101	230	25,246	38,000	3,281	822	460	440	2,213	85	2,260	Ohio
S. Dak.	1952	4000	488	95	10,914	21,000	-	1,000	475	125	2,126	400	2,400	S. Dak.
[illegible]	14,477	5,880	2,465	196	20,752	28,000	1,591	499	384	208	3,883	22	490	[illegible]
N. C.	59,439	4,947	12,016	2,088	231,778	389,114	18,380	10,668	7,331	4,229	31,088	2887	13,982	N. C.
Del.	149	4,250	35	10	1,214	3,200	50,000	80	3.4	3	60	2	2	Del.
Md.	953	4,670	204	34	3,800	8,500	18,000	380	29	32	343	10	57	Md.
Va.	1,591	3,600	442	84	10,085	18,000	14,000	805	96	102	1,000	82	375	Va.
W. Va.	850	3,527	241	44	4,806	5,600	6,063	235	22	30	614	56	450	W. Va.
N. C.	1,639	4,017	408	86	12,738	30,000	18,140	240	140	130	854	35	58	N. C.
Ky.	2,250	3,695	609	112	13,000	28,000	1,144	224	150	150	1,420	103	1,080	Ky.
Tenn.	3,200	3,571	616	97.5	12,000	21,000	2,237	190	165	160	1,406	130	435	Tenn.
S. C.	9632	3,770	2,555	467.5	57,643	114,300	10,584	2,154	6034	607	5647	418	2,457	S. C.
Ala.	1,309	3,200	409	64	8,337	16,000	-	162	135	140	1,153	164	44	Ala.
Ark.	1,548	3,097	500	63	9,877	17,000	10,175	121	154	142	1,374	160	112	Ark.
Fla.	347	3,200	109	19	2,605	5,300	4,447	110	105	86	1,050	454	23	Fla.
Ga.	1,163	3,243	359	58	9,504	18,000	14,025	146	255	215	1,052	150	18	Ga.
[illegible]	• 753	• 2,338	• 322	• 32.5	• 5,695	• 11,000	• 1,069	• 65	142	121	1,333	360	• 282	[illegible]
[illegible]	1,400	2,656	527	52	8,316	19,500	1,377	126	110	108	1,400	191	80	[illegible]
[illegible]	2921	3,350	872	132	16,348	26,000	2,486	473	126	143	2,678	525	340	[illegible]
S. C.	650	3,693	176	30	4750	11,650	2,600	180	83	81	382	27	4	[illegible]
Tex.	4639	3,238	1,441	272	35,997	51,000	9,656	3836	310	295	7,515	2,220	9900	Tex.
South.	14,750	3,132	4,715	723.5	101,429	175,450	45,835	5,719	1,420	1,331	17,437	4,251	10,803	South.
Ariz.	280	5,385	52	6.8	768	1,100	634	90	7	7	900	415	700	Ariz.
Calif.	5062	6,850	739	176.7	16,637	25,000	7,500	3,445	86	95	2,400	515	2700	Calif.
Colo.	1130	4,848	231	39	4,794	7,000	-	878	66	48	1,636	505	2,550	Colo.
Idaho	1,450	5,664	256	25	2,952	4,700	-	246	60	45	874	135	1,450	Idaho
Kans.	3560	4,300	828	184	20,687	35,000	855	977	250	200	3,364	595	1,080	Kans.
Mont.	800	4,790	167	21	2,356	4,619	-	276	76	34	1,439	500	3,337	Mont.
Nev.	112	5,500	20	2.8	304	500	-	31	3	2	411	170	716	Nev.
N. Mex.	239	3,500	74	12	1,461	1,600	-	50	11	10	1,112	544	1,975	N. Mex.
N. Dak.	2178	4048	543	53	6,500	12,000	-	906	200	40	1,730	185	1,150	N. Dak.
Oreg.	1318	5,372	250	40	4,035	5,900	300	1,917	41	30	984	230	1,270	Oreg.
Utah	665	5,885	113	21	2,930	4,600	-	1,234	21	16	473	112	2,470	Utah
Wash.	2,004	5,800	349	76	7,532	9,500	1,091	1,110	47	38	907	113	580	Wash.
Wyo.	215	4,565	70	8.7	1,002	2,200	-	250	16	10	943	375	3,840	Wyo.
West	17,193	5,198	3,672	676.0	71,758	113,719	10,380	11,410	884	575	17,173	4,774	23,818	West

1/ For a few States tentative goals were included in tabulations. (•) Indicates suggested goal; no goal established.

Total	120,499	4,606	26,160	4596.7	526,093	892,983	210,004	32,041	10,924	6,910	76,964	11,980	51,892

APPENDIX D

1943 SUPPORT PRICES

Commodity	Price Support
Hogs	Average for good-to-choice butcher hogs at Chicago: $13.75 per cwt. for hogs weighing 200-270 pounds, through September 30, 1944; $12.50 per cwt. for hogs weighing 190-230 pounds, October 1, 1944-March 31, 1945. (USDA 533-44)
Eggs.....	Purchased on offer-and-acceptance basis equivalent to not less than 30 cents per dozen in spring and early summer, and an annual average price of 34 cents, basis U.S.average farm price, effective through June 30, 1944. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42)
Butter.....	46 cents per pound for 92 score, Chicago basis, effective through June 30,1944. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42)
Cheese.....	Equivalent of 27 cents per pound, including subsidy for U.S. No. 1 American cheese, Plymouth basis, effective through June 30, 1944. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42)
Dry skim and evaporated milk.....	12.5 cents per pound for roller and 14.5 for spray process, extra grade, f.o.b. plant, Mid-West basis, with support prices for evaporated milk about in line with prices for butter and dry skim milk, effective through June 30, 1944. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42)
Chickens.....	90 percent of parity, excluding broilers or chickens weighing less than 3 pounds, effective through June 30, 1944. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42)
Turkeys.....	90 percent of parity, effective through June 30, 1944. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42)
Soybeans for oil.....	For 1943 crop: $1.67-$1.86 per bushel, U.S. average farm price, for yellow or green soybeans of high oil content, with price of $1.80 for No. 2 yellow, 14 percent moisture content, and storage allowance of 7 cents per bushel, on farm-stored seed under CCC loan. (USDA 1762-43, 2063-43)
Flaxseed for oil.....	For 1943 crop: $2.85 per bushel, basis No. 1 at Minneapolis, with storage allowance of 7 cents per bushel on farm-stored seed under CCC loan. (USDA 2063-43)

Commodity	Price Support
Cottonseed.....	For 1943 crop: $55 per ton, f.o.b. shipping point, Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico; $56, other States. (USDA 223-44)
Peanuts.....	For 1943 crop: Support prices Virginia and Spanish types all uses average $140 per ton; runner type, $130. Adjustments for grade. Uniform price to all farmers for peanuts of like type or grade within each area or region. (USDA 2063-43)
Dry beans..... (Designated classes; pea; medium white; great northern; small and flat small white; pink; pinto; cranberry; small red; light, dark, and western red kidney; lima, and baby lima)	For 1943 crop: $6.50 per cwt. for U.S. No. 1; $6.35, U.S. No. 2; in bags, f.o.b. country shipping points, except $7.50 per cwt. for U.S. No. 1 and $7.35 for U.S. No. 2 lima; baby lima; light, dark, and western red kidney. Loan on thresher-run dry edible beans, all classes except tepary and mixed, at $5.50 per cwt. for U.S. No. 1; $5.35, U.S. No. 2; and $5.10 U.S. No. 3. (USDA 2138-43)
Dry peas:	
Smooth types..... (Designated classes: Alaska, Scotch green, first and best, marrowfat, white Canada)	For 1943 crop: $5.65 per cwt. for U.S. No. 1 and $5.40 for U.S. No. 2, in bags, f.o.b. carrier at country shipping points. Loan on thresher-run smooth dry edible peas of $4.50 per cwt. for U.S. No. 1 and $4.25 for U.S. No. 2. (USDA 1475-43, 2063-43)
Wrinkled types..... (Designated classes: alderman, perfection, profusion, surprise, Thomas Laxton)	For 1943 crop: $4.25 per cwt. for U.S. No. 1; $4.00, U.S. No. 2; in bags, f.o.b. carrier at country shipping points, for peas grown for canning purposes under contracts approved by State War Boards but which, for various reasons, will not be canned. (USDA 1475-43)
Blackeye (South).....	For 1943 crop: $5.75 per cwt. for U.S. No. 1, cleaned, bagged, and delivered to designated points; $5.60, U.S. No. 2; and $5.35, U.S. No. 3. (USDA 2063-43)
American-Egyptian and Sea Island cotton.....	For 1943 crop: American-Egyptian, 48 cents per pound net weight for No. 2 1$\frac{1}{2}$-inch cotton. (USDA 1290-43) Sea Island 56-70 cents per

Commodity	Price Support
American-Egyptian and Sea Island cotton (Con't.)..	pound (Puerto Rican) and 48-59 cents (Mainland). (USDA 1418-43)
Cotton, corn, wheat, tobacco, and rice.....	Farmers cooperating in the agricultural conservation program will be eligible for loans equivalent to 90 percent of parity (or 85 percent in the case of corn and wheat) as of the 15th of the month preceding the beginning of the marketing year as provided in the Agricultural Act of 1938, as amended. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42). Loan rate for 1943 cotton, 19.26 cents per pound for middling 15/16-inch, gross weight. (USDA 272-44) Loan rate for 1943 wheat, average of $1.23 per bushel at the farm. (USDA 2712-43)
White potatoes.....	For 1943 crop: 90 percent of parity as calculated at the beginning of the marketing year, but not less than specified prices for certain grades of potatoes in specified commercial areas, and 50 cents per bushel on normal yield of acreage planted to potatoes in excess of 90 percent of the farm goal, up to 110 percent of the goal, effective on acreage planted after February 1, 1943. (USDA unnumbered release, 11-27-42)
Sweetpotatoes.....	For 1943 crop: $1.15 per bushel, August-November; $1.30, December-January; $1.45, February-April; for U.S. No. 1 packed in bushel crates, baskets or hampers. U.S. No. 2 containing at least 75 percent U.S. No. 1, 15 cents under price for U.S. No. 1. For U.S. No. 1 or better, cured, properly packed in bushel crates, baskets or hampers, $1.50 during Jan. 1944; $1.65, February. (USDA 404-44)
Vegetables for fresh consumption.....	For 1943 crop: $50 per acre for each acre over 90 percent of the farm goal (for carrots, snap beans, lima beans, beets, tomatoes, cabbage, onions, and green peas as a group) up to 110 percent of goal. (USDA 2063-43)

Commodity	Price Support
Canning crops.....	For 1943 crop: Minimum support prices will be paid on acreage contracted with certified canners at following levels (prices on national basis; will vary by States): tomatoes, $24.25 per ton; green peas, $81.50; sweet corn, $18; snap beans, $91; lima beans, $90-$115; beets, $19-$21; carrots, $20-$22; cabbage for kraut, $12. (USDA 1844-43)
Canned vegetables.....	For 1943 pack: 95 percent of canners' net ceiling prices until mid-1944 for canned tomatoes, tomato juice, tomato pulp, tomato paste, sweet corn, snap beans, green peas, lima beans, beets, and carrots. (USDA 64-44)
Apples, for processing.....	For 1943 crop: Apple products will be purchased from certified processors paying the following prices per hundred pounds for apples: U.S. No. 1 cannery grade, 2¼-inch and up (and "C" grade, Washington and Oregon), $3.10 for Class A and $2.50 for Class B; U.S. No. 2 cannery grade, 2¼-inch and up, $1.65 for Class A and $1.50 for Class B; ciders, $1.00. (USDA 591-44)
Apricots, for canning.....	For 1943 crop: $95 per ton, roadside. (USDA 2469-43)
Figs, for processing.....	For 1943 crop: For canning: Kadotas, $125 per ton. For drying: Calimyrnas (basis 75 percent test), $380 per ton; Adriatic (basis 80 percent test), $250; Kadotas, tree-picked (basis 90 percent test), $240; Kadotas, natural (basis 85 percent test), $230; Black Mission (basis 85 percent test), $200. (OPA-2956)
Dried fruits:	
Apricots.....	Natural-condition, 1943 crop: Average of 32 cents per pound. (USDA 2469-43)
Peaches.....	Natural-condition, 1943 crop: Freestone, $440 per ton; clingstone, $330. (USDA 176-44)
Pears.....	For 1943 crop: Lake County quality, $360 per ton; others, $330. (USDA 176-44)

Commodity	Price Support
Prunes.....	Natural-condition, 1943 crop: California, 3-district, 8½ cents per lb. basis (80 prunes a lb.); California "outside" district, Washington, and Oregon, 8½ cents. (USDA 243-44)
Raisins.....	Natural-condition, 1943 crop: Thompson seedless, $155 per ton; Muscats, $165; Sultanas, $150. (USDA 243-44) Dehydrated: golden-bleached, sulphur-bleached, and soda-dipped Thompson seedless, $195 per ton; Valencia or dehydrated Muscats, $205; so-called Zante currants, $215; tray slip Muscats, $180. (USDA 383-44)
Grain sorghums.....	For 1943 crop: U.S. No. 2 or better, 85 cents per bushel; U.S. No. 3, 80 cents; U.S. No. 4, 70 cents; except Arizona and California 5 cents higher. (USDA 1775-43)
Hemp.....	Prices will be supported for hemp and hemp seed grown under contract, 1943 crop. (USDA 1287-43; 1953-43)
Castor beans.....	For a small acreage: 6 cents per pound for beans in the hull that shell 70 percent, 1943 crop. (USDA 1615-43)
Wool.....	1943 clip will be purchased at ceiling prices. (USDA 2026-43)
Barley.....	For 1943 crop: From 60 cents per bushel for U.S. No. 5 to 75 cents for U.S. No. 1, with rates 5 cents higher on Pacific Coast. (USDA 1775-43)
Sugar beets.....	For 1943 crop: Producers assured $1.50 per ton more than they received for 1942 beets of standard quality (16.5% sucrose). Returns should average around $11 per ton. (USDA 1571-43)
Gum naval stores.....	For 1943 season: Loan and purchase rates for turpentine, 64 and 68 cents per gallon, respectively. For rosin, loan rates from $3.70 per cwt. net for X grade to $3.25 for G grade, average of $3.50; purchase rates same grades, $4.04-$3.59 with an average of $3.84. (USDA 295-44)

Commodity	Price Support
Hay and pasture seeds.....	For 1943 crop, support loans or purchases are offered for 30 hay and pasture seeds, including alfalfa; several varieties of clover and lespedeza; timothy; smooth bromegrass; crested, western, and slender wheatgrass; blue and side oats grama; orchard, buffalo, bermuda, dallis, and behia grass, meadow fescue; blue lupine; and wild winter peas. (USDA 1593-43, 2249-43, 2691-43)

APPENDIX E

1944
IMPORT PROGRAM

Commodity	Country	Rating	Quota
Anchovies in brine.....	Chile	B-3	100
	Uruguay	B-3	100
Anchovies in oil.....	Chile	B-3	50
Animal Fats & Greases.... (free fatty acids)	Australia	B-3	1,000
Annatto & Extract.....	Br. W. Indies	B-3	400
	Dom. Republic	B-3	200
	Ecuador	B-3	250
Babassu Kernels.....	Brazil	B-1	30,000
Babassu Nut Oil.....	Brazil	A-3	500
Beans and Peas, dried....	Brazil	B-3	30,000
	Chile	B-2	50,000
Beef, canned, incl..... corned beef (for Army, Navy and Maritime uses only)	Argentina	B-1	22,000
	Brazil	B-1	10,000
	Uruguay	B-1	20,000
Beef Extract.....	Argentina	B-3	1,400
	Brazil	B-3	300
	Paraguay	B-3	200
	Uruguay	B-3	800
Cashew Nut Kernels 1/....	India	B-3	4,000
Cashew Nut Shell Liquid..	Brazil	A-2	500
	Haiti	A-2	50
	India	A-2	3,500
Castor Beans.....	Brazil	A-3	160,000
		B-3	20,000
	Central America	A-3	1,000
	Dom.Republic,incl. Haiti	A-3	3,500
	Ecuador	A-3	1,000
	Mexico	A-3	10,000
Cocoa Beans.....	Brazil	B-2	70,000
		B-3	40,000
	Br. W. Indies	B-2	10,000
	Costa Rica	B-2	2,500
	Dom. Republic	B-2	22,000
	Ecuador	B-2	15,000
	Guatemala	B-2	300
	Haiti	B-2	1,000
	Nicaragua	B-2	200

1/ To be certified by FEA. Oil to be provided pound for pound.

Commodity	Country	Rating	Quota
Cocoa Beans (Continued)	Oceania (Br.W.Samoa)	B-2	500
	Panama	B-2	2,500
	Venezuela	B-2	15,000
	West Africa	B-2	100,000
		B-3	30,000
Cocoa Butter.....	Brazil	B-3	2,000 1/
Coconut Oil.....	Ceylon	B-1	25,000 2/
Cod Oil.....	Newfoundland	B-1	2,000
Coffee.....	Brazil	B-2	602,839
	Colombia	B-2	204,188
	Costa Rica	B-2	12,964
	Cuba	B-2	5,186
	Dom. Republic	B-2	7,779
	Ecuador	B-2	9,706
	El Salvador	B-2	38,893
	Guatemala	B-2	34,679
	Haiti	B-2	17,826
	Honduras	B-2	1,296
	Mexico (West Coast)	B-2	20,000
	Nicaragua	B-2	12,640
	Peru	B-2	1,621
	Venezuela	B-2	27,225
Cohune Kernels.....	Br. Honduras	B-1	1,000
Copra.....	Oceania (Fiji Islands, Samoa, New Hebrides, and Tahiti)	B-1	60,000
	Central America	B-1	1,000
	Ceylon	B-1	85,000
Cotton..... 1-11/16" staple and over	Puerto Rico	A-2	400
	Br.W. Indies	A-2	300
Cotton, staple "good".. grade, "fully good" or better, 1's & 2's, Giza 7, Sakha 4, Malaki & Karnak	Egypt, incl. Sudan	B-2	12,500
Cottonseed Oil Cake.... and Meal	Argentina	B-3	2,000
	Brazil	B-1	50,000
		B-3	50,000
Cottonseed Soap Stock..	Argentina	B-3	500
Fish, Cod, dry salted..	Canada	A-3	4,000
	Newfoundland	A-3	7,000
Fish, Cod, wet salted..	Iceland	A-3	250
	Newfoundland	A-3	2,000

1/ Not more than 1,000 tons to be moved in any one month.
2/ To be shipped in deep tanks not suitable for other cargo, or in tankers.

Commodity	Country	Rating	Quota
Fish, Halibut.....	Greenland	B-3	25
Fish, Herring, salt....	Canada	B-3	1,000
	Iceland	B-3	3,000
	Newfoundland	B-3	10,000
Fish, Sardines, in oil.	Chile	B-2	100
Fish, Tuna and Bonito..	Chile	B-2	250
fresh, frozen,	Costa Rica	B-2	1,500
canned, salted	Peru	B-2	500
Fish and Fish Products.	Alaska	A-3	130,000
Fish Livers.....	Alaska	A-3	25
	Brazil	A-3	100
	Caribbean Area	A-3	75
	Central America	A-3	75
	Chile	A-3	300
	Colombia	A-3	300
	Greenland	A-3	25
	Peru	A-3	300
Fish Liver Oils.....	Canada (Atlantic)	A-2	1,225
(Cod, Halibut, Tuna,	Caribbean Area	A-2	50
Shark, Dogfish,etc.)	Central America (incl.Mexico)	A-2	50
	Greenland	A-2	75
	Iceland	A-2	2,500
	Newfoundland	A-2	1,500
	Oceania	A-2	150
	South Africa	A-2	200
	Venezuela	A-2	35
Flax, line fiber only..	Argentina	A-3	300
(Flax, hackled,incl.	Brazil	A-3	200
"Dressed line", and	Chile	A-3	200
Flax, not hackled)	Peru	A-3	2,000
Garlic.....	Argentina	B-3	700
	Chile	B-3	530
Glycerin, crude and....	Argentina (incl.		
refined	Uruguay)	A-2	3,000
	Brazil	A-2	200
	Cuba	A-2	2,000
Honey.....	Argentina	B-3	3,000
	Brazil	B-3	450
	Chile	B-3	900
	Hawaii	B-3	675
Lentils.....	Chile	B-3	1,500
Licorice Root.....	Iran	B-3	)
	Iraq	B-3	)
	Syria	B-3	7,000)
	Turkey	B-3	)

Commodity	Country	Rating	Quota
Linseed.....	Argentina	B-1	200,000
		B-3	175,000
Linseed Oil Cake.....	Australia	B-3	2,500
Muru Muru Nut Oil and.... Kernels	Brazil	B-2	1,000
Neatsfoot Oil.....	Argentina (incl. Brazil and Uruguay)	B-1	2,000
Oleic Acid.....	Argentina	B-1	2,000
Oils, edible and dena-... tured (incl.corn, cottonseed, linseed, peanut, and sun-flower)	Argentina	B-3	168,000 1/
	Brazil	B-3	4,000 1/
Oiticica Oil.....	Brazil	A-3	8,000
Onions.....	Argentina	B-3	3,000
	Australia	B-3	1,300
	Chile	B-3	7,000
	Cuba	B-3	300
Ouricury Kernels.....	Brazil	B-1	5,000
Palm Kernels.....	Liberia	B-1	4,000
	West Africa	B-2	20,000
		B-3	24,000
Palm Oil.....	West Africa (incl. Belgian Congo and Nigeria)	B-1	30,000
Peanuts, shelled.....	Fr. W. Africa	B-3	50,000
Pimientos, canned.....	Argentina	B-3	100
Pineapple, canned.....	Hawaii	B-1	234,000
Pineapple, fresh.....	Hawaii	B-1	5,500
Pineapple Juice.....	Hawaii	B-1	140,000
Pyrethrum Flowers.....	Belgian Congo	A-1	1,000
	Brazil	A-1	700
	Br. East Africa	A-1	5,000

1/ In deep tanks not suitable for dry cargo or in tankers.

Commodity	Country	Rating	Quota
Rapeseed Oil.....	Argentina	A-3	8,500
Rice, broken.....	Argentina	B-2	550
Rice, other than brewers'.....	Nicaragua	B-2	2,500
Rotenone-bearing Roots.	Peru and Brazil	A-1	4,000
Sausage Casings, Beef...	Argentina	B-3	5,000
	Brazil	B-3	1,250
	Paraguay	B-3	625
	Uruguay	B-3	1,625
Sausage Casings,..... Sheep, Lamb and Goat	Algeria	B-2	50
	Argentina & Uruguay	B-2	800
	Australia	B-2	1,000
	Chile	B-2	250
	Egypt (incl.Palestine)	B-2	50
	India (incl.Afghanistan)	B-2	300
	Iran	B-2	400
	Iraq	B-2	250
	Fr. Morocco	B-2	50
	New Zealand	B-2	1,200
	Peru	B-2	30
	Russia	B-2	300
	South Africa	B-2	50
	Syria	B-2	125
	Tunisia	B-2	50
	Turkey	B-2	100
Seal Oil.....	Iceland, (incl.Greenland)	B-1	600
Sesame Seed.....	Brazil	B-1	1,000
	Central America	B-1	5,000
Stearic Acid.....	Argentina	B-1	1,000
Sugar, cane, raw and... refined, for human consumption	Caribbean, general (incl.Central America)	B-1	3,660,000
	Hawaii	B-3	715,000
	Br. Oceania, Australia, and Fiji Islands	B-1	45,000
Tallow, inedible,..... beef and mutton	Argentina	B-2	10,000
	Australia	B-2	13,000
	New Zealand	B-2	30,000
Tankage (incl. blood... albumen, greave cake, livermeal and bone ash)	Argentina	B-1	70,000
	Australia	B-1	6,000
	Brazil	B-1	31,000
	Cuba	B-1	2,500
	New Zealand	B-1	2,000
	Uruguay	B-1	25,000

Commodity	Country	Rating	Quota
Tankage, Whale.....	Chile	B-3	15,000
Tea, black or green.....	Ceylon and India	B-2	45,000
Tobacco.....	South Rhodesia	B-3	800
	Syria	B-3	3,000
	Turkey	B-3	28,000
Tomato paste.....	Argentina	B-3	2,000
Tonka Beans.....	Brazil	B-3	200
Tucum Nut Oil and Kernels.....	Brazil	B-2	1,000
Tung Oil (Chinawood Oil).....	Argentina	A-1	700
	Brazil	A-1	100
	India (from China)	A-1	1,000 1/
Vanilla Beans.....	Fr. Eq. Africa	B-3	10
	Fr. West Indies	B-3	10
	Madagascar (incl. Reunion)	B-3	360
	Oceania	B-3	60
Whale Oil.....	Chile	B-1	4,000

1/ To be flown from China to India; to be shipped by boat from India to U.S.

Appendix G-1

FORM IC-41
(5-24-43)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

CLAIMANT AGENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROLLED MATERIALS AND ADVANCE ALLOTMENTS

Reproduced for internal use only - not to be used in obtaining data from business or the public.

CLAIMANT AGENCY: WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATION — IC-41

REPORT FOR QUARTER, 194

PROGRAM			CARBON STEEL INCLUDING CASTINGS (Short tons)	ALLOY STEEL INCLUDING CASTINGS (Short tons)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY SHEET AND STRIP (000 Pounds)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY ROD, BAR, WIRE (000 Pounds)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY TUBING AND PIPE (000 Pounds)	COPPER BRASS-MILL PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	COPPER WIRE-MILL PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	COPPER AND ALLOY FOUNDRY PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	ALUMINUM PRODUCTS TOTAL (000 Pounds)
SYMBOL (1)	DESCRIPTION (2)		REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (3)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (4)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (5)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (6)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (7)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (8)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (9)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (10)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (11)
	FARM MACHINERY -DOMESTIC USE										
450	Agricultural Machinery (earth working, fertilizing, spraying, etc).	1943	222,070	3624	195	333	263	16	5	426	3
		1944	307,245	2923	150	286	323	10	4	473	5
451	Agricultural Machinery (harvesting, haying, Farm elevators)	1943	213,164	1894	143	8	60	72	9	101	1
		1944	328,675	1797	311	13	34	45	49	154	1
452	Agricultural Machinery (farm wagons and trucks, irrigating equipment, farm pumps, etc.)	1943	40,567	278	116	268	110	202	69	759	2
		1944	52,680	252	47	494	199	31	62	1720	-
453	Agricultural Machinery (barnyard and poultry, farm and dairy equipment, etc.)	1943	108,494	577	752	589	239	176	525	1024	12
		1944	100,408	708	1,429	643	193	257	1,056	1183	19
471	Agricultural Machinery Tractors, wheel type	1943	119,728	31,579	1,806	102	35	246	301	285	30
		1944	129,181	34,564	2,228	154	54	317	477	346	56
813	Repair Parts	1943	191,827	13,134	480	489	537	242	182	1768	142
		1944	184,000	10,476	1,323	1,062	669	338	462	2200	13
	TOTAL	1943	895,850	51,086	3,492	1,789	1244	954	1,091	4363	190
		1944	1,102,189	50,720	5,488	2,652	1472	998	2,110	6076	94

NOTE - 1943 data partially estimated and a 10% reduction has been taken arbitrarily to account for export. 1944 data obviously are preliminary and do not include the recent additional quantity to implement the tractor program.

FOLD HERE FOR INSERTION IN STANDARD TYPEWRITER

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REFER TO (Name) | ADDRESS (Street, City, State) | TELEPHONE EXT. | SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL | DATE FILED

Appendix G p-2

FORM IC-41 (5-24-43)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

CLAIMANT AGENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROLLED MATERIALS AND ADVANCE ALLOTMENTS

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CLAIMANT AGENCY: WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATION — IC-41

REPORT FOR: QUARTER, 194

PROGRAM			CARBON STEEL INCLUDING CASTINGS (Short tons)	ALLOY STEEL INCLUDING CASTINGS (Short tons)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY SHEET AND STRIP (000 Pounds)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY ROD, BAR, WIRE (000 Pounds)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY TUBING AND PIPE (000 Pounds)	COPPER BRASS-MILL PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	COPPER WIRE-MILL PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	COPPER AND ALLOY FOUNDRY PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	ALUMINUM PRODUCTS TOTAL (000 Pounds)
SYMBOL (1)	DESCRIPTION (2)		REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (3)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (4)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (5)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (6)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (7)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (8)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (9)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (10)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (11)
	Programmed B. Products										
200	Baking Machinery	1943	5,221.0	123.0	8.7	5.6	8.8	2.8	14.8	161.0	3.6
		1944	12,700.0	422.0	29.6	14.1	17.9	5.5	58.4	653.0	69.2
201	Canning Plant Machinery	1943	6,215.0	300.0	34.8	63.2	36.7	53.9	10.1	321.3	28.6
		1944	7,104.0	122.6	27.6	230.9	22.6	32.1	1.6	553.6	240.6
202	Cereal Manufacturing Machinery	1943	3,307.0	79.0	3.2	8.9	3.4	10.0	8.4	22.3	.5
		1944	6,926.0	459.5	69.8	11.8	26.0	129.0	11.2	124.8	.8
203	Dairy & Milk Processing Machinery	1943	5,980.0	1,194.0	35.8	137.4	124.5	341.9	16.1	846.3	12.1
		1944	10,710.7	2,941.9	13.3	422.4	364.7	518.7	20.3	3,386.2	49.9
204	Meat Packing House Machinery	1943	4,780.0	93.0	4.8	9.3	2.5	3.9	8.9	47.0	20.1
		1944	9,597.7	432.6	5.0	6.6	4.4	10.8	40.9	61.	90.2
205	Sugar Mill & Refining Machinery	1943	505.0	31.0	5.9	5.2	11.8	47.5	4.2	31.5	-
		1944	1,500.0	72.7	12.7	5.7	39.3	99.4	21.8	39.4	-
206	Cotton Ginning & Delinting Machinery 1/	1943	5,334.0	10.9		.1	.6	.7	.1	5.7	3.5
		1944	9,440.0	90.0	.8	2.0	1.0	5.8	.3	17.4	10.8
247	Animal, Vegetable and Fish Oil Machinery	1943	2,702.0	288.0	9.5	7.8	8.1	.4	.8	29.9	.5
		1944	5,524.0	302.0	18.3	.4	4.0	53.6	9.0	14.0	-
676	Fishing Equipment, Commercial	1943	502.0	7.5	16.8	27.3	6.7	-	.3	10.2	-
		1944	2,201.0	20.0	126.3	89.3	15.2	33.7	6.2	39.3	-
560	Marine Diesel Engines	1943	601.0 2/	58.4	3.0	6.7	6.7	7.3	.3	43.3	15.9
		1944	4,400.0	440.0	22.0	45.6	41.2	44.0	3.6	324.0	83.2
	TOTAL	1943	35,147.0	2,184.8	122.5	271.5	209.8	468.4	64.0	1,518.5	84.8
		1944	70,103.4	5,303.3	325.4	82 88	536.3	932 6	173.3	5,213.1	544.7

1/ No allotment data for 2nd and 3rd Quarters.
2/ No allotment data for Second Quarter.

All figures for 1943 are for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Quarters only and include allotments used by all claimant agencies for these quarters. Since we do not have accurate records concerning first quarter allotments to W.F.A., it is believed that the portion used by other claimant agencies roughly compensates for this and the figures above substantially represent W.F.A. use for 1943. The 1944 figures represent amounts requested by W.F.A.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REFER TO (Name) | ADDRESS (Street, City, State) | TELEPHONE EXT. | SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL | DATE FILED

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Appendix G p-3

FORM IC-41
15-24-43I

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

CLAIMANT AGENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROLLED MATERIALS AND ADVANCE ALLOTMENTS

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CLAIMANT AGENCY: WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATION — IC-41

REPORT FOR: QUARTER, 19

PROGRAM			CARBON STEEL INCLUDING CASTINGS (Short tons)	ALLOY STEEL INCLUDING CASTINGS (Short tons)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY SHEET AND STRIP (000 Pounds)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY ROD, BAR, WIRE (000 Pounds)	COPPER-BASE ALLOY TUBING AND PIPE (000 Pounds)	COPPER BRASS-MILL PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	COPPER WIRE-MILL PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	COPPER AND ALLOY FOUNDRY PRODUCTS (000 Pounds)	ALUMINUM PRODUCTS TOTAL (000 Pounds)
SYMBOL (1)	DESCRIPTION (2)		REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (3)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (4)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (5)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (6)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (7)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (8)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (9)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (10)	REQUIREMENTS ADV. ALLOTMENTS (11)
C	CONTAINTERS AND CLOSURES										
627	Fluid Milk Shipping Containers	1943	27,625								
		1944	28,100								
629	Metal Cans	1943	1,655,309								
		1944	1,946,427								
639	Metal Closures (home)	1943	81,152								
		1944	90,000								
640	Metal Closures (commercial)	1943	95,000								
		1944	109,000								
624	Metal crowns Other Than Beverage	1943	1,500								
		1944	1,500								
	CLASS A PRODUCTS										
	I Regular										
	3216 - New Fishing Boats	1943 1/	3,372.5	157.6	92.3	759.2	67.8	25.0	35.4	298.7	33.2
		1944	4,906.5	100.1	35.7	200.9	114.3	39.4	91.8	402.7	.9
	3214 - Tobacco on Farm	1943	2,908.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		1944	3,300.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

1/ Data for 1st Quarter not available. Allotments for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Quarters adjusted to cover the entire year.

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